



Moving Beyond Nuclear Deterrence

to a Nuclear
Weapons Free
World

Nuclear Abolition Forum

Dialogue on the Process to Achieve and Sustain a Nuclear Weapons Free World

The Nuclear Abolition Forum strives to foster debate on key legal, technical, institutional and political elements for achieving the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons under a Nuclear Weapons Convention or package of agreements, as well as the process to achieving this. To this end, the Forum offers a dedicated website and a periodical to facilitate dialogue between academics, governments, disarmament experts and NGOs on such elements. The Forum is a joint project of eight leading organizations on disarmament and nonproliferation issues.

For more information about Nuclear Abolition Forum, visit [**abolitionforum.org**](http://abolitionforum.org).

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Dialogue on the Process to Achieve and Sustain a Nuclear Weapons Free World

C/o **World Future Council**

100 Pall Mall, SW1Y 5NQ

London, United Kingdom

Tel.: +44 (0) 20 7321 3810

Fax: +44 (0) 20 7321 3738

Email: rob.vanriet@worldfuturecouncil.org

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Cover: "Cat's Cradle/String Theory" (oil on canvas, 36" x 48"), 2008, by Baila Goldenthal.

Design by Jana Jedličková.

Moving Beyond Nuclear Deterrence to a Nuclear Weapons Free World

Nuclear Abolition Forum · Issue No. 2

CONTRIBUTORS

Ward Wilson · Christopher Ford · Paul Quilès · Bruno Tertrais · Sheel Kant Sharma ·
Manpreet Sethi · Alyn Ware · Kiho Yi · Hiromishi Umebayashi · Nobuyasu Abe ·
Hirofumi Tosaki · Bill Kidd · John Ainslie · Uta Zapf · Jonathan Granoff · Rob van Riet ·
David Krieger · Richard Falk · Teresa Bergman

GUEST CO-EDITORS

Marc Finaud · Paul Meyer · Manpreet Sethi · Alyn Ware

EDITOR

Rob van Riet



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Sustain a Nuclear Weapons Free World**

NUCLEAR ABOLITION FORUM

Issue No. 2 · April 2013

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About the Nuclear Abolition Forum

The Nuclear Abolition Forum: *Dialogue on the Process to Achieve and Sustain a Nuclear Weapons Free World*, was launched in 2011 to facilitate and promote discussion on key issues related to the achievement and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons. Founded by Alyn Ware, the Forum is a joint project of eight leading organizations in the disarmament field* and is able to rely on about seventy high-level consultants to ensure quality contributions.

The vision for a nuclear weapons free world has recently been advanced by leaders and high-level officials (current and former) of key states including those possessing nuclear weapons or covered by nuclear deterrence doctrines. The goal has been supported by legislators, academics, disarmament experts and other sectors of civil society. The path to achieving such a world however is still unclear.

States Parties to the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (NPT Review Conference) agreed that “*All States need to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons,*” and noted in this context “*the Five-Point Proposal for Nuclear Disarmament of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which proposes inter alia the consideration of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention or a framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments backed by a strong system of verification.*”

As such, States have collectively recognized that a focus solely on the next non-proliferation and disarmament steps is no longer sufficient or able to succeed. A comprehensive approach to nuclear disarmament must be developed alongside and complementary to the step-by-step process.

There are of course many challenges that need to be overcome and questions still to be addressed in order for governments to undertake the abolition and elimination of nuclear weapons. This independent forum aims to assist this process by exploring the legal, technical, institutional and political elements for achieving a nuclear weapons free world.

To this end, the Forum offers a dedicated website – www.abolitionforum.org – and a periodical to facilitate dialogue between academics, governments, disarmament experts and NGOs on key issues regarding the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons under a Nuclear Weapons Convention or package of agreements, as well as the process to achieving this. Noteworthy, the Forum seeks to include a variety of perspectives rather than advocating any particular approach to achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. This could include analysis and proposals from those who consider the time is right for a comprehensive approach, alongside contributions from those who do not yet believe that nuclear abolition is possible, or who are not yet convinced of the merits of a comprehensive approach, or who believe that there are pre-conditions to be met before undertaking a comprehensive approach.

The Nuclear Abolition Forum provides an extensive database of documents dealing with these elements, filed on the website under a variety of category headings. The website also offers users a variety of interactive features, including the possibility to post articles and comment and initiate and partake in discussions. **You are invited to join the debate.**

Each issue of the periodical will take on one of these elements, such as international humanitarian law, nuclear deterrence, verification, enforcement, political will, nuclear energy and related dual-use issues, individual and criminal responsibility, phases of implementation, the role of civil society, and national legislative measures to further nuclear abolition, to name a few. The rationale behind this approach is that edition-by-edition such key nucle-

* **Albert Schweitzer Institute, Global Security Institute (GSI), International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP), International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA), International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), Pugwash (Canada and Denmark branches) and the World Future Council (WFC).** The forum is hosted by the WFC’s London Office.

ar abolition aspects will be examined and critiqued, thereby paving the way for building the framework for achieving and sustaining a nuclear weapons free world.

Inaugural edition of the Nuclear Abolition Forum

The inaugural edition of the periodic Nuclear Abolition Forum publication, released in November 2011, had as its theme **International Humanitarian Law and Nuclear Weapons: Examining the humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament**. The edition's topic was timely and relevant, against the backdrop of the growing momentum for the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament.

The inaugural edition comprises articles from a range of experts, including Dr. John Burroughs (Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) and Guest Editor for the edition), Prof. Nicholas Grief (Kent Law School), Peter Weiss (International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms), Sameer Kanaal (LCNP) on a presentation of Dr. Bruce Blair (Global Zero), Prof. Gro Nystuen (International Law and Policy Institute), Dr. Randy Rydell (United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs), Malcolm Fraser (Former Prime-Minister of Australia) and Peter Giugni (Australian Red Cross). The edition also includes a foreword by Sergio Duarte, former UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and as an appendix the Vancouver Declaration, "Law's Imperative for the Urgent Achievement of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World".

To order a free-of-charge copy of the inaugural edition, please contact Rob van Riet at rob.vanriet@worldfuturecouncil.org.

Introduction

Probably the biggest barrier to making progress on nuclear disarmament and in preventing nuclear proliferation is the continued role of nuclear deterrence in security thinking and doctrines. As long as States believe that nuclear deterrence can protect them from aggression, they will resist or block efforts and initiatives for nuclear disarmament – even if they accept legal obligations or make political commitments otherwise.

Thus, this second edition of the Nuclear Abolition Forum is dedicated to an examination of nuclear deterrence – the role it plays in security policies, its benefits and/or risks, and an exploration on how security could be achieved without nuclear deterrence in order to facilitate the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free world.

On May 9, 2012, on the occasion of the First Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Nuclear Abolition Forum organized in Vienna an event entitled “Beyond Nuclear Deterrence to a Nuclear Weapons Free World”. The event yielded a rich and constructive discussion, with contributions from John Burroughs, Jacqueline Cabasso, Christopher Ford, Erika Simpson, Susi Snyder, Nikolai Sokov, Hiromishi Umebayashi, Alyn Ware, Ward Wilson, and Jean-Pascal Zanders.

This second edition of the Nuclear Abolition Forum, which has the same title as the event – **Moving Beyond Nuclear Deterrence to a Nuclear Weapons Free World** – picks up where the dynamic discussions of the event had to leave off. Several of the speakers have contributed articles to this edition, allowing them to expound further on their thoughts and make their case.

In line with the Nuclear Abolition Forum’s overall objective, this edition aims to provide a variety of perspectives, reflecting the different country -and region-specific applications of the deterrence doctrine, bringing together diverging views on the validity, sustainability and effectiveness of the doctrine, and including contributors from different backgrounds (political, academic, etc.). The over-arching objective is the consideration of practical proposals on how to move beyond reliance on the doctrine.

In *The Myth of Nuclear Necessity* (a re-publication of a New York Times Op-Ed), **Ward Wilson**, Senior Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, offers a fundamental challenge to the theory of nuclear deterrence. By examining historical examples of when deterrence failed, he aims to deconstruct the most fundamental beliefs about nuclear weapons, and the doctrines employing them, by disproving five myths generally accepted about these weapons. In his opinion, the powerful conventional wisdom is quite simply erroneous. The article offers an excellent preview of Mr. Wilson’s recent book “Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons”.

Dr. Christopher Ford, the current Republican Chief Counsel to the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, disputes Wilson’s hypotheses. In a reprint of Dr. Ford’s remarks at the Nuclear Abolition Forum event on May 9, 2012, entitled *Conceptual Challenges of Nuclear Deterrence*, he claims that nuclear deterrence is not an obsolete, “quaint illusion from which we should free ourselves,” but rather, the best, although difficult, policy currently at our disposal to prevent full-scale, bellicose power struggles between adversaries.

Moving to national perspectives on the role of nuclear weapons in defence and security strategies and the utility of such deterrence doctrines, **Paul Quilès**, former French Minister of Defence, argues in his article *Nuclear Deterrence: Not Suitable for the 21st Century* that although nuclear deterrence may have achieved balance between the eastern and western blocks within the cold war climate, in today’s “strategic environment” the doctrine has become outdated. Worse still, in this multi-polar world the existence of nuclear weapons threaten stability and may spur proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Quilès notes that especially in the European context nuclear weapons have lost their “strategic function” as there is no threat of “massive aggression”. With regard to moving away from deterrence, he sees answers lying in an effective, non-discriminatory multilateral framework for nuclear disarmament, in all its guises, and he identifies ways how France could contribute to such a process.

Offering another French perspective, **Dr. Bruno Tertrais**, Senior Research Fellow of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, sees it differently from Paul Quilès. In *Going to Zero – A sceptical French position*, Dr. Tertrais examines the rationales for maintaining France’s “force de frappe”, and sees none of the possible nuclear disarmament scenarios that he considers in his article, which range from unilateral disarmament to a “Great Powers Initiative to go to Zero”, as taking place any time soon. Dr. Tertrais further asserts that France would only consider the global elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons if there is “no foreseeable major threat against its vital interests” and those of Europe – something he deems highly unlikely.

Ambassador Sheel Kant Sharma, Distinguished Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies in India and former Secretary General of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), also places nuclear deterrence in the context of conditions and potential drivers for global nuclear disarmament in his article *The Future of Nuclear Disarmament* – and he is less sceptical. Although he recognizes that the road ahead will be long and hard, he claims that seeing as “nuclear weapons have ceased to offer hopes of enduring peace, security or stability, and evidence abounds about their inability to deliver on these goals”, States should focus on a road map to complete nuclear disarmament with inter-related steps and mutually reinforcing solutions. While surveying the global political landscape, Ambassador Sharma comments on his own country, that the 1988 “Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for Ushering in a Nuclear-Weapon Free and Non-Violent World Order” is still largely valid and could be looked to for identifying detailed essential steps toward a world free of nuclear weapons.

Dr. Manpreet Sethi, Project Leader, Nuclear Security at the Centre for Air Power Studies in New Delhi, India, and Co-Editor for this edition of the Nuclear Abolition Forum, examines this proposal further in *Identifying Principles for a NWFZ – RGAP as a Relevant Guide*. Looking at the doctrines of the nuclear armed states, she argues that nuclear weapons still have a steadfast hold on these states’ national security strategies. Using the RGAP as a pathfinder, Dr. Sethi identifies six principles that could move countries away from such adversarial and dangerous doctrines toward a constructive framework within which they can enter into meaningful engagement and negotiations on nuclear disarmament: Universality, Non-discriminatory, Verifiability, Simultaneous Collateral Measures, Acceptance and Tolerance, and Time-bound yet Flexible.

In *Taming Godzilla: Nuclear Deterrence in North-Asia*, **Alyn Ware**, Founder of the Nuclear Abolition Forum and Global Coordinator of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, **Kiho Yi**, Associate Director of Nautilus, a research institute on North-East Asian security, and **Dr. Hiromishi Umebayashi**, Director of the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University, look at how deterrence plays out in the North-East Asia region, and how (extended) deterrence can be replaced by regional non-nuclear, cooperative security arrangements and instruments. In particular, the authors examine the proposal to establish a North-East Asian nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ), which has received considerable political and civil society support, and sets out detailed plans to decrease the role of nuclear weapons in the doctrines of the regional nuclear-armed states and guarantee the security of all countries in the region. As the proposal draws from the existing NWFZs, so too can the North-East Asian NWFZ offer lessons to other regions in the world facing comparable security challenges. As the title suggests, the authors compare nuclear weapons to Godzilla in that, like the giant monster mutated by nuclear radiation from popular culture, they threaten the security of people and countries in the North-East Asian region.

Ambassador Nobuyasu Abe, Director of the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation at Japan Institute of International Affairs (CPDNP), and **Dr. Hirofumi Tosaki**, Senior Research Fellow at CPDNP, also examine the North-East Asian context in *Untangling Japan’s Nuclear Dilemma: Deterrence before Disarmament* (an abridged version of a previously published work) by considering how it relates to Japan’s security concerns, and identify quite different security solutions and possibilities. The authors note the seemingly paradoxical Japanese security policy regarding nuclear weapons, which on the one hand supports the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, but on the other hand relies heavily on U.S. extended nuclear deterrence, and as such is con-

cerned about Washington's possible intentions to reduce the role and number of its nuclear weapons. Ambassador Abe and Dr. Tosaki argue that against the backdrop of what they see as an increasingly unstable and complicated security environment in North-East Asia, Japan will continue to rely on the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States. Under these circumstances, they advocate Japan increases its efforts to strengthen its own conventional deterrence capability, and works together with the U.S. and other allies to construct a "regional security architecture" tailored to meet a mix of nuclear and conventional threats.

This edition also includes some perspectives from parliamentarians on nuclear deterrence and nuclear disarmament. In *From Unilateral to Multilateral*, **Bill Kidd**, Member of Scottish Parliament and Co-President of PNND, and **John Ainslie**, Coordinator of the Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, look at the United Kingdom's nuclear capabilities and strategies, the upcoming decision on renewal of the Trident nuclear weapons system, the anti-nuclear weapons policy of the Scottish National Party (SNP) Government, and how Scottish independence, for which a referendum will be held in late 2014, might thus result in unilateral nuclear disarmament. The authors consider proposed options of moving the nuclear warheads and submarines from their base in Scotland to other potential locations (inside and outside the U.K.), but conclude that, with little to no viable alternatives, a future independent Scotland will bring the U.K. to the edge of having to leave the nuclear club. They posit that such unilateral disarmament could be the breakthrough that will lead to serious *de facto* action on multilateral nuclear disarmament.

A second parliamentary perspective is provided by **Uta Zapf**, Member of the Bundestag (German Parliament) and Chair of the Subcommittee on Disarmament, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, who discusses in *Nuclear Deterrence, NATO, and the Role of Parliamentarians* NATO's recently adopted strategy documents – the 2010 Strategic Concept and the 2012 Defence and Deterrence Posture Review – and notes the absence of arms control and nuclear disarmament therein. Ms. Zapf highlights several initiatives undertaken in the Bundestag to question the role of nuclear weapons in the Alliance and get nuclear disarmament on the NATO agenda, including a resolution to work for removal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Germany, and a resolution supporting the proposal for a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

In *Nuclear Deterrence and Changing the Framework of the Debate*, **Jonathan Granoff**, President of the Global Security Institute, places nuclear deterrence in a wider context, looking beyond matters related to strategic defence and security. He advocates a cooperative holistic model for global security that integrates universal nuclear disarmament, and bases this upon the ethical value of reciprocity, prevalent in all human cultures and religions. Mr. Granoff argues that nuclear deterrence has no place in such a framework and works as a "logjam" against progress in this direction, whilst stimulating that which it claims to hinder – insecurity and proliferation. The mind-shift he proposes is one which identifies a world free of nuclear weapons as a global public good, to be pursued multilaterally alongside other issues of global concern, such as cyber security, widespread poverty, pandemic diseases, and environmental degradation.

Rob van Riet, Coordinator of the Disarmament Programme at the World Future Council and Director of the Nuclear Abolition Forum, also links the need to phase out nuclear deterrence and achieve nuclear abolition to other key challenges and threats facing humankind in the 21st Century. In *Nuclear Deterrence and a Trans-generational Approach* he argues that universal nuclear disarmament is a trans-generational issue in that its achievement will probably span generations, failure to achieve it is a liability to future generation, the maintenance of such a nuclear-free regime will be the responsibility of future generations, and inter-generational discourse is vital in order to understand the reasons for current nuclear doctrines and to forge viable solutions within emerging political realities. Mr. van Riet also highlights some of the risks and flaws inherent to the nuclear deterrence doctrine, and touches on some non-military motivations for maintaining nuclear weapons and psychological dimensions to reliance on nuclear deterrence.

The penultimate article comes in the form of a dialogue between **Dr. David Krieger**, President and Founder of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and **Dr. Richard Falk**, American Professor Emeritus of International Law at Princeton University. An abridged version of the chapter *A Critique of Nuclear Deterrence* from their book “The Path to Zero, Dialogues on Nuclear Dangers”, considers a wide range of issues and perspectives related to the doctrine, including objectives of current deterrence strategies, rationales for maintaining deterrence, and possibilities to renounce nuclear deterrence. Dr. Krieger and Dr. Falk also uncover some inconvenient truths about nuclear deterrence and its profound moral failings.

To further guide the dialogue on nuclear deterrence, the final article in this edition of the Nuclear Abolition Forum sets out a framework covering established thinking on nuclear deterrence and provides a summary and review of existing perspectives and proposals. Written and compiled by **Alyn Ware** and **Teresa Bergman**, Policy Officer at the Basel Peace Office, the review draws from key academic and policy-analytical contributions on nuclear deterrence and categorizes accordingly three main perspectives on the doctrine: dinosaur (outmoded), dragon (mythical, powerful and /or dangerous) and durable defence (suitable for core security and flexible to meet current security challenges). Setting the tone for the overarching objective of this edition, Mr. Ware and Ms. Bergman, however, identify a fourth perspective – one that encompasses all three and adds a problem-solving approach to examine the possibilities for moving beyond nuclear deterrence to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world.

We conclude the forum with three appendices: the **Santa Barbara Declaration**, which summarises many of the arguments against nuclear deterrence, the 2012 **NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review**, which affirms NATO’s adherence to nuclear deterrence but also commits NATO States to creating the conditions to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world, and the summary of a **Briefing Paper to the Middle Power’s Initiative Framework Forum** which picks up the challenge of NATO on creating the conditions and building the framework for the achievement and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons. These annexes provide snapshots of the range of arguments in this edition, and the political process into which these arguments feed.

Whether they argue in favour of retaining nuclear deterrence as the best available security mechanism on offer today, or advocate rejecting the adversarial doctrine as dangerous, useless and unfit to address today’s transnational security challenges, contributors to this edition of the Nuclear Abolition Forum seem to agree that the issue of nuclear deterrence goes to the heart of the nuclear disarmament debate. Some excellent work has been carried out in recent years on testing the validity and utility and examining the morality and legality of nuclear deterrence. The dialogue should turn next to how we can move beyond nuclear deterrence in order to facilitate the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear weapons-free world. We hope that this edition will provide a significant contribution to advancing this dialogue.

Acknowledgments

We are thankful to the contributors to this second edition of the Nuclear Abolition Forum’s periodical magazine. Their articles provide a range of perspectives on the critical issue of how to move beyond nuclear deterrence to a nuclear weapons-free world. In addition, we are particularly grateful to this edition’s Co-Editors, Marc Finaud of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), Paul Meyer of Simon Fraser University, Dr. Manpreet Sethi of the Centre for Air Power Studies and Alyn Ware of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, for their insight, input and dedication. We are also thankful to the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, whose generous contribution made this edition possible, and to GCSP for hosting the publication’s launch event. Finally, we are grateful to the family of Baila Goldenthal and their generosity in allowing us to use her beautiful painting “Cat’s Cradle/String Theory” for the front cover, and to Jana Jedličková for the cover design.

The Myth of Nuclear Necessity*

WARD WILSON¹

Five years ago, four titans of American foreign policy – the former secretaries of state George P. Shultz and Henry A. Kissinger, the former defense secretary William J. Perry and the former senator Sam Nunn – called for “a world free of nuclear weapons,” giving new momentum to an idea that had moved from the sidelines of pacifist idealism to the center of foreign policy debate.

America’s 76 million baby boomers grew up during the cold war, when a deep fear of nuclear weapons permeated American life, from duck-and-cover school drills to backyard fallout shelters. Then, in the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan’s leadership, combined with immense anti-nuclear demonstrations, led to negotiations with the Soviet Union that drastically reduced the size of the two superpowers’ nuclear arsenals.

Sadly, the abolition movement seems stalled. Part of the reason is fear of nuclear weapons in the hands of others: President George W. Bush exploited anxieties over nuclear weapons to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq; most Republican presidential candidates last year said they would fight a war with Iran rather than allow it to get the bomb.

There is also a small group of people who still believe fervently in nuclear weapons. President Obama had to buy passage of the New START treaty with Russia, in 2010, with a promise to spend \$185 billion to modernize warheads and delivery systems over 10 years – revealing that while support for nuclear weapons may not be broad, it runs deep. That support endures because of five widely held myths.

The first is the myth that nuclear weapons altered the course of World War II. Leaving aside the morality of America’s decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, new research by the historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and other scholars shows that Japan surrendered not because of the atom bomb but because the Soviets renounced neutrality and joined the war. Sixty-six Japanese cities had already been destroyed by conventional weapons – two more did not make the difference. Attributing surrender to the bomb was also convenient for Japan’s leaders, allowing them to blame defeat on a “miracle” weapon.

Second is the myth of “decisive destruction.” Mass destruction doesn’t win wars; killing soldiers does. No war has ever been won simply by killing civilians. The 1941-44 siege of Leningrad didn’t deter Soviet leaders from pressing the fight against Hitler. Nor did the 1945 firebombing of Dresden force Germany to submit. As long as an army has a fighting chance at victory, wars continue. Building ever more destructive weapons simply increases the horror of war, not the certainty of ending it.

Third is the myth of reliable nuclear deterrence. Numerous leaders have taken risks and acted aggressively during nuclear crises. In 1962, President John F. Kennedy and his advisers knew that blockading Cuba risked nuclear war; they mentioned the possibility 60 times while debating their options. Yet they went ahead. Nuclear proponents might argue that no cold war crisis ever erupted into nuclear war, so deterrence must work. But they’re moving the goal posts.

Originally it was claimed that nuclear weapons would assure success in negotiations, prevent any sort of attack – conventional or nuclear – and allow countries to protect their friends with a nuclear umbrella. When the Russians weren’t intimidated during talks after World War II, the claim about negotiations was dropped. When the Yom Kippur War and the Falkland Islands War showed that

* This article is reprinted from the *New York Times*, January 13, 2013.

fighting against nuclear-armed countries was possible, the prevention of conventional war claim was dropped. The nuclear umbrella claim ought to have been dropped at the same time, but there was too much American foreign policy riding on it for anyone to make this argument. After all, if Britain couldn't deter an attack on its own far-flung islands, how could deterrence prevent attacks on other countries?

Fourth is the myth of the long peace: the argument that the absence of nuclear war since 1945 means nuclear weapons have “kept the peace.” But we don't accept proof by absence in any circumstance where there is real risk. We wouldn't fly an airline that claimed to have invented a device that prevented metal fatigue, proved it by equipping 100 planes with the devices for one year without a single crash, and then suddenly ceased all metal-fatigue inspections and repairs, and decided instead to rely solely on these new devices.

The last and most stubborn myth is that of irreversibility. Whenever idealists say that they want to abolish nuclear weapons, so-called realists shake their heads and say, in tones of patient condescension, “You can't stuff the nuclear genie back in the bottle.”

This is a specious argument. It's true that no technology is ever disinvented, but technology does fall out of use all the time. (If you don't believe me, try to get tech support on any electronic device more than three years old.) Devices disappear either because they are displaced by better technology or because they simply weren't good. The question isn't whether nuclear weapons can be disinvented, but whether they are useful. And their usefulness is questionable, given that no one has found an occasion to use them in over 67 years.

Not everyone wants nuclear weapons. What most people don't realize is that 12 countries have either abandoned nuclear programs, dismantled existing weapons, as South Africa did in the early 1990s, or

handed them over, as Kazakhstan did after the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union. By contrast, only nine have nukes today (the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea).

It's often assumed that Israel would be the last nation to give up nuclear weapons, given its history and a deep sense of responsibility to protect the Jewish people after the horrors of the Holocaust. But Israel has a powerful conventional military, is allied with the strongest country in the world and its leaders have a keen appreciation of military realities. They understand that nukes pose a greater danger to small countries than large ones. Twenty nuclear weapons used on Israel would do far more overlapping damage than 20 used on Iran.

Small nations have always been vulnerable. In a world without nuclear weapons they would preserve themselves as they always have: by forming alliances with the powerful and avoiding antagonizing neighbors.

France, not Israel, would most likely be the last country to give up nuclear weapons, which help preserve its image as a world power. In a nuclear-free world, France would just be another middle-size power with great cuisine. The real value of nuclear bombs is as status symbols, not as practical weapons.

America and other nuclear powers must pursue the gradual abolition of nuclear weapons, but it will not be easy. Many leaders have little interest in giving up power, real or perceived. Any agreement would have to include stringent inspections and extensive safeguards. It would have to include all current nuclear-armed states in a complicated diplomatic process. But bans on other dangerous but clumsy armaments, like chemical and biological weapons, have been negotiated in the past. These bans – like laws – are sometimes broken. But the world is far safer with the bans than it would be without them.

As Reagan knew, nuclear weapons make the world more dangerous, not less. Imagine arming a bank guard with dynamite and a lighter and you get a good idea of nuclear weapons' utility: powerful, but too clumsy to use.

Nuclear weapons were born out of fear, nurtured in fear and sustained by fear. They are dinosaurs – an evolutionary dead end. The trend in warfare today is toward smaller, smarter, more effective precision-guided weapons. Nuclear weapons – extremely dangerous and not very useful – are the wave of the past.

¹ **WARD WILSON** is a Senior Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies. He is the author of “Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons” and co-author of “Delegitimizing Nuclear Weapons: Examining the Validity of Nuclear Deterrence”. He is Director of Rethinking Nuclear Weapons, a project aimed at pragmatically re-evaluating the rationale for nuclear weapons.

Conceptual Challenges of Nuclear Deterrence*

CHRISTOPHER FORD¹

Good morning – or rather, good day, since while it is still morning here in Washington, it will be mid-afternoon for you in Vienna. Anyway, it is a pleasure to be able to take part in this discussion, and I hope our video connection holds up.

I. Debating Deterrence

There is irony in the fact that it may be the very success of nuclear deterrence over the decades of the Cold War that has brought about a situation in which it is surprisingly common to hear it said that nuclear deterrence is a fantasy, and that nuclear weapons are unnecessary for anyone. To my eye, nuclear weaponry does seem to have helped check the traditional tendency of great power competition to escalate into general war. However, precisely because there is no counterexample of a post-war world that did collapse again into conflict, it is now sometimes claimed that our nuclear efforts were unnecessary all along – and that nuclear deterrence is a quaint illusion of which we should now rid ourselves.

I disagree. There is no escaping the fact that despite the occasional crisis, there has not been a full-on general war between the great powers in the nuclear age, nor indeed has there been one between any nuclear-armed states, and this represents a remarkable departure from the previous few hundred years. The question, of course, is what to make of it. The usual interpretation is to conclude

that nuclear deterrence did contribute to the post-war peace, and that “extended” nuclear deterrence has helped prevent additional countries from acquiring nuclear weapons. Is there, however, a persuasive reason to throw out the idea of nuclear deterrence, the conceptual foundation of the nuclear security architecture with which so many have lived for so long?

I do not believe that there is. We should be very wary of revisionist re-examination of what seems to have worked for so long, especially when the evidence for a contrary view is so scant and tendentious. Nuclear deterrence was never a panacea, no one ever claimed that it would or could work perfectly, and we indeed face significant challenges in applying it in today’s world. Nevertheless, it would be a great mistake to dismiss its relevance, *in toto*, without very good cause indeed. And there is no strong case for doing so.

II. Analytical Challenges

Analytically speaking, of course, part of the challenge in assessing these questions is that history provides us with a terrible data set for “scientific” assessment. At best, we only know what actually happened, we can’t control for different variables, and we can’t run the experiment over again to see how different approaches affect outcomes. All we really have to work with, in effect, is a body of anecdotal evidence, to which we can do little more than apply good sense in good faith.

Using simple good sense can still be useful, however, since not all lines of argumentation stand up to it very well. I would contend, for instance, that a common-sense approach to analysing the history of nuclear deterrence should pay little heed to historical cases that do not seem actually to have involved questions of deterrence in the first place. This is why I think that the much-discussed issue of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is no more than an analytical red herring. The use of nuclear weapons in 1945 was about

* This article is based on Dr. Ford’s remarks on May 9, 2012, at the event “Moving Beyond Nuclear Deterrence to a Nuclear Weapons Free World” in Vienna, Austria, organized by the Nuclear Abolition Forum on the occasion of the first session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Dr. Ford gave his presentation via video-conference from his office in Washington D.C., United States.

how to coerce one side in a massive and prolonged general war into giving up the fight. It was, in other words, not about deterring war but about war termination, and those are notably different things. The question concerned defeating Japan, and not just keeping it from doing something that it was not yet doing anyway. As a result, it wasn't about "deterrence" at all, from which it follows that whatever role atomic weapons really played in bringing about Japan's surrender, this answer is of little relevance to the study of nuclear deterrence theory today.

That said, of course, it is not entirely clear precisely how relevant our long Cold War experience with actual nuclear deterrence really is today either – and here lies what I think is an important point. I have yet to see any persuasive debunking of the generally-accepted notion that nuclear deterrence played a critical role in the strategic stability of that period. Nevertheless, it does not necessarily follow that the same approach that deterred the USSR then is the right recipe with which to deter others today. It might in fact be, but whether or not this is so is a critical question. And this points us to one of the most vexing challenges of the study of deterrence: there probably is no fixed answer to the question of what deters whom. Deterrence is subjective, in that it exists in the eye of the one who is deterred, but what deters him has no necessary connection to the anticipations of his would-be deterrer.

One obvious implication of this subjectivity is that deterrence strategies should be tailored to their targets as specifically as possible, for what deters one country from doing one thing may be somewhat different from what deters a different one from doing a different thing. (What deters any particular target, of course, may also change over time, so these questions will presumably have to be constantly re-asked even if one has gotten the answer 'right'.) This is obviously difficult to implement in

practice – and it also undercuts our ability to translate lessons from one case study to another.

III. Lessons for Non-proliferation Policy

But there may be some lessons for us in these challenges all the same. Let me suggest two that pertain directly to non-proliferation.

First, I think the subjectivity of deterrence provides a powerful reason to limit the number of "players" in the nuclear game. Cold War experience suggests that it is not impossible to achieve adequate deterrent effects when the only real nuclear relationship of consequence is bipolar. This seems reasonable to me, for focusing one's efforts along this single axis of deterrent interest gives participants some opportunity to study each other and to "learn" reciprocal deterrence over time. It would surely be vastly harder, however, to do this well – or perhaps at all – as the number of players grows.

Game-theoretical literature suggests that tri-polar systems are much less stable than bipolar ones, and that instability increases geometrically with each new addition to the game. It stands to reason that this is true in deterrence relationships. I might be able to figure out what deters you, for instance, but this may not be the same thing that deters the next guy. Indeed, what deterrence impels me to seek vis-à-vis one player might actually end up looking alarmingly provocative, or dangerously weak, to another. We are obviously talking about very complex analytical problems here, and at some point one has to wonder whether they simply become insoluble.

Since one can only have one force posture at a time, it follows that each player may have to choose between multiple different and somewhat inconsistent deterrent "packages" – such as by picking the one felt best to deter the most worrisome potential adversary and hoping that this doesn't cause too many problems elsewhere, or by choosing one that merely "satisfies" in a kind of

lowest-common-denominator way against many targets while offering optimal deterrence against none. Since a deterrence failure could mean the slaughter of huge numbers of people, it isn't very reassuring to have to rely overmuch upon this kind of judgment call. This should provide us with powerful reasons, therefore, to work very hard to keep the number of nuclear players from increasing: the world is likely to be much more stable if this number can be kept small. (Most of you listening right now are in Vienna in connection with the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee meeting, so I implore you to keep this in mind and not get distracted by issues ancillary to the imperative of non-proliferation.)

A second lesson for non-proliferation also flows from the difficulty of guessing precisely what it is that deterrence requires. Ideally, one would identify what will deter the target, and then build a force posture around that requirement. Since there is uncertainty in this, however, it is safer to err on the high side, as a strategic "hedge" against getting it wrong. (After all, while having too many weapons is hardly costless, this is less problematic than having fewer than needed to achieve deterrence. The price in that case can be war.) The more players there are in the game, moreover – and thus the more different deterrent axes one has to try to posture along, and the greater the calculative uncertainty – the greater will be each player's incentive to aim high.

And here we see a linkage between non-proliferation and disarmament different from what one usually hears in NPT circles. I do not mean merely that achieving some future nuclear "zero" will be impossible if the international community cannot demonstrate its ability and willingness to preclude the entry of new players into the nuclear game, though this is obviously indeed the case. I mean also that the difficulty of precise deterrent calculations suggests that the more players there are, the harder it will be even to

achieve reductions in weapons-possessor arsenals. This logic is simple: the more participants in the game – or at least the more significant players there are, at any rate – the more pressure there will be for each to hedge against deterrent uncertainty along these proliferating axes by aiming high (i.e., building, or keeping around, larger numbers of weapons). This is another powerful reason for countries to take non-proliferation more seriously than many have hitherto done.

IV. The Deterrence Paradigm

But while I thus think that there are lessons to learn from how challenging nuclear deterrence can be, I still see no adequate alternative. Nor do I think there is good reason to conclude that the concept itself is chimerical.

And I am not alone. All nuclear weapons possessors in the real world – and a good many of their friends and allies – seem to think deterrence works, and they indeed have long acted as if it does. And of course there indeed has been no general war between nuclear weapons possessors, nor even the close allies thereof – which in historical terms is quite remarkable. Furthermore, when confronted by a potential adversary with nuclear weaponry or with conventional superiority, non-possessors with the technical option of doing so have shown a notable tendency to seek nuclear weapons themselves. (They are sometimes talked out of it, especially when they are reassured that their interests will be protected by some relationship with a strong ally that often itself possesses nuclear weapons, but to my eye that tends to prove the point.)

Even if one cannot "prove" that deterrence works in a meaningfully scientific sense, this is all highly suggestive. It may not make the case in an impeccably rigorous and scientifically defensible way, but it is very hard to speak coherently about "proving" any such interpretive proposition – one way or the other – when looking back upon the once-through multivariant puzzle of the historical re-

cord. There certainly seems to be a vastly stronger case for nuclear deterrence than for the proposition that the entire concept has always been fantastical.

If anything, I would suggest that the argument needs to be turned around. We are not debating what course of action to take as if writing on a blank sheet of paper. We are debating whether to uproot long-established concepts that form the foundation of many countries' most important security policy choices – a framework for which no coherent alternative has yet been offered, which seems to have helped prevent general war for a long time, and which hasn't in any event been shown to be so broken today as to justify its repudiation. Under the circumstances, the burden of "proof," such as it is, should really be reversed: it should lie with anyone who wants to overturn the world's ongoing reliance upon nuclear deterrence by asserting its irrelevance. So far, I have heard nothing to suggest that this burden of disproof, as it were, is anywhere near being met.

In an uncertain and still dangerous world, strategic planners have an obligation to plan against contingencies, hedging against uncertainty and unpredictability in part by avoiding choices that tie us inescapably to assumptions that might turn out to be dangerously wrong. Even if we believe in nuclear deterrence only in the same sense that Pascal famously suggested one should believe in God – that is, because the cost of doing so in error is lower than the cost of not doing so in error – I'd say we have every reason to keep on believing.

¹ **DR. CHRISTOPHER A. FORD** is currently Republican Chief Counsel to the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations. Prior to that he was Director, Center for Technology and Global Security at the Hudson Institute. He served until September 2008 as United States Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, and prior to that as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State responsible for arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament verification and compliance policy.

Nuclear Deterrence: *Not Suitable for the 21st Century*

PAUL QUILÈS¹

Some 23 years ago the Berlin Wall fell. This major event, followed by the dismantlement of the Soviet bloc, put an end to a bipolar world and caused fundamental upheaval on the international scene. Yet no new security doctrine has emerged from this profound geo-political mutation. Whether we like it or not, nuclear deterrence – consisting of exposing one's enemy to the risk of mass destruction – remains the pillar of France's and Great Britain's defence policies.

Yesterday nuclear arms control symbolised the will to maintain a balance – albeit a fragile one – between the Eastern and Western blocs. Yesterday a certain strategic relevance of nuclear weapons could be conceivable. Today the balance and the relevance have disappeared. The threats of the Cold War period can be deemed fears of the past. The nuclear deterrence doctrine is no longer suitable within an evolving world in the early 21st century. Today, paradoxically, the greatest threat comes from the very existence of nuclear weapons, coupled with the risk of their proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

Nuclear proliferation will be fought more effectively through multilateralism and international treaties such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), than with nuclear deterrence.² Moreover, establishing linkage between the possession of nuclear weapons and great power status, as is often done, can only encourage countries to acquire a nuclear capability, whilst the aim of the NPT, ratified by almost all UN member states (189), is precisely to lead to a nuclear weapons-free world. Today, the new international environment, characterised by deep political instability, requires making abolition of nuclear

weapons the spearhead of a new international security doctrine.

Despite this evidence, nuclear weapons are not really questioned, and their preservation is justified not by real arguments, but by ritual incantation. While claiming that nuclear weapons are the ultimate security guarantee, the governments of nuclear weapon-States continue to view their arsenals as an instrument of prestige. The possession of such weapons gives them the feeling of holding great power status.

The new generation, on the contrary, believes in a world where promoting nuclear disarmament embodies more political power and prestige than redundant, dangerous and costly nuclear stockpiles. Precisely because it can free itself from the fears of the past, this generation, which did not live through the Cold War, is able to find a new language and propose a new approach.

It does not believe that ever-lasting stability of states can be induced by nuclear weapons. It understands that the nuclear weapons it has inherited will not help respond to 21st century problems: terrorism, economic and financial crisis, pollution and climate change, poverty or pandemics. It is outraged to hear of budget cuts affecting social welfare, knowing that the cost of maintaining nuclear stockpiles will reach 700 billion Euros in the next decade.

Transforming mindsets is a common strategic and moral duty. For the first time in decades, the theme of nuclear disarmament finds a deep resonance among young people. Like them, and for them, I support the appeal of *Global Zero* - in favour of the first multilateral negotiation in history toward the gradual and controlled elimination of nuclear weapons. European governments must pledge to take part in such a negotiation in order to make the Cold War a piece of antiquity, and thus leave a nuclear weapons-free world to future generations.

The Multilateral Framework

The NPT considers that five states have the right to possess nuclear weapons, but it does not give them the right to keep those weapons forever. On the contrary, its Article VI unequivocally commits them to “nuclear disarmament” and “a treaty on general and complete disarmament.”³

Even if the performance of the five nuclear weapon-States can be criticized with respect to this commitment, one should not underestimate the progress already made in nuclear disarmament, contributing to a better international security climate and reduction in the risk of nuclear proliferation. Too often is the argument heard that despite the evident decrease in world stockpiles of nuclear weapons, nuclear proliferation proceeds unabated. The case of North Korea joining the nuclear club is mentioned. True, there were six nuclear powers in 1989, eight in 1998 (India, Pakistan) and nine in 2006 (North Korea). However, in the meantime, let us remember that South Africa unilaterally disarmed (1991), and Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan renounced the nuclear weapons inherited from the Soviet Union (Lisbon Protocol, May 23, 1992). More recently, Libya gave up its nuclear ambitions having negotiated with the U.S. and the United Kingdom. As for Syria’s plans, they were stopped by an Israeli military strike in 2007 (operation Orchard). Measures of unilateral, multilateral, even coercive disarmament prevented six countries from acquiring or keeping nuclear weapons. Finally, since 1991, several concrete actions against proliferation have been developed: four new nuclear weapon-free zones were established in Mongolia (1992), Africa (1996), South-East Asia (1997), and Central Asia (2000); and the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Additional Protocol was adopted by 114 states.⁴

Of course, new initiatives for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation will have to be introduced in order to achieve the goal of a nuclear weapons-free

world. But this cannot be achieved outside a multilateral framework. This is why it is crucial that eventually all nuclear weapon-States become fully incorporated in the disarmament process.

It is clear that the United States and Russia, holding some 95% of the world’s nuclear armaments, have a special responsibility. Even once the New START Treaty is fully implemented, their stockpiles will still remain considerable - as this treaty sets no limits on non-deployed or sub-strategic weapons. Those two categories of weapons are indeed twice as numerous as the ones covered by the treaty. Moreover the existing ceilings do not exert strict constraints: 1550 warheads by 2018, taking into consideration the accounting rules allocating only one warhead per strategic bomber.

These figures clearly sit far below the goal of 1000 warheads, which, coupled with constraints on non-deployed weapons, could have acted as a real incentive for multilateral negotiations without negatively affecting the security of both countries concerned. That being said, the importance of the New START Treaty should not be underestimated, especially because of its verification and transparency mechanisms.

In order to address the complex equation that constitutes nuclear disarmament, involving so many actors with very diverse interests, I consider three notions to be essential:

1. Confidence implying transparency. This will prove indispensable to any progress on these issues. The guarantees, which the U.S. and more broadly NATO provide to Russia with respect to antiballistic missile defence, will be decisive. It should be feasible, through technical data exchange and operational cooperation, to reassure Russia that the system will not weaken its deterrent.

Middle nuclear powers also have a role to play in enhancing confidence. France could indeed, like

the U.K., increase its policy of transparency on the level and nature of its nuclear armaments.

In this regard, one can only approve of the now regular meetings among the five official nuclear weapon-States, aiming at increasing confidence on deterrence policies and transparency within nuclear postures. Let's hope that such meetings go beyond formal contacts!

Building confidence within interstate relations is also a necessity in Asia. What is needed is a stronger commitment from the international community in favour of solving conflicts between India and Pakistan, and between China and India. It is furthermore essential to put a halt to rising tensions within China's maritime surroundings.

2. A second fundamental notion is multilateralism - meaning the participation of all states, whether nuclear or not, in the negotiation for nuclear disarmament, on an equal and non-discriminatory footing.

The NPT Review Conferences may, from this viewpoint, allow for considerable progress. It is indeed within this framework that nuclear weapon-States are required to report on their disarmament efforts in conformity with Article VI of the Treaty. In particular the 2000 Review Conference adopted a roadmap toward disarmament through 13 priority steps, allowing for rigorous evaluation of each nuclear weapon-State.

There are two other multilateral frameworks of crucial importance for disarmament. The first deals with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The other involves launching negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for weapons purposes: the Cut-off Treaty.

With respect to the CTBT, the main goal is to achieve ratification of the treaty by the United States. Regarding the Cut-off Treaty, an end to the Pakistani veto is needed. This will probably require taking Pakistan's concerns about existing stockpiles

into account, as well as exhibiting a stronger expression of consensus between other member states.

3. Verification. No decisive progress toward nuclear disarmament will occur unless adequate verification mechanisms are put into place. It is not an easy task. From a technical, military and political viewpoint, it is a formidable challenge to move beyond verifying the number of delivery vehicles to verifying warheads, their stationing and their dismantlement, as well as fissile materials. Taking the achievements of chemical disarmament into consideration however, it seems a realistic goal - provided the necessary political will exists. This political will must be measured against the risks resulting from thousands of nuclear weapons being constantly perfected. The contribution of civil society, NGOs, independent experts and a movement such as *Global Zero* is invaluable on this issue.

What Can France Do?

As for my own country, France, it could realistically contribute to nuclear disarmament in two ways:

1. Through technical measures

By considering the possibility of committing itself to a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons:

During the Cold War such a commitment was impossible due to the conventional superiority of the Warsaw Pact. The new strategic environment could allow for such a shift in doctrine however. The current review process of NATO's deterrence and defence posture could offer an opportunity. A massive conventional offensive against European countries has become an increasingly unlikely scenario. The only argument to justify maintaining a nuclear component in the alliance's forces is the persistence of Russian tactical and strategic nuclear forces. Under such circumstances, NATO should state that the sole purpose of its nuclear weapons is to deter a potential aggressor from using nuclear

weapons against it. It follows that the allied nuclear powers, and France in particular, should make the same commitment to a no-first-use policy.

By enhancing the transparency of existing stockpiles:

France could, like the U.K., strengthen its policy of transparency on the level and composition of its nuclear arsenals. Both countries could encourage the other nuclear powers to follow suit.

By accepting negotiated constraints on the level and composition of French nuclear weapons:

Taking into consideration the disproportion between the U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles on the one hand, and the stockpiles of the other nuclear powers on the other hand, it is difficult, at least at this stage, to envisage France joining a negotiation for nuclear disarmament.⁵ A negotiated reduction of French nuclear weapons would suppose that Russia and the U.S. have already reduced their nuclear warheads of all kinds down to 1000. However, France could commit, possibly in a treaty, to freeze the level of its stockpiles by reducing the scope of its current modernisation process (M-51 missile), or even by stopping some aspects of this process completely. The utility of the airborne component of French nuclear forces could also be reviewed. We are told that because of asymmetrical threats, flexible responses are needed, and that airborne capacities allow a gradual engagement in a conflict, thus avoiding global sanctions. If this means that the heart of a regime could be targeted by precision-guided penetrating weapons capable of reaching a dictator in a hardened bunker with cruise missiles or airborne air-to-ground missiles, then we are much closer to a doctrine of use than of deterrence.

By supporting U.S.-Russia negotiations toward the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons:

France could support the request of 14 NATO nations, calling for the withdrawal of some 180 U.S. tactical weapons (currently designed to equip European air fighter jets), from the territories of

Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey, where they are positioned. This withdrawal could be conditioned upon Russia's willingness to enter into negotiations with the U.S. on a nuclear disarmament process including tactical weapons. France always firmly opposed the removal of the U.S. deployment; not wishing to become the sole Western nuclear power left on the European continent, and thus become drafted into 'tactical' weapon disarmament. Indeed, for both the U.S. and Russia, the French nuclear airborne weapons can be considered 'tactical'.

Now this opposition seems to be fading away. For the first time, in his report to the French President on "Consequences of France's Return into NATO's Integrated Command", former Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine clearly advocates a policy shift:

*"France, which always insisted on keeping its deterrent to a minimum level, can only encourage the United States and Russia to reduce further the number of their nuclear warheads, and has no reason to oppose the elimination of the last "tactical" or "non-strategic" nuclear weapons of NATO (out-of-date airborne gravity bombs). This would not in any way undermine the deterrence capabilities of the Alliance."*⁶

The internal review process is underway and it is crucial that this approach become France's new official posture.

2. Through fundamentally adapting France's deterrence posture to the new security environment

By explicitly recognizing that nuclear weapons no longer realise the same strategic function as they fulfilled in the Cold War i.e. that Europe is no longer exposed to a threat of massive aggression:

The current official French doctrine describes nuclear weapons as the "ultimate guarantee of France's national independence and of the autonomy of its strategic decisions."⁷ In today's world

however, it is illusory to build France's security upon a foundation of nuclear weapons possession. Currently French security principally depends on membership in the European Union, as well as inclusion in a network of alliances, agreements and interdependent relationships, all of which ensure the stability of France's environment.

By redefining, as a consequence, the role of nuclear weapons in France's national security strategy:

The scenario of massive aggression against France's vital interests with conventional means has become most unlikely. What is more, only an attack with weapons of mass destruction - meaning in practice nuclear weapons - would justify, in present circumstances, a nuclear response. France's nuclear weapons only deter potential aggressors who would opt to use nuclear weapons against it. In order to conform with present strategic realities, it would thus be appropriate for France to cease declaring that it reserves the right to use nuclear weapons as a response to any attack on its 'vital interests', whatever the form of such an attack.⁸ Indeed the threat of nuclear deterrence can only be credible, if it is meant to deter a possible aggressor from resorting to weapons of mass destruction - meaning at present, nuclear weapons.

By explicitly accepting the prospect of a world free of nuclear weapons:

France could, like the U.K., explicitly support the trajectory for a nuclear weapons-free world based on two conditions:

- The initiation of a process of verified and structured reductions of the existing arsenals of all nuclear weapon-States, leading to their full elimination;
- The strengthening of the non-proliferation regime in such a way as to prevent, if necessary through constraints, any new state from becoming a nuclear weapon-State.

Such a set of measures would constitute a historic step for France. It would enable it to achieve coherency between current practice, and its stated ambition of contributing to a reduction of tensions and disorders in the 21st century world.

¹ **PAUL QUILÈS** was the Minister of Defence of France between 1985 and 1986. He contributed this article specifically for this issue of the Nuclear Abolition Forum. He is the author of "Nuclear, a French lie: Reflections on nuclear disarmament". Translation for this article was provided by Marc Finaud, Senior Programme Advisor, Emerging Security Challenges Programme, Geneva Centre for Security Policy.

² Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereafter NPT), open to signature on July 1, 1968. The May 2010 NPT Review Conference adopted an 'Action Plan' on the three pillars of the Treaty (disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy), and planned a conference in 2012 on the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

³ Article VI of the NPT states: "Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

⁴ The IAEA Additional Protocol allows inspections of undeclared nuclear activities or installations across the world.

⁵ Russia and the United States hold more than 95 percent of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

⁶ Védérine, Hubert. *Report for the President of the French Republic on the Consequences of France's Return to NATO's Integrated Military Command, on the Future of Transatlantic Relations, and the Outlook for the Europe of Defence*, 14 November, 2012. http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/12-2226-Rapport_H_VEDRINE_VEN.pdf.

⁷ "Défense et sécurité nationale, le livre blanc." La Documentation française/Odile Jacob: June 2008. <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/084000341/0000.pdf>.

⁸ France asserts this right of legitimate self-defence based on Article 51 of the UN Charter.

Going to Zero:

A Sceptical French Position

BRUNO TERTRAIS¹

Nuclear Abolition: Neither Desirable, Nor Feasible ... At Least For Now

Many believe that we should now seek the abolition of nuclear weapons. Three different motivations are put forward, yet none of them proves entirely persuasive.

The first motivation for disarmament is a perceived increased risk of nuclear proliferation. However, two decades of arms reductions have left non-aligned countries unimpressed, new nuclear-capable countries unaffected, and potential proliferators undaunted.

The second motivation is the longstanding idea that nuclear weapon-States have a legal responsibility enshrined in Article VI of the 'Non-Proliferation Treaty' (NPT), to get rid of their nuclear arsenals. A careful reading of both the Treaty and of its negotiating record leads one to conclude that the legal obligations are defined in a much more complex and subtle manner however. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) also gave an advisory opinion on this issue in 1996, but, in addition to the fact that it was not legally binding, the Court refrained from stating that this obligation existed separately from the broader obligation of Article VI.

The third motivational tenant is the alleged existence of alternatives to nuclear weapons, such as modern conventional weaponry and missile defence. Conventional weapons do not however, have the same capabilities as nuclear weapons. They are unable to credibly put hardened targets at risk. Only nuclear weapons can threaten to destroy any State as an organized entity in a matter of minutes. A long and sustained conventional bombing campaign could perhaps achieve the same result,

but this would allow the adversary to adapt and adjust; thus why conventional strategic city bombing has rarely been efficient on its own. Any massive bombing campaign would catalyse intense political pressure on the government of the acting party – especially as casualties grow. It would also leave time for the adversary to resort to non-conventional tactics such as terrorism. Finally, the scary and terrifying nature of nuclear weapons awards them power. As witnessed once again by the world's reaction to the Fukushima accident, there is something irrational about the public perception of all things nuclear, which lies at the root of nuclear deterrence.

It is very difficult to explain the absence of any major-power war since 1945 – a true historical anomaly – without acknowledging the role of nuclear weapons. Alternative explanations are not satisfying.

Missile defence is an interesting complement to nuclear deterrence. But it cannot threaten an adversary with unacceptable damage. And to rely exclusively on missile defence for the protection of vital interests would open the door to a costly arms race. For these reasons missile defence is no substitute for nuclear deterrence.

Such thoughts inform French strategic culture regarding the continued need for nuclear deterrence.

French Rationales for Maintaining Nuclear Weapons

While undoubtedly a major political dimension existed in France's original decision to develop a nuclear force, security concerns were paramount. Today it is mostly security rational that explains France's policy to maintain nuclear weapons in the post Cold War environment.

The French still believe that there is value in maintaining nuclear deterrence for security reasons. Two rationales are put forward. The first one refers to what the French often term the "life insur-

ance” function of nuclear deterrence. The world can change rapidly, and the emergence of a new major threat to Europe within the next 15-30 years is not a far-fetched scenario. Accordingly, it is deemed prudent to maintain a national nuclear deterrent. The logic maintains, even in the absence of such a major threat today, as France already has a nuclear capability, it may as well retain it, if the cost of doing so remains bearable.

Even in today’s financial context, President Hollande has made it clear that France would not give up its deterrent, which amounts to about 0.2% of GDP. Despite France’s traditionally good relations with Moscow and Beijing, the idea that one of these two countries could one day pose a major threat to Europe is far from being dismissed in French political circles. Russia is traditionally first on the list of major powers that could potentially be a threat to Europe, but China now appears to come second. The build-up of nuclear arsenals in Asia is deemed a matter of concern for Europe. Paris worries about a future scenario where Beijing seeks to deter European involvement in a crisis in Asia by exerting a nuclear threat.

The second security rationale is to guarantee that no regional power could blackmail or pressure France with weapons of mass destruction. Among potential threats to French vital interests, nuclear and ballistic proliferation in the greater Middle East is a topic of particular attention. The kind of scenario that has French officials worried is one where, for instance, a country tries to block military intervention by threatening to strike the national territory. This concept could be called ‘counter-deterrence’ or ‘counter-blackmail’. No specific countries of concern are identified in French discourse; however, Iran is now regularly mentioned in official foreign and security policy speeches.

At its origin France’s nuclear programme was partly driven by global status reasons. Today this

rationale has disappeared. No link is made in France between the country’s possession of nuclear weapons and its status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for instance. The French consider that they have special responsibilities stemming from this status, which they exert via voluntary financial contributions to UN organisations, as well as significant military contributions to UN-mandated operations. Paris actively supports opening the UNSC to new permanent members.

The possession of nuclear weapons however, is still connected with French foreign policy at large. The underlying idea that nuclear weapons make you free and independent is very much present in the national strategic culture. The country’s nuclear status seems to be a constant, ever-present in the backs of the minds of French Presidents. One may even wonder: would France have taken the stance it took in early 2003 – *actively* opposing war in Iraq to the point of threatening to veto the passing of a UNSC resolution – had it not been an independent nuclear power, not dependant on the United States for guaranteeing its security?

France has a fairly traditional approach to the overall concept of deterrence. Few contemporary heads of State of nuclear-endowed countries would devote an entire speech to nuclear deterrence matters as Chirac and Sarkozy did (the former in 2001 and 2006, the latter in 2008). The words ‘nuclear’ and ‘deterrence’ are still very much associated with each other, within the nation’s strategic culture. There is a traditional defiance vis-à-vis missile defence, for strategic and budgetary reasons. The French defence of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) until 2001, was partly motivated by the fear that its demise would prompt Russia to bolster its defences, and thus undermine the French deterrent; or at least force Paris to increase efforts to maintain its credibility. However, since 2001 Paris has shown an increasing pragmatism in this do-

main, and now considers missile defence as a complement to nuclear deterrence.

The French nuclear deterrent covers only ‘vital interests’. The core of these vital interests includes the integrity of the national territory (the mainland as well as overseas departments and territories), the free exercise of national sovereignty, and the protection of the French population. An attack on France’s vital interests would bring on a nuclear response in the form of ‘unacceptable damage’, regardless of the nature of the threat, the identity of the State concerned, or the means employed. The current French doctrine is to deter a country essentially through the threat of destroying its political, economic and military centres of power. Also included is the option aimed at restoring deterrence, to threaten an adversary who may have misjudged French resolve or miscalculated the limits of French vital interests with a limited strike or ‘nuclear warning’. French military authorities have let it be known in 2006 that a high altitude electromagnetic pulse strike could be an option to that effect.

French authorities regularly reaffirm that their nuclear forces are solely for deterrence and do not have any war-fighting role. Since 2008, policy refers to “extreme circumstances of self-defence”. The use of this expression, taken straight from the language of the July 1996 ICJ Advisory Opinion, carries a subtle message. Even though France is reluctant to consider itself legally bound by political commitments made in the context of the NPT (or by negative security assurances), Paris is keen to show that it has not broadened the role of its nuclear deterrent.

France considers that its nuclear policy is consistent with its international legal obligations, including Article VI of the NPT. It maintains its force at a level of ‘sufficiency’ (a French expression broadly equivalent to ‘minimum deterrent’). However, the French have also adopted a very strict interpreta-

tion of Article VI. France is keen to emphasize the multidimensional character of Article VI, including the goals of cessation of the arms race and of general and complete disarmament. It considers that its actions in favour of biological, chemical and conventional disarmament are part of its Article VI record – as is its assistance to nuclear threat reduction in Russia.

Could France Ever Abandon Nuclear Weapons?

Given the importance of nuclear weapons for France, the abandonment of nuclear deterrence by Paris is an extreme hypothesis. What could be the extraordinary circumstances under which France could give up this capability? Three different scenarios need to be envisioned:

Abolition by Example

Abolition by example is hardly a credible scenario. A British decision to give up its own deterrent, for instance, would not be enough: the exemplary effect that could be expected would be in all likelihood compensated by the realization that France would then be the sole nuclear power in Europe – probably giving it a sense of responsibility, as well as a new status on the continent. An American decision to renounce nuclear weapons would be different, but France would still claim it is the forces of its adversaries that matter, not those of its allies.

A Unilateral Decision to Disarm

A unilateral decision by Paris to disarm is hardly credible either. A consistent feature of the French nuclear stance is the insistence on the need to retain nuclear weapons as long as other States can exert a major military threat against France. Various French leaders have made this point clear upon several occasions.

Nevertheless, circumstances in which major potential threats to the security of France could disappear can be imagined. A prerequisite would be a fully democratic Russia, firmly entrenched in the

Western camp in terms of fundamental values and policies. As the biggest nuclear power in Europe's neighbourhood, it is a salient feature of France's strategic environment.

A second condition would be the convincing rolling-back of nuclear proliferation, especially in the Middle East. The development of medium- and long-range ballistic missiles in the same region would also need to have ceased. This does not mean all major threats would disappear, only that the cost/benefit calculus of maintaining a nuclear deterrent would be drastically changed to the point that it would be difficult for a French government to fund and prepare the next generation of nuclear forces, especially in an era of structural budgetary constraints.

Paradoxically, the continued possession by the United States of a nuclear deterrent might help a French decision to go to zero. The U.S. extended deterrent to Europe would remain a last line of defence in case of a sudden and dramatic reversal of the strategic environment. In other words, paradoxically, a French decision to forego its nuclear arsenal may be impossible if the United States was to disarm unilaterally.

A U.S.-led Global Initiative to Go to Zero

France's participation in a coordinated move toward zero would still be another extreme scenario. However, it is possible to imagine the conditions under which Paris would willingly participate in such a move.

The fear of a major proliferation wave in the European neighbourhood would not be enough for Paris to consider abolition. The French reaction would rather be based on the idiom; "better a bird in hand than two in the bush". The safer bet would be to maintain nuclear deterrence than participating in a global abolition exercise; for if the possibility of a world with 30 nuclear powers was serious, then the political conditions for global abolition would hardly be present.

For France to go along with a U.S.-led initiative for nuclear abolition, there would need to be a dramatic change in the international environment for the better. Alternatively, a scenario where nuclear use has taken place and triggers a general trend towards general disarmament would also be a possibility. The coming into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) would probably be needed. Nuclear proliferation would have to be demonstrably and verifiably stopped, and all nuclear-capable States would need to be ready to participate in a global move towards zero.

There would also need to be very significant progress towards non-nuclear stability and disarmament. This would require fully implementing and maintaining such instruments as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). A limitation of ballistic missile proliferation would also need to be ensured. A NATO missile defence architecture, which effectively shielded Europe from any significant missile attack (whatever the payload such missiles would carry), may also be needed as an insurance policy. A democratic evolution in Russia, better relations between Moscow and its immediate neighbours, as well as the political stabilization of the greater Middle East region – from Morocco to Pakistan – would certainly be needed to help France consider a move toward zero.

A "Great Powers" Initiative to Go to Zero

A variant of the previous scenario might alter the perspective. While Paris would find it easy to resist a U.S.-only initiative, it would be much more difficult politically to do so if both Russia and China took part in it. Beijing's participation would be seen as critical, because it would then imply a very strong pressure on New-Delhi, and thus on Islamabad, to give up nuclear weapons. (Pressure on Pakistan would work directly but also indirectly,

since China would probably use its full weight to obtain Islamabad's cooperation).

In such a dramatic scenario, there would in all likelihood be strong pressures from within the European Union for France to follow suit. Assuming the United Kingdom was ready to play along, there would then be very strong pressure from key countries such as Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden, where public opinion for nuclear deterrence has never been very strong. Only some eastern European countries such as Poland and the Baltic States might resist such pressure, given their traditional fear of Russia. This could lead them, in the absence of a U.S. nuclear guarantee, to view U.K. and French forces with increased sympathy. Given France's willingness to continue to be one of the key political actors in Europe, such pressure would be very hard to resist. Before giving its arsenal, Paris would certainly attempt to secure its existence for several years, waiting for concrete disarmament steps by the major nuclear players – notably the United States and Russia, given the size of their arsenals – and for proof that verification measures would be efficient.

Thus the only credible circumstance, in which France would be seriously willing to consider a global abolition of nuclear weapons, would be where there is no foreseeable major threat against its vital interests, and those of its European partners.

¹ **DR. BRUNO TERTRAIS** is a Senior Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (FRS). He graduated from the *Institut d'études politiques de Paris* in 1984. He holds a Master's degree in Public Law (1985) and a Doctorate in Political Science (1994). His past positions include: Director, Civilian Affairs Committee, NATO Assembly (1990-1993); European affairs desk officer, Ministry of Defense (1993-1995); Visiting Fellow, the Rand Corporation (1995-1996); Special Assistant to the Director of Strategic Affairs, Ministry of Defense (1996-2001). He is a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies and a member of the editorial board of the *Washington Quarterly*.

The Future of Nuclear Disarmament

AMBASSADOR SHEEL KANT SHARMA¹

The past year has registered once again despondency on the part of the campaign, and cynical dismissal on the part of sceptics of nuclear disarmament. The world is at a crossroads as to whether that brief spring of hope, which bloomed with President Obama's Prague speech, will in his second term gain more warmth or ice. A faint feeling has grown in recent years – a plausible hope that use of the nuclear weapon may never be repeated, especially with the widening distance in time since its last use (in warfare) over sixty years ago. It is a moot point, whether the hope of such a taboo enduring is illusory. The grim reminders of the horrors of the evisceration of Japanese cities point to the abyss to which humanity can sink, and the ultimate horrors of our own destructiveness. History compels us to think retrospectively and gauge if and to what extent humankind has moved away from the brink. Deterrence theorists claim that this 60 year absence has only been possible due to the maintenance of a robust and credible deterrent. Argued equally strongly is the case against placing faith in such a strategy, which is inherently destabilizing to the point of hair trigger alerts and where deterrence remains vulnerable to misjudgement, miscalculation or catastrophic failure.

Nuclear disarmament is the strict opposite of nuclear arms race – it seeks undiminished or enhanced security at progressively lower level of arms while the latter is like chasing the chimera of strategic stability through dominance over the adversary. Nuclear deterrence as a theory was developed for ex-post-facto rationalization of the nuclear arms race. So, when we speak of the future of nuclear disarmament it is inextricably tied to the future of the nuclear arms race and theories of nu-

clear deterrence. There is an increasing sense that deterrence stability requires a modicum of cooperation between those involved. If so, at least there lies the cusp between deterrence and disarmament since a certain promise of cooperation is also needed to lead to nuclear arms reduction.

Nuclear weapons today are scarcely the currency of power and respect that was in vogue during the years of cold war or in the decade after the Soviet collapse. The watershed to a large measure has been the extraordinary terror strikes by suicide bombers over the past decade, not in distant forlorn urban habitations of the developing world but in the metropolitan centres of the developed societies. These metropolitan centres lay in countries that had won the cold war; won, *inter alia*, on the power of nuclear weapons and open market economy. The suicide attackers came from developing regions and may well have had diverse backing of proliferating nuclear weapon states under the cloak of deniability and a black mail which get starker by the day. This is the moment of reckoning which inspires even hardened practitioners of nuclear deterrent theories to proclaim that nuclear deterrence may not be credible against the new adversaries and the kind of threats that have cropped up.

Paradoxically, it was precisely during the most virulent phase of the cold war during the 1980s that revulsion against these weapons also peaked – a million strong rally in the Central park of New York city in 1982 and subsequent demonstrations all over the world, the Summit in Delhi declaring nonalignment as history's biggest peace movement, acute concerns epitomized in Jonathan Schell's powerful book "The Fate of the Earth"², and the prophesies about nuclear winter: these were the *cri du coeur* of humanity at the brink of nuclear exchange. Somehow with the Soviet collapse that entire angst and revulsion appeared to have given way to complacency in Europe and America. It was made out as though the peril did not lay in the nature of such weapons. The hardnosed appeared

sanguine about living with nuclear weapons and dismissed those evoking the fear of a nuclear holocaust as time warped.

There was the wise counsel of many at that time for reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the security calculus and outlawing their use. The debate in the UN General Assembly in the mid-nineteen nineties about seeking a reference in this regard to the International Court of Justice and diverse submissions before the Court reflected a persistent divide about the approach to questioning the legitimacy of nuclear weapons use. As things stand today, the fears of nuclear weapons use never seemed to have gone away and are reignited today by the spectre of nuclear terrorism; though its provenance may have shifted to the South.

In that sense nuclear weapons have ceased to offer hopes of enduring peace, security or stability, and evidence abounds about their inability to deliver on these goals. Besides, such is the dismal record of nuclear weapons stockpiles that the demise of the Soviet Union could not be prevented by them, nor are the conflagrations in the Middle East deterred by nuclear weapons and even South Asia scarcely enjoys more security after its much heralded and possibly inescapable nuclearisation. There are ethical and moral concerns in the West as displayed, for instance, by popular resistance to high cost of modernization of the Trident system in U.K. or the symbolic but intrepid protest of the senior gatecrashers at the Oak Ridge nuclear production facility in United States. Finally, serious questions have been raised about the safety and security of the ‘nuclear enterprise’ which sustains these weapons. These are clear indicators of a future where it is going to be progressively and tangibly more dangerous living with nuclear weapons.

As regards nuclear disarmament, it has multiple dimensions: apart from the popular angst against the weapons, their mounting costs and non-utility; dedicated NGOs and think tanks have consistently

made the case for their elimination in recent years. Then there are the non-proliferation advocates whose concerns focus more, or primarily, on preventing new nations from acquiring these weapons than on disarmament. Their case gets increasingly weaker under scrutiny as, for example, very thoroughly argued by none other than Mohamed El-Baradei, Nobel laureate and former director General of the IAEA in his book, “The Age of Deception: Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous Times”.³ He warns that proliferation will be hard to stop so long as nuclear weapons of the “haves” continue without restraint. As a result, the official stance of the nuclear weapon states of indifference to disarmament has been under severe pressure for change or reform, as in the case of NATO, and questioning by the NPT parties for implementing obligations (under Art. VI of the NPT) for nuclear disarmament; apart from being roundly squeezed on grounds of financial sustainability.

President Obama rekindled in his 2009 Prague speech a refreshing initiative towards the goal of a nuclear weapon free world, which became difficult for his nuclear allies in Europe to push aside. The concrete achievements of arms reduction between Washington and Moscow are undeniable: For the first time the numbers of strategic weapons in their arsenals have gone to levels below those in the nineteen fifties. An entire set of measures and proposals are also before the international community for taking steps towards the goal of a nuclear weapons-free world. This is unprecedented since the first special session of the UN General Assembly on disarmament in 1978 had forged a consensus setting similar goals; this time cynicism about such aspirations is less defensible than in the past.

That said where is the reality check? The question that is hard to blow away is why many nations crucial to the process are still not prepared to commence dedicated work for nuclear disarmament. What are possible reasons of the present dithering

on their part, and general disbelief or even cynicism? The past five years have seen the tide and ebb of the ideas proposed by the *four horsemen of apocalypse*. In a 2007 joint paper, Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, William Perry and Sam Nunn sought a nuclear weapon free world, essentially since nuclear deterrence, which may have worked in a bi-polar world, is too risky in a multi-polar world, and of no use against emerging threats such as those posed by suicide terrorists possessing a bomb.⁴ The spate of proposals and initiatives that followed included President Obama's Prague speech and the range of measures in his 2009 Nuclear Posture Review, further reductions in US-Russian forces in the New Start treaty (and proposals for even deeper reductions), the UN Secretary General's systematic five point plan for nuclear disarmament, the recommendations of NPT Review Conference of 2010 and a slew of other well considered measures advanced by global think tanks and peace movements.

However, in a piece last April in the Washington Post, Kissinger and Scowcroft seemed to have come full circle, as it were. Their concern:

*"The Obama administration is said to be considering negotiations (with Russia) for a new round of nuclear reductions to bring about ceilings as low as 300 warheads. Before momentum builds on that basis, we feel obliged to stress our conviction that the goal of future negotiations should be strategic stability and that lower numbers of weapons should be a consequence of strategic analysis, not an abstract preconceived determination."*⁵

They further assert that

*"Regardless of one's vision of the ultimate future of nuclear weapons, the overarching goal of contemporary U.S. nuclear policy must be to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used. Strategic stability is not inherent with low numbers of weapons; indeed, excessively low numbers could lead to a situation in which surprise attacks are conceivable."*⁶

While official Pentagon positions on these issues remain far more conservative, Kissinger and Scowcroft are pointing here to the hard road which lies ahead. Given their vast experience with nuclear disarmament negotiations it is not easy to dismiss their concerns. They have re-emphasized some old basics and added new pre-conditions for nuclear arms reduction, which, as understood by this author, could be briefly paraphrased as enhancing strategic stability, sufficiency, diversity, robustness as well as suitability and interrelationships of strategic forces with new technologies including missile defence, and precision guided or long range conventional weapons. Furthermore, they insist on taking into account a possible weakening of the non-proliferation regime and emergence of proliferating states if the US and Russia reduce nuclear weapons drastically and too quickly, on avoiding strategic analysis by mirror imaging *à la* cold war dialogues (i.e. attributing the same behaviour to the adversary as oneself with regard to nuclear weapons use) and the need to reassure US friends and allies about reliability of US extended deterrence in the ensuing uncertainty.

As can be seen very clearly these fundamental conditions are difficult to meet in simple minded step-by-step reductions. Verification of reductions and extended confidence in the verification system are also very weighty requirements when more nuclear powers join the fray; especially as sharp reduction in numbers would make the risks much higher of ineffective verifiability of compliance. Additionally, as North Korea showed, and the Iran imbroglio betrays, the so called "break out scenarios" lend further complications. The option trumpeted by the hawks, of pre-emption has a throwback to the age old pattern of disarmament through warfare – which would appear to be far less desirable in a multi polar world in times of global economic crises. Hence, more determined advocacy of global nuclear disarmament will be required – advocacy where the road map may have to comprise mutual

acceptability among concerned states at every stage and for every step.

The story of the twentieth Century struggle for disarmament in general and nuclear disarmament in particular has been that key states either preferred, or were compelled, to view it as a game. It is not as though humankind can afford to rest or have a sense of closure with having completed a round. Nor can key states have the luxury of resting on their laurels since reality of these weapons asserts in devious ways and outstrips past gains. It was first proliferation, then clandestine acquisition by states, then non-state actors joining the fray and finally the terror outfits prowling among them, putting paid to whatever assurance of stability were built by adherence of norms and restraints on the part of so many law abiding states. Partial solutions meant for managing rather than abolishing the weapons are proving inadequate in the face of dangers that persist.

In short, the moral, ethical, economic and strategic reasons for nuclear arms reduction may be much more potent and convincing today than ever before in the history of nuclear age but the pathways and mechanism for ushering in a systematic process of negotiations, actual reductions, and effective verification and compliance are by no means less daunting than anything hitherto. Hence the need for maintaining and stepping up pressure on governments to focus on a road map to elimination with inter-related steps and mutually reinforcing solutions – letting up such pressures is no option as these weapon systems have spawned over the decades tremendous vested interests, complex industry lobbies and pork barrel politics; unmindful of untold disasters in store.

As viewed from India, as regards the detailing of essential steps, those spelled out in the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan (RGAP), for instance, appear to be still valid for the most part, perhaps with some updating, e.g. prohibition on first use by an

international convention, non-use against non-nuclear weapon states, fissile materials cut off, implementation of the CTBT, clear stages of involvement of the other three nuclear weapon states after deep reductions by US-Russia, and committing all nuclear weapon-possessing states to halting and reducing their weapons in a verifiable, transparent, equitable and multilateral process of negotiations. Concurrent work on each of these steps will be mutually reinforcing and would reduce concerns about threats to strategic stability and possible deterrence failure in the disarmament process. This is especially true due to the fact that nuclear capacities and force structures are varied between the regions and globally. There is big rupture in the logic of some states that articulate defence of their nuclear deterrent as one of last resort but in the same breath, advance scenarios and preparedness – avowedly for deterrence credibility - with no holds barred. Global commitment therefore would seem to be the *sine qua non* for the road ahead.

Surveying the political landscape; hopes are delicately pinned on the second term of President Obama for reviving the impetus. More cynical assessments have alleged expedience to NPT review in 2010 as being the motivation for the orchestrated wave of disarmament talk from 2007-10. Fact remains, however, that economic situation looks less and less predictable and in any case far from capable of sustaining the enormous cost of these weapons not only for US, but for other nuclear weapon states such as U.K. and France. And, what of Russia and China? Each of them has own agenda vis-à-vis the impending prospect of a changing global order. China postulates a global order with cooperation at high table with US and Europe; but remains somewhat ambivalent on nuclear disarmament. Russian President Putin's strident pronouncements, on the other hand, do not conceal what he is demanding before moving with further reductions. France and Britain are coy but

equivocal about a process even as their weapons stockpile remains low.

Pakistan is by far alone going full throttle on nuclear weapons build up and proclaims it would guard its prowess with all its military might. Indian government maintains its credible minimum deterrent while remaining broadly committed to pursuit of RGAP goal of NFWF in a verifiable, equitable, multilaterally negotiated process. Challenges posed by Iran and North Korea remain undiminished. It remains critical in the case of Iran to separate the perspective from that in North East Asia, not to let Iran go the North Korea way and continue the search for a diplomatic solution. Peaceful resolution of the Iranian imbroglio will also lend strength to the International Atomic Energy Agency which remains the only international organization with a track record in the nuclear domain, with a Nobel to its credit.

A vision of the world without nuclear weapon cannot be a reality unless credible international machinery was at hand and the inherent balance within the IAEA's cooperative framework points the way towards it. In spite of the present state of the CTBT the organization set up in this regard, i.e. the CTBTO, has done commendably so far and is reassuring enough to be competent to play its due role after the Treaty enters into force. The UN machinery for disarmament was envisaged in 1978 and needs revitalization and review of the methods of work and procedures. Responsible states need to guard against steps that may dent the trust of a vast majority of nations in these institutions.

One can be an incorrigible optimist and say that a timeline exists for nuclear weapon free world i.e. the present century. To give a sobering perspective for disarmament, it is relevant to draw comparison with the prognosis of the Chemical Weapons Convention which is expected to fulfil its objectives almost close to the centenary of 1925 protocol. We are nowhere close to even the stage of the 1925

protocol as far as nuclear weapons are concerned. For nuclear disarmament, the emotion and passion must remain to act and achieve it tomorrow even though ample patience will be required to wait for a century and to not allow fatigue to set in.

¹ **AMBASSADOR SHEEL KANT SHARMA** is a Distinguished Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies in New Delhi, India and former Secretary General of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). He was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service and holds a Ph.D. (High Energy Physics) from Indian Institute of Technology (IIT).

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⁶ Ibid.

Identifying Principles for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World:

The Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan as a Relevant Guide

MANPREET SETHI¹

Since its birth as a nation state in 1947, India has never wavered in its desire for a nuclear weapons-free world (NWFV). Over nearly six and a half long decades, the country has presented several proposals and introduced many resolutions - some spanning at least three decades uninterrupted - at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), as well as identifying steps to realise the abolition of nuclear weapons. The most comprehensive of these actions was the Action Plan for a Nuclear Weapon Free and Non-violent World Order, (loosely referred to as the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan, or the RGAP). Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi presented the RGAP to the Third Special Session on Disarmament of the UNGA in 1988. The document laid out an elaborate three-phase plan to progressively proceed toward nuclear abolition. Had this roadmap been followed, we would have already achieved a nuclear weapons-free world today. But, this was not to be. Within a world then steeped in the Cold War mindset, the idea proved to be ahead of its time and did not receive the attention it deserved.

Nearly a quarter of a century later, many other countries and non-governmental organisations have offered reports and road maps to achieve the elimination of nuclear weapons. In fact, in the three years immediately preceding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in May 2010, there was a near frenzy of writings, commissions and seminars on the desirability and feasibility of a world free of nuclear weapons. As expected, much of the noise subsided after 2010 and only a few nuclear abolition loyalists con-

tinued to strive for universal nuclear disarmament - despite the fact that for all nuclear-armed States, it's business as usual.

Indeed, a brief look into the present policy positions of nuclear weapon-States reveals the steadfast influence of these weapons on national security strategies. The U.S. sets the tone of the discourse on nuclear issues. Despite President Obama's unprecedented speech in April 2009 however - where he signalled a U.S. desire to make efforts at moving towards a world free of nuclear weapons, thereby rendering the idea of disarmament fashionable - nothing has really changed in the U.S. nuclear strategy, except operating at reduced numbers. President Obama may have received the Nobel Peace Prize for the mere expression of his desire for nuclear abolition during his first term in office, yet he could achieve little by way of pushing his administration, and especially the Pentagon to make any meaningful progress towards this end. Will he be able to do any better during his second term? It is too early to guess. Nothing in his officials statements provides any concrete indication of where he places nuclear disarmament amongst his priorities. But unless the U.S. somehow indicates a serious commitment to this objective, it is unlikely to succeed elsewhere.

Russia, meanwhile, harbours no enthusiasm for nuclear disarmament at the time being. Moscow is in fact quite vocal in its opposition to even considering further reductions in its nuclear arsenal, catalysed by a perceived comedown in conventional capability since the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the growing ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability of the USA. Rather, in order to deal with a perceived degradation of its deterrent, the country is investing heavily in buttressing all legs of its nuclear delivery systems - from enhancing the mobility of land based missiles, to building new submarine launched missiles, and retaining the ability of its bombers.

A similar trend of strategic modernisation is also evident in China. It is focussed on enhancing its nuclear delivery capability, including the testing and development of Multiple Independently Re-targetable Vehicles (MIRVed) and Manoeuvrable Re-entry Vehicle (MARVed) missiles. Both of these would enable China to counter American missile defence. At the same time however, China does voice desire for disarmament, though it presently maintains it is up to the U.S. and Russia to take the first steps. These States would be required to significantly reduce their nuclear warheads before China could be asked to join them. China's true commitment to the realisation of a NFWF will only be tested once it is made to engage in a meaningful dialogue on the subject.

Amongst the other nuclear weapon-States (NWS), the U.K. has expressed a willingness to consider universal nuclear disarmament and has even examined the practical dimensions of verifying warhead dismantlement through a joint exercise with Norway. It does, at the same time, continue to retain its deterrent capability of nuclear capable submarines, although at a minimum level. In contrast, France has shown little support for the idea of the elimination of nuclear weapons. Its position constitutes a stumbling block, or at least a significant hurdle in the journey towards nuclear disarmament. Meanwhile, far greater difficulties are posed by Pakistan and North Korea, both of whom view their nuclear arsenal as having multi-role utility, providing them with a potent asymmetric advantage. Convincing these States to renounce their nuclear weapons will not be easy. For the moment such action can only be envisaged through collective international pressure based on a judicious mix of 'carrots' and 'sticks'. In the case of Israel, an endorsement for a NFWF can only be expected within the context of a larger solution to the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) issue in the Middle East. Lastly, India has explicitly expressed strong support for universal nuclear disarmament,

deeming its long-term security to be best served in a NFWF. Given the current situation however, it finds it necessary to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent.

As is evident from this brief *tour de horizon* of the nine nuclear-armed States, each one appears to have a varying degree of desire and commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The predominant trend appears to be in favour of following a hedging strategy, in which retention of nuclear weapons is considered necessary to safeguard national security against some specific or even non-specific threats, while the aspiration for a NFWF remains a long-term, distant goal.

The maintenance of this status quo, however, is not devoid of dangers from the continued existence of nuclear weapons, which will only grow in scope and dimension. In fact, while different countries naturally perceive different risks to their national security from nuclear weapons - based on whether or not they face nuclear-armed adversaries, the nature of their adversarial relationships, the character of their adversaries, confidence in controls over nuclear materials etc. - there is no escaping the fact that the dangers provoked by nuclear proliferation and terrorism are near global in scope. It has been scientifically proven that any deliberate nuclear exchange, even with low kiloton yields of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki variety, will have repercussions that go beyond national and regional boundaries. During the height of the Cold War, an exchange between the U.S. and USSR was expected to cause a severe nuclear winter, the effects of which would have been felt across regions. With the reduction in numbers since then, this fear may have dissipated somewhat, but it has certainly not gone away. Rather, with the spread of nuclear weapons to more States, and the persistent risk of even more proliferation (which can only be expected as non-proliferation cannot be sustainable without disarmament), the dangers can only multiply.

As it is, today's leaders are grappling with the challenge of establishing strategic stability in a multipolar environment with multiple nuclear powers. This is not an easy proposition since multiple nuclear dyads pose many new problems for a system that has until now been used to bipolar deterrence. To complicate matters further, the parameters of rationality of all the nuclear players can hardly be equated. During the Cold War, a set of rules evolved between the two superpowers that brought a modicum of predictability, and hence stability to the nuclear game. Some of the post Cold War nuclear players, however, most notably Pakistan and North Korea, have displayed a propensity for maintaining instability as a means of establishing deterrence. Therefore, besides an increase in the number of nuclear players, there now exists a lack of understanding, or a lack of desire to play by the established rules of the game of nuclear deterrence. As more countries join in, the complexities can only increase. In a crowded nuclear street, one can only hope that each player has an equally effective control over its nuclear assets, so as to minimise existential risks of inadvertent or unauthorised use of the nuclear weapon.

Furthermore, the non-state actor threatens to gate-crash the nuclear 'playpen'. Al Qaeda is of course the most well known case in its desire to acquire nuclear weapons. But there could be others. And if that were to happen, classical nuclear deterrence would not be able to avert the use of the nuclear weapon. In that unfortunate situation, the immediate physical damage that would result would be equally matched by a breach of psychological norms and taboos against nuclear use.

For all these reasons, amounting to a common risk to all countries, nuclear disarmament needs to be an urgent exercise. However, for it to have any chance of success, it is necessary that the ideal of a NFWF be premised on a set of widely accepted principles. This is especially pertinent since nuclear

weapons, more than any other weapons that mankind has possessed or renounced, have the potential to change the nature of global power plays and inter-state dynamics. Hence, nuclear disarmament needs to be conceived as being equally beneficial to all, individually and collectively. Efforts at moving towards a nuclear weapons-free world must include measures to help build a positive overall atmosphere, substantively altering threat perceptions and creating a constructive framework, within which countries can find it easy to enter into meaningful engagements and negotiations.

How can all this be obtained? How can a framework be identified that could possibly be acceptable to all nations? This article seeks to answer these questions by using the RGAP as a guide to identify six principles that must undergird a nuclear weapons-free world.

Universality

In order to be viable, nuclear disarmament must necessarily be universal and equally applicable to all nations. Unilateral nuclear disarmament, whether voluntary or imposed, cannot be the answer for stopping further proliferation. Of course, there could be countries, as there have been, who no longer feel the need to possess nuclear weapons and who unilaterally decide to give them up. South Africa made this decision for itself. But this move did not lead other nuclear weapon-States considering abandonment of their arsenals. Nor did it stem proliferation. In order to be meaningful and sustainable, nuclear disarmament has to be universal and inclusive. Each country that has nuclear weapons, or the capability to build weapons, has to commit to eliminate its stockpile, whilst those that are non-nuclear need to commit themselves to remaining so. Every country will therefore be a part of the process of disarmament. Even if one nation chooses to retain its nuclear weapons, this would render a NFWF unachievable and unsustainable.

Non-discriminatory

Uniformity of commitments is critical to the success of measures aimed at universal nuclear elimination. The requirement of equal compliance to uniformly applicable verification procedures should be applicable to all states. This scenario would drastically differ from the NPT, which has created two classes of states, with varying levels of verification and compliance standards. In fact, by doing so, it has inadvertently created an adversarial relationship between non-proliferation and disarmament. For all countries to become subject to the same rigorous implementation standards of obligations uniformly committed to, it is necessary to premise disarmament on a singular standard of compliance, which is non-discriminatory.

Verifiable

In order to address the current lack of trust among nations and to foster this trust for the future, it is necessary that as provided for in RGAP, measures towards nuclear disarmament are “underpinned by treaties and institutions, which insure against nuclear delinquency.”² This will require the establishment of an integrated multilateral verification system, perhaps under the aegis of the UN or another newly created body tasked specifically with this responsibility. It is true that the scope of verification measures may need to differ across possessors and non-possessors of nuclear weapons, yet intrusiveness and stringency must be equal in principle and practice. Only if disarmament is premised on such values, can we foster sufficient transparency, and thus confidence amongst States to stick to their commitments in the long term.

Accompanied by Simultaneous Collateral Measures

Various nations perceive nuclear weapons contribute to their security needs. Thus as nuclear disarmament proceeds, a natural tendency to mitigate perceived security deficits via other types of military ‘crutches’ could arise – whether through con-

ventional, space-based weaponry, new offensive technologies etc. Such a move would not only be counterproductive but also further complicate steps towards disarmament. A requirement therefore exists to adopt a multi-pronged strategy, in order to achieve a disarmament, which simultaneously addresses wider security perceptions and builds confidence in areas such as; reducing conventional military capabilities to minimum levels required for defensive purposes; prohibition of the weaponisation of outer space; or precluding the development of new weapon systems based on emerging technologies etc. The RGAP especially recognised this requirement. In his address to the UN, Rajiv Gandhi said, “While nuclear disarmament constitutes the centrepiece of each stage of the plan, this is buttressed by collateral and other measures to further the process of disarmament.”³

This, of course, does not look easy in the contemporary context. However, the answer may lie in the nature of collateral measures taken alongside the move to nuclear elimination. For example, if nuclear disarmament is *either the result of, or results in more cooperative and secure inter-state relations, then countries will not feel the need to move towards build up of conventional capabilities*. For instance, if the U.S. and Russia converge in their views on a cooperative approach to ballistic missile defence, a joint vision on universal nuclear disarmament could most likely arise from this. In such a scenario, the nature of inter-state security automatically changes. Therefore, one cannot help but emphasise the importance of a broadly and consensually agreed upon process of disarmament that includes a multitude of simultaneous steps. Collectively, these would generate greater confidence and have a benign effect on the international security climate.

Acceptance and tolerance

The Action Plan presented by Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 was prescient in stating:

“The root causes of global insecurity reach far below the calculus of military parity. They are related to the instability spawned by widespread poverty, squalor, hunger, disease and illiteracy [...] The effort to promote security for all must be underpinned by the effort to promote opportunity for all and equitable access to achievement. Comprehensive global security must rest on a new, more just, more honourable world order.”⁴

Indeed, a culture of non-violence within which the military dimension of international relations is de-emphasised, must be accepted as the principle for conduct within international relations if we are to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. The new world order will have to be based on “respect for various ideologies, on the right to pursue different socio-economic systems, and the celebration of diversity.”⁵ It is the threat of regime change or non-acceptance of a particular political or economic system that raises insecurities. With the end of the ideological rivalry of the Cold War, there does appear to be greater tolerance for different national approaches. As long as basic humanitarian values are respected, the new world order must show greater respect for the principles of coexistence, non-use of force, non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, and the right of every state to pursue its own path of development, all of which are enshrined in the UN Charter.

India’s first Prime Minister used to emphasise the goal of peace over security. The reason behind this is well explained by India’s foremost strategic analyst Jasjit Singh:

“An environment of peace would naturally provide security, whereas mere security may or may not bring peace. For example, security in Europe during the Cold War was ensured for 45 years by something like 60,000 nuclear weapons, 94,000 combat airplanes, about 110,000 tanks and massive quantities of other weapons and military systems.”⁶

Despite all security measures in place, peace proved to be elusive. The acquisition of nuclear

weapons, whether through national possession or extended deterrence, brought security but not peace. Therefore, as Singh points out, “Peace has to be given a chance in shaping future paradigms”.⁷

Indeed, cooperative security, in place of current ‘competitive security’, is what we need to not only meet the requirements of nuclear disarmament but also face the many challenges of the 21st century. An indication of this understanding can be found in the UN Security Council Resolution 1887, adopted on 24 September 2009 under the chairmanship of President Obama. It established a linkage between nuclear disarmament and the promotion of international stability, peace and security premised on, “the principle of increased and undiminished security for all.”⁸ Can nations bring themselves to rise above existing paradigms of security to envision a different world order premised on cooperation and the objective of peace rather than security? Can we at least begin to talk, write and debate the contours of a post-nuclear world, so that its appeal and advantages can begin to pervade wider spaces – geographical, and of the mind? And as mindsets change, so will the reality of the day. This is a fact proven by history, and the abolition of well-entrenched systems such as slavery and apartheid bear testimony to this.

Time bound but Flexible

The RGAP recommended a three-stage, time bound plan to get to zero. The first and second phases were to last 6 years each, while the final phase was to last a decade. However, over the years, many countries, such as France and Russia, have opposed the creation of ‘artificial time lines’. While it is certainly necessary that flexibility be allowed on an issue as complex as elimination of nuclear weapons, the problem with not committing to any fixed schedule is that the fight could remain open-ended, without creating tangible benchmarks for progress. It would be far more helpful if some consensually agreed upon phases for implementa-

tion of these steps could be developed. The time line would have to be negotiable in order to arrive at a broad consensus, but to have no deadlines for necessary actions, is akin to having no real plan of action.

Conclusion

In 1988 Rajiv Gandhi said:

*“Humanity is at a crossroads. One road will take us like lemmings to our suicide. That is the path indicated by doctrines of nuclear deterrence, deriving from traditional concepts of the balance of power. The other road will give us another chance. That is the path signposted by the doctrine of peaceful coexistence, deriving from the imperative values of non-violence, tolerance and compassion.”*⁹

Humanity is still poised at the same juncture today. This is both a fortunate and an unfortunate reality. It is fortunate because mankind has not yet blown itself up in a nuclear holocaust and the numbers of nuclear weapons have progressively reduced. At the same time, it is also unfortunate that humanity has not progressed down the road to a nuclear weapons-free world. While numbers may have been reduced, the dangers from nuclear weapons remain and have in fact grown in dimension to become even more sinister.

Today we inhabit a world where many more states possess nuclear weapons; where even more could be tempted to cross the threshold, thereby leaving a large tear in the non-proliferation fabric; where non-state actors are powerful enough to pose threats to state security; where the possibility of non-state actors acquiring nuclear material or weapons for terrorism, either with or without state complicity, have multiplied; where inter-state relations are mired in mutual mistrust; and where the possibility of a nuclear incident – terrorist triggered or state sponsored - occurring somewhere in the world, poses a risk. President Obama stated at the Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010, “It is an

irony that while the risks of a nuclear confrontation have come down, the risks of a nuclear attack have increased.”¹⁰

With an increase in nuclear danger, there must be simultaneous progression in our understanding that the only sustainable route to mitigating these dangers, is through creating a nuclear weapons-free world. Such a world must be built on the pillars of all the aforementioned principles, thus promising equal cooperative security to all.

¹ **DR. MANPREET SETHI** is a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Air Power Studies, New Delhi, India and heads its Nuclear Security project. She is also Fellow, International Relations, Centre de Sciences Humaines, New Delhi. On the research faculty of Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, from 1997 to 2001, she focussed on nuclear energy proliferation, export controls, and disarmament. She completed her Ph.D. from School of International Studies, JNU, New Delhi in 1997.

² Gandhi, Rajiv. “Address by his Excellency Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, Prime Minister of the Republic of India.” Third Special Session on Disarmament, June 9, 1988, in *Report of the Informal Group on RGAP 88*, p 196. New Delhi, August 20, 2011 (hereafter “Report of the Informal Group on RGAP 88”). <http://www.pugwashindia.org/images/uploads/Report.pdf>. [For the “1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for Ushering in a Nuclear Weapons Free and Non-Violent World Order” see pp. 186 – 191.]

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., p. 200.

⁶ Singh, Jasjit. “Introductory Remarks to the New Delhi Conference.”, in *Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World*, edited by Manpreet Sethi, xvi. New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2009.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1887, September 24, 2009.

⁹ Report of the Informal Group on RGAP 88, p. 193.

¹⁰ Obama, Barack. “Speech at the Nuclear Security Summit.” Washington D.C., United States. April 13, 2010. <http://www.cfr.org/proliferation/obamas-speech-nuclear-security-summit-april-2010/p21889>.

Taming Godzilla: *Nuclear Deterrence in North-East Asia**

ALYN WARE,¹ KIHO HI,²
HIROMICHI UMEBAYASHI³

Godzilla, a giant monster mutated by nuclear radiation, first appears in a 1954 Japanese science fiction movie by the same name, ravaging Japan in a symbolic warning about the risks of nuclear weapons. Since then Godzilla has appeared in more than 28 films as well as many video games, novels, comic books, and a television series.

Like Godzilla, nuclear weapons continue to manifest themselves in various ways, threatening the security of people and countries in the North-East Asian region.

In the West the most publicized North-East Asian threat remains North Korea (DPRK) – with their withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003, nuclear test detonations in 2006, 2009 and 2013, and the testing of ballistic missiles possibly carrying nuclear weapons, the most recent of which successfully launched a space satellite in December 2012.

Western media in particular, highlight the totalitarian nature of the North Korean regime, occasional military skirmishes with South Korea, as well as frequent vitriolic official statements against the U.S., and what North Korea calls the ‘U.S. puppet governments of South Korea and Japan’. Evidence of collaboration in the nuclear black-market network of A.Q. Khan is also taken to indicate the threat from the North.⁴ Nicholas D. Kristof of the *New York Times* goes as far to state, “the greatest atomic peril since the Cuban Missile Crisis looms just beyond the horizon as the situation worsens in North Korea.”⁵

On the other hand, the nuclear deterrence policy of North Korea can be seen as a logical response to perceived threats from the United States, Japan and South Korea. North Korea’s repeated requests for a peace treaty to officially end the 1950-53 Korean War have been rejected.⁶ The U.S., Japan and South Korea refuse to rule out the option of a first-use of nuclear weapons against North Korea. Various U.S. administrations have called North Korea a “rogue” state and have discussed “regime change”.⁷ Joint military exercises off the coast of North Korea, such as “Team Spirit” and “Resolve” exercises, are perceived by North Korea as “war games aimed at northward invasion.”⁸

The decision by North Korea to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and acquire a nuclear deterrent capacity was made after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. North Korea argued that it was the elimination of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction that removed their deterrent, thus enabling a U.S. invasion. They announced the need to develop their own nuclear deterrent to prevent a similar invasion.⁹ Within this political context, the possibility of reversing the nuclearisation of North Korea without addressing their security concerns, whether perceived or real, is very low. In particular North Korea has been calling for a peace treaty to end the uneasy armistice, and for guarantees of non-aggression against them.

The Korean peninsula is not the only flashpoint in North-East Asia that could trigger a nuclear confrontation. China and the United States, both nuclear-armed States, continue to face off over the status of Taiwan. The Chinese claim sovereignty over Taiwan, whilst the U.S. provides military and political support to the Taiwanese.¹⁰ Competing claims between China and neighbouring countries (including U.S. allies Japan, South Korea and the Philippines), over small islands in the South and East China Sea, are increasing in intensity. With increasing ambitions by States to exploit seabed

* This is a slightly edited version of an article that appeared in the *Pacific Ecologist*, Summer 2013 edition.

resources within the exclusive economic zones of these islands, a military conflict could escalate into a nuclear crisis.¹¹

The variety of nuclear threats in the region and the interlinking of nuclear doctrines with security issues and perceptions, points to the need for a regional approach that enhances security guarantees on the non-use of force, and decreases the role of nuclear weapons for all nuclear-possessing States and their allies. The alternative approach, focusing on the nuclear capabilities of only one country (such as the original Six Party Process, which aimed to reverse the North Korean nuclear program), has already been proved unrealistic.¹²

The Research Centre for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, based at Nagasaki University, has put forward a comprehensive strategy to address nuclear threats in the North-East Asian region. The plan focuses primarily on establishing a North-East Asian nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ). A draft treaty was released in 2008 by Katsuya Okada, the then Chair of the Democratic Party of Japan's Parliamentary Disarmament Group, who went on to become Japan's Foreign Minister. It has been the subject of a number of academic and parliamentary meetings in Japan and South Korea since then.

Based on a '3+3 formula'¹³, the draft treaty proposes that North Korea give up its nuclear weapons and become subject to verification, but not unilaterally. Under the treaty the other five nations; South Korea, Japan, Russia, China; and the United States, would also have to decrease the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines:

- Japan and South Korea would commit to not allowing nuclear weapons on their territories and to not threatening North Korea with nuclear weapons being used by the U.S. in their 'defence'
- The U.S., China and Russia would commit to not deploying nuclear weapons on the territories of Japan, South Korea or North Korea

- The U.S., China and Russia would commit to not using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against Japan, South Korea or North Korea.

The proposal provides a 'win/win/win/win' approach to enhance the security of all States in the region. North Korea would receive binding guarantees, particularly by the United States, that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. Japan and South Korea would receive binding guarantees, particularly by China and Russia, that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. The proposal thus provides the most realistic approach to persuading North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons capability. Tensions between China, Russia and the U.S. would be reduced through decreasing the role of nuclear weapons in their doctrines. Furthermore regional tensions regarding the islands in the South and East China Seas would be reduced, as the possible threat from nuclear weapons would be taken off the table.¹⁴

The proposal draws from other nuclear weapon-free zones established in Antarctica, Latin America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, South-East Asia, Africa and Central Asia. It is nonetheless uniquely designed to address the specific security environment in North-East Asia.

Already the proposal has received considerable political and civil society support. 93 parliamentarians from Japan and South Korea have endorsed a *Joint Statement by Parliamentarians of Japan and the Republic of Korea on Denuclearization of Northeast Asia*, which supports the establishment of a North-East Asian NWFZ. Endorsers include former foreign ministers and other high-level parliamentarians from both government and opposition parties.¹⁵ In Japan, mayors and other heads of over 400 local authorities have supported a statement to create a nuclear weapon-free zone in North-East Asia.¹⁶

A number of issues remain unresolved within the proposal, including whether such an agreement would need to proscribe the role of nuclear weapons completely in Japanese and South Korean security policies, or whether a reduced form of extended nuclear deterrence would be permitted.

The draft treaty circulated by Okada proposes that, “Each Intra-zonal State shall undertake to eliminate all dependence whatsoever on any nuclear weapon or any other nuclear explosive device in all aspects of its security policy.”¹⁷ Some analysts argue that this is an unrealistic approach as Japan and South Korea rely on extended nuclear deterrence for their security, particularly relating to security threats from nuclear-armed China and Russia. These analysts argue that neither Japan nor South Korea would be prepared to join a treaty, which entirely eliminated extended nuclear deterrence.¹⁸

This argument is questionable. The proposed draft treaty stipulates it would only enter into force, when the 3-named nuclear weapon-States (China, Russia and the U.S.) ratify the treaty protocols under which they guarantee not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against any of the 3-zonal parties (Japan, South Korea and the DPRK). Thus under the 3+3 NWFZ Treaty, Japan and South Korea would no longer ‘require’ extended nuclear deterrence from the U.S. to deter China and Russia.

Australia’s membership in the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ), despite its nuclear alliance with the United States, shows how flexibility in negotiations can bring success and normative shifts in policy, without having to directly confront the nuclear weapon-States. Australia couldn’t agree to prohibit nuclear deterrence in the SPNFZ Treaty. Officially Australia continues to embrace an extended nuclear deterrence relationship with the U.S..¹⁹ However, both China and Russia perceived Australia’s joining the SPNFZ Treaty as an indication of a lowering of the role of extended nuclear deterrence by the U.S. in the re-

gion. They thus ratified the treaty, thereby committing not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against the States parties to the zone.

Some analysts argue that despite current Japanese and Korean policy embracing nuclear deterrence, there is a very real chance that this could be phased out in the near future with sound diplomacy and political leadership. Jeffrey Lewis, for example, argues that the Japanese-U.S. extended nuclear deterrence arrangement is but a smoke-screen – with no evidential commitment from the U.S. to utilize nuclear forces in response to military threats confronting their North-East Asian allies. Rather than risking a nuclear escalation, the U.S. in reality, relies on conventional forces for extended deterrence.²⁰

Peter Hayes argues that Japanese and South Korean policy makers are beginning to understand that extended nuclear deterrence has been counter-productive in efforts to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons, and that an alternative strategy based fully on non-nuclear military power might be more effective. Hayes goes further, arguing that North Korea’s nuclear policy is not primarily a response to extended nuclear deterrence, but relates to a perceived direct threat of nuclear attack from the United States. Thus North Korea’s willingness to join a North-East Asian NWFZ will rely on negative security assurances from the U.S., and also on progress towards global nuclear abolition.²¹

In 2008, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon released a Five-Point Plan for Nuclear Disarmament. This envisions achieving a nuclear weapons-free world through a global nuclear abolition treaty. The treaty would be negotiated concurrently with interim measures including establishing additional nuclear weapons-free zones.

The UN Secretary-General’s proposal has been supported worldwide, including in a unanimous resolution of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, representing 160 national parliaments and 10 regional

parliaments. Continued adherence to nuclear deterrence, including extended nuclear deterrence, is the primary barrier to achieving this vision.

As such, in 2009 a number of leading parliamentarians from countries under extended nuclear deterrence released a paper calling for the practice to be phased out. They argued that the 21st century key security issues constitute non-military threats, which require international collaborative and non-military responses. These security threats include climate change, poverty, the spread of diseases, resource depletion and financial crises. The provocative approach of nuclear deterrence prevents rather than assists global collaboration required to meet these security needs.

Secondly it was argued the military threats that continue to exist could be better met by non-nuclear means. Nuclear weapons have no role in civil wars. Nor can nuclear weapons deter terrorists. International aggression is better prevented and responded to by collective action under United Nations authorisation, than by the threat or use of nuclear weapons. The threat of a nuclear attack by a rogue state is furthermore best addressed by UN collective response, or if necessary, by conventional military force.

Thirdly, regional security is more effectively promoted by security mechanisms and mutually beneficial economic and trade relationships than by nuclear deterrence. International security mechanisms include the United Nations Security Council, International Court of Justice, International Criminal Court, and various arms-control and disarmament treaties. Regional security mechanisms in Europe include the European Union, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and the NATO Partnership Program.

These arguments should move political leaders in North-East Asia to commence negotiations on a North-East Asian NWFZ and increase their sup-

port for global nuclear abolition. This would prevent the nuclear Godzilla from rearing its ugly head again in the region, or anywhere in the world. Political leaders are all too often ‘joined at the hip’ with antiquated security frameworks, militaristic ideology, and the political interests of the nuclear weapons industry. An additional push by civil society will probably be needed in order to get the ball rolling, and finally condemn the nuclear Godzilla to the waste-bin of the past.

¹ **ALYN WARE** is a policy analyst and nuclear abolition advocate from Aotearoa-New Zealand. He is the founder of the Nuclear Abolition Forum, Global Co-ordinator of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNND), a member of the World Future Council, a consultant for the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms and a 2009 winner of the Right Livelihood Award.

² **KIHO YI** is an Associate Director of Nautilus, a research institute on North-East Asian security. Previously YI Kiho served as the Korean Coordinator of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, and Secretary General of Korea Peace Forum. He studied at Waseda University in Japan, looking at the local civil movement and its links to peace in East Asia. Before 1999 he worked for ten years in the Korea Christian Academy, where he focused on Korean political change and global peace networks.

³ **DR. HIROMICHI UMEBAYASHI** is Director of the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University, Former President & Founder of Peace Depot Japan and North-East Asia Coordinator for Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament. He is a Ph.D. holder in the field of Applied Solid State Physics from Tokyo University. After resigning from university teaching in 1980, he became a fulltime campaigner and researcher for peace, disarmament and human rights issues. He is the Editor in Chief of bi-weekly periodical “Nuclear Weapon & Test Monitor” (in Japanese) and the Supervising Editor of the Year Book “Nuclear Disarmament & Peace – for Citizens and Local Authorities” (in Japanese). He won the Peace Prize of the Peace Studies Association of Japan in 2008.

⁴ “Letter to A.Q. Khan.” *The New York Times*, July 7, 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/07/08/world/asia/20110708_KHAN_LETTER_DOC.html?ref=nuclearprogram.

⁵ Kristof, Nicholas D. “Nuclear Collision Course.” *The New York Times*, July 17, 2005. <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/17/opinion/17NORTH KOREA-FEATURE.html>.

⁶ “North Korea Calls for Unconditional Peace Treaty With U.S.” *Global Security Newswire*, July 26, 2012. <http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/north-korea-calls-unconditional-peace-treaty-us/>.

⁷“Post–cold War Policy - Isolating and punishing “rogue” states.” *Encyclopaedia of the New American Nation*. <http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Post-cold-War-Policy-Isolating-and-punishing-rogue-states.html#ixzz1km2m5X7A>.

⁸Kim, Min-seok and Min-yong Lee, “North strongly protests new Key Resolve joint exercises.” *Korea JoongAng Daily*, March 9, 2010. <http://koreajoongangdaily.joinsmsn.com/news/article/article.aspx?aid=2917570>.

⁹“It is a serious lesson the world has drawn from the Iraqi war that a war can be averted and the sovereignty of the country and the security of the nation can be protected only when a country has a physical deterrent force, a strong military deterrent force capable of decisively repelling any attack to be made by any types of sophisticated weapons. The reality indicates that building up a physical deterrent force is urgently required for preventing the outbreak of a nuclear war on the Korean peninsula and ensuring peace and security of the world.” Press Statement by the DPRK, May 12, 2003. See “U.S. to Blame for Derailing Process of Denuclearization on Korean Peninsula”, *Korean Central News Agency*, 12 May, 2003. <http://www.kcna.co.jp/item/2003/200305/news05/13.htm>.

¹⁰Carpenter, Ted, Galen. *America's Coming War With China: A Collision Course Over Taiwan*. New York, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

¹¹“China’s Territorial Disputes.” *The New York Times*, Accessed January 13, 2013. <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/china/territorial-disputes/index.html>.

Johnson, Robert. “China Newspaper Says To 'Prepare For The Worst' After Military Confrontation With Japan In The East China Sea”, *Business Insider*, January 12, 2013. <http://www.businessinsider.com/china-fighter-jet-flights-diaoyu-senkaku-islands-2013-1#ixzz2HvLyb3XV>.

¹²Blank, Stephan. “Rethinking the Six-Party Process on Korea.” *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, 20/1, (2011).

A new flexibility in the Six Party process to include security concerns of DPRK along with those of Japan and South Korea might be more successful. Such an approach could include the possibility of a 3+3 NE Asia NWFZ treaty.

¹³The 3+3 formula would involve three intra-zonal States (Japan, South Korea and North Korea), and three ‘neighbouring’ nuclear weapon-States (China, Russia and the United States). The ratification of all six States would be required for the treaty to enter-into-force.

¹⁴As such there is some talk about also inviting Taiwan to join a North-East Asian nuclear weapon-free zone. However, the complications regarding the status of Taiwan might preclude this. China might not be agreeable to Taiwan joining the treaty as a State. Taiwan and the U.S. might be hesitant for Taiwan to join the treaty in any other status.

¹⁵“NE Asia NWFZ – moving toward sustainable regional security”, *PNNND Update*, 32 (April 2012). <http://www.gsinsitute.org/pnnd/updates/32.html#13>.

¹⁶“The heads of more than 400 local authorities express support for a Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone”, *Peace Depot*, August 13, 2012.

¹⁷Treaty on the Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (tentative translation): The Democratic Party of Japan Nuclear Disarmament Group, August 2008. <http://www.pnnd.org/docs/NEA-NWFZ.pdf>.

¹⁸Nobuyasu Abe and Hirofumi Tosaki write, “Without extended nuclear deterrence, Washington’s allies, including Japan, would question the credibility of the US commitment to their security and the region’s security.” Abe, Nobuyasu and Hirofumi Tosaki. “Untangling Japan’s Nuclear Dilemma: Deterrence before Disarmament.”, in *Disarming Doubt, The Future of Nuclear Deterrence in East Asia*, edited by Rory Medcalf and Fiona Cunningham, 19-46. Woolahra: Lowy Institute, 2012, p. 31.

¹⁹“For so long as nuclear weapons exist, we are able to rely on the nuclear forces of the United States to deter nuclear attack on Australia. Australian defence policy under successive governments has acknowledged the value to Australia of the protection afforded by extended nuclear deterrence under the US alliance. That protection provides a stable and reliable sense of assurance and has over the years removed the need for Australia to consider more significant and expensive defence options.” *Australia Defence White Paper*, Section 6:34, 2009. http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_paper_2009.pdf.

²⁰Lewis, Jeffrey. “Rethinking Extended Deterrence in Northeast Asia.” *Nautilus Institute Policy Forum*, Policy Forum 10-054, November 3, 2010. <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/rethinking-extended-deterrence/>.

²¹Hayes, Peter. “Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Global Abolition and Korea.” *Nautilus Institute Policy Forum*, Policy Forum 09-096A17, December 17, 2009. <http://nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/extended-nuclear-deterrence-global-abolition-and-korea/>.

Untangling Japan's Nuclear Dilemma:

*Deterrence before Disarmament**

NOBUYASU ABE¹ AND HIROFUMI TOSAKI²

Introduction

In his historic Prague speech in 2009, President Barack Obama committed the United States to take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons while maintaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal for deterrence and reassurance as long as nuclear weapons exist.³ In response, Tokyo expressed strong support for his first goal, but also concern that a reduced role and size of US nuclear forces might weaken US extended nuclear deterrence, the so-called nuclear umbrella. This seemingly paradoxical response reflects a long standing dilemma in Japanese security policy regarding nuclear weapons.

The total elimination of nuclear weapons has been an earnest and pervasive desire in Japan since the time of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan also sees the promotion of nuclear disarmament as strengthening its security by mitigating the nuclear threats that it faces. But, given the security imperatives imposed by its fragile security environment, Japan has depended on US extended nuclear deterrence for many decades. The fact that former Prime Minister and Nobel Laureate Eisaku Sato had to accept a secret understanding with the United States that undermined Japan's Three Non-Nuclear Principles is testimony to the depth of the dilemma that Japan faces. While Japan maintains this set of poli-

cies renouncing the possession and manufacturing of nuclear weapons and their introduction into Japanese territory, in 2010 a government-organised committee headed by Professor Shinichi Kitaoka confirmed the existence of a secret "tacit" agreement with the United States to allow passage of American nuclear weapons through Japanese territory.⁴

Unlike the situation for US allies in the European theatre, the collapse of the Soviet Union did not alleviate all of Japan's security concerns. Rather, Tokyo perceives that the security environment in Northeast Asia is becoming more unstable and complicated, with such diverse threats and challenges as the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait; North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles; China's rapid and aggressive military modernisation; unresolved issues over territory and maritime interests; and the possibility of a power transition due to China's rise and the relative decline of US power. It is true that thick and complex interdependence has developed among Northeast Asian countries (except North Korea), making it difficult for them to resort to war in order to resolve disputes or enforce their will on others. Still, "[m]ilitary-political security has priority, and the use of force, even all-out war is understood as a possibility"⁵ in this region.

Japan's Nuclear Umbrella Dilemma: Between Aversion and Abandonment

The US nuclear umbrella over Japan has been characterised as existential deterrence based on the US possession of massive nuclear forces, mutual defence commitments under the Japan-US Security Treaty and occasional reaffirmations by Washington. Unlike in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries and South Korea during the Cold War, US nuclear forces were not deployed in Japan, nor were operational plans for the use of nuclear weapons or a so-called "escalation ladder" established. Indeed, Tokyo and Washington had

* This article is an abridged version of edited volume chapter: Abe, Nobuyasu and Hirofumi Tosaki. "Untangling Japan's Nuclear Dilemma: Deterrence before Disarmament," in *Disarming Doubt: The Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence in East Asia*, edited by Rory Medcalf and Fiona Cunningham, 19-46. Woollahra: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2012. See also: http://lowyinstitute.cachefly.net/files/disarmingdoubt_web.pdf.

not even discussed the details of extended deterrence until recently.

The credibility of the nuclear umbrella was never a significant issue for Japan during the Cold War except when China conducted its first nuclear test in 1964 and Japan was seriously considering its accession to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) during the 1960s and 1970s.

In Northeast Asia, US nuclear and conventional forces were superior to those of the Soviet Union, and, in particular, the combined naval and air capabilities of Japan's Self-Defense Forces and US forces had a high denial capability. In addition, the possibility of US counter-attack, including the use of nuclear weapons to defend Japan, was regarded as realistic because of Japan's importance to the US strategy to contain the Soviet Union. Japan's fear at this time was of "entrapment" in a US-Soviet clash rather than "abandonment" by the United States.

Given the changes in the regional and international security environment after the Cold War, Japan's interest in extended nuclear deterrence has been increasing for some time now. Its primary concerns have gradually shifted from entrapment to abandonment and the potential weakening of the credibility of the nuclear umbrella. President Obama's commitment to reducing the role and number of US nuclear weapons has thus invited Japan's attention.

Minimum Deterrence

Theoretically, even if the United States drastically reduced the role and the size of its nuclear arsenal, and, for example, adopted a minimum deterrence posture, the deterrent effect of its nuclear umbrella could persist due to unpredictability in the use of such tremendously destructive weapons. A prospective attacker simply could not be confident that Washington would never use its nuclear weapons to defend Japan.⁶ Besides, as indicated in the Joint Statement of the Japan-US Security Consulta-

tive Committee (2+2) in May 2007, "the full range of U.S. military capabilities – both nuclear and non-nuclear strike forces and defensive capabilities – form the core of extended deterrence and support U.S. commitments to the defense of Japan."⁷ The role of US conventional deterrence has been expanding significantly and complements nuclear deterrence. Still, Japan could well be concerned about deeper cuts in the number of US weapons to the extent that it expects the US nuclear umbrella to perform roles other than minimum deterrence.

Deterrence by Denial

One possible role Japan might expect of the US nuclear forces is deterrence by denial and damage limitation through counterforce operations if deterrence failed. The establishment of an effective denial posture would reduce the probability that the United States and/or Japan would suffer serious damage from a nuclear attack. In theory, such a posture would also enhance the credibility of US extended deterrence. This would seem to require a large number of nuclear weapons and a broad range of strike options, including first strike or even pre-emption.

However, Tokyo does not appear to be wedded to this potential role for the US arsenal. Japan did not express concern or opposition, at least officially, when the Obama Administration decided to terminate programs for the research and development of new nuclear weapons, including the robust nuclear earth penetrator and "mini-nukes", which the George W Bush Administration had abortively sought to develop for attacking and defeating hard and deeply buried targets, mobile and relocatable targets, and chemical or biological agents.

The lack of Japanese opposition might have reflected Japan's basic position calling for eventual complete nuclear disarmament, or a judgment that existing US nuclear forces could fulfill the requirements of a denial posture. At the same time,

considering that the Bush Administration pursued these capabilities because of a perceived lack of capabilities for a denial posture, Japan's indifference may also imply that it perceives denial as a less important role for US extended nuclear deterrence.

Deterrence by Punishment

If Japan indeed accords little importance to deterrence by denial, the remaining role that it expects the US nuclear arsenal to play is deterrence by punishment. As Japan is unable to possess any retaliatory capability against enemy territory under the current interpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, Tokyo has counted upon the US nuclear umbrella to deter not just nuclear but also biological, chemical and even massive conventional attacks or threats of such attacks.

This is one of the reasons Tokyo is concerned about the possible curtailment of the roles of US nuclear weapons at a time when Japan still faces those threats.

Some Japanese security officials and experts express concern about the consequences were the United States to reduce its strategic nuclear arsenal to below 1,000 warheads in the current security environment. This number does not seem to reflect a thorough calculation of the number of weapons needed for the missions and targeting necessary to maintain extended nuclear deterrence by punishment on Japan's behalf. Rather, it is more likely to be a largely psychological calculation: Japan would only feel reassured if the US nuclear capability remains undoubtedly second to none.

US Declaratory Policy

Japan has also carefully watched the debate over US declaratory policy. The declaratory policy set out in the 2010 NPR seems to have been a meeting point between those who favoured a reduced role for nuclear weapons (with an eye toward a world

without such weapons) and those who favoured maintaining nuclear deterrence and thus reassuring Tokyo.

On the one hand, reflecting the vision of nuclear weapon free world advocates, the NPR declared that "the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons ... is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners," and the United States "will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations."⁸

On the other hand, it satisfies the concerns of supporters of extended deterrence with statements such as "in the case of countries not covered by this assurance – states that possess nuclear weapons and states not in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations – there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the U.S. or its allies and partners."⁹

Their concerns were also alleviated when the 2010 NPR also stated that "the United States will consult with allies and partners regarding the conditions under which it would be prudent to shift to a policy under which deterring nuclear attack is the sole purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons."¹⁰

These questions, compromises and concerns about the adequacy of US nuclear posture and capabilities to support the nuclear umbrella give rise to a number of challenges that Japan and the United States must manage cooperatively.

The issue regarding the TLAM-Ns and US declaratory policy seems to reveal the gap between the perceptions of the United States and its allies. The fact is that certain allies continue to attach importance to particular weapons systems or measures while the United States sees particular weapons

systems in narrower terms of their practical effectiveness in providing deterrence. It will be vital for regional stability and Japan's security for the United States and its allies, including Japan, to find ways to manage the challenges posed by these perception gaps in terms of deterrence and reassurance so as to maintain alliance cohesion and integrity.

Another challenge is how reasonably to limit Japan's expectations of the US nuclear umbrella. How can Japan resist the temptation to expect extended deterrence to do more than that of which it is capable? Extended nuclear deterrence remains the ultimate guarantor of Japan's security, but it is also true that this umbrella cannot deter all the contingencies Japan may face. Therefore, it is important to establish postures for deterring and countering the wide range of contingencies that Japan may face in the future, and do so using non-nuclear capabilities to a much larger extent than before.

The 2010 NPR hinted that the United States would require its allies to strengthen their own defence capability, stating that the US "Administration is pursuing strategic dialogues with its allies and partners in East Asia and the Middle East to determine how best to cooperatively strengthen regional security architectures to enhance peace and security."¹¹ This implies that Japan is required to strengthen its own conventional deterrence to compensate for reduced US reliance on nuclear deterrence.

Extended Conventional Deterrence

According to one US analyst, "bureaucratic reorganization and reform, procurement and modernization programs, and even the missions assigned to deployed military units have changed in ways that deemphasize the role of U.S. nuclear forces in military operations and planning."¹² This change is reflected in the various US Nuclear Posture Reviews.

In the 2002 NPR the Bush Administration introduced a "New Triad" which consisted of offence (nuclear and non-nuclear), defence and responsive infrastructure.

The Obama Administration embarked on quest to fulfil its unequivocal commitment to maintain deterrence with a reduced role for a smaller arsenal of nuclear weapons by continuing to strengthen its overwhelming conventional capabilities. Regarding regional issues in particular, the 2010 NPR indicated that "enhancing regional security architectures are key parts of the U.S. strategy for strengthening regional deterrence while reducing the role and number of nuclear weapons. These regional security architectures include effective missile defense, counter-WMD capabilities, conventional power-projection capabilities, and integrated command and control,"¹³ in addition to forward-deployed nuclear forces.

The physical and psychological impact of conventional forces falls short of that of nuclear forces, and US conventional deterrence may fail if the other side underestimates US capabilities. Just as worryingly, an adversary that perceives its forces to be greatly inferior to US conventional forces might be tempted to bolster its position by acquiring and building such capabilities as weapons of mass destruction (WMD), ballistic missiles and special forces.¹⁴

Regardless of such arguments, it cannot be denied that improving the accuracy and yield of US conventional forces provides a greater range of more flexible options for retaliation prior to any need to use nuclear forces, ranging from a decapitation attack against the opponent's leadership to a large and devastating conventional military response. Since the threshold for using conventional forces is much lower than that for nuclear use, a broader and more flexible range of options for conventional retaliation can complement nuclear deter-

rence by punishment, the credibility of which is often questioned.

Furthermore, “when U.S. priority goals include post-conflict ‘nation-building’ and the reconstruction of a defeated opponent, U.S. advanced non-nuclear capabilit[ies] may be more credible.”¹⁵

Certainly the development of US conventional forces has also strengthened its denial posture. Dramatic improvement of conventional offensive capabilities, including the development of a conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) capability, would help expand the options for attacking an enemy’s high-value assets.

The United States is also developing and deploying a missile defence system. The United States is seeking to build a denial posture with effective conventional damage limitation capabilities.

Still, this requires enormous investment of money and time – and both may be in short supply, given the new constraints on the US defence budget from 2011 onwards and the rate at which the region’s strategic balance appears to be changing. In addition, since capability rather than will is the essential ingredient for effective conventional deterrence, its reinforcement may be more likely to stimulate an arms race among the countries concerned than would nuclear deterrence. It could be argued that an adversary that faces US overwhelming conventional capabilities might be tempted to use its WMD and ballistic missiles at an early stage of a conflict before losing them.¹⁶ Moreover, a war-fighting capability may not always be interpreted as a deterrent capability.¹⁷

All of these limits inherent in conventional deterrence mean that, although the United States may prevail in most regional conflicts without using nuclear forces, it is inconceivable that conventional deterrence would completely replace the nuclear umbrella in regions such as Northeast Asia in the near future. Without extended nuclear deterrence,

Washington’s allies, including Japan, would question the credibility of the US commitment to their security and the region’s security. Therefore the United States and its allies need to work together to construct a “regional security architecture” tailored to meet a mix of nuclear and conventional.

Conclusion

Japan has adjusted its security policy in order to hedge against an uncertain future in Northeast Asia. While the nuclear umbrella provided by the United States will continue to play a significant role as the ultimate guarantor of Japan’s security, the role of conventional deterrence has been increasing. Under these circumstances Japan needs to increase its efforts to strengthen its own deterrence capability rather than rely exclusively on US extended deterrence. This will also bolster conventional deterrence within the alliance.

At the same time, in order to reduce the negative consequences of strengthened deterrence, such as the security dilemma and demands on defence budgets, diplomacy is of obvious importance.

Therefore, Japan should also take proactive steps toward establishing a stable security environment in Northeast Asia. Until such a goal is achieved, extended deterrence under the Japan-US Security Treaty will play an important stabilising role, maintaining regional and Japanese security by deterring attempts to change the status quo or threaten regional order.

In addition, the US provision of extended deterrence has mitigated the effects of Tokyo’s concerns about instability in the region, reducing the need for Japan to consider more drastic measures such as a rapid and massive conventional build-up, major changes in its security policy or the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which might trigger further instability or arms racing in the region.

Ultimately, these multilayered efforts can be understood as a method of realising a Northeast Asia

where the US nuclear umbrella is no longer needed. In other words, they can prepare the way to a world without nuclear weapons. In this sense, US provision of extended deterrence, including the nuclear umbrella and the US-Japan reinforcement of deterrence with conventional capabilities do not contradict nuclear disarmament. When understood this way, Japan's apparent nuclear dilemma between disarmament and extended deterrence has the potential to frame a strategy for reconciling Japan's disarmament idealism and actual circumstances in a way that permits its ideals to be progressively realised.

¹ **PROF. NOBUYASU ABE** has been serving as Director of the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-proliferation (CPDNP), Japan Institute of International Affairs since 2008. He served as U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs (2003-06), as Ambassador of Japan to the IAEA and other international organizations in Vienna (1999-2001), Saudi Arabia (2001-03) and Switzerland (2006-08) and as Director-General for Arms Control and Science Affairs of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1997-99).

² **DR. TOSAKI HIROFUMI** has been Senior Research Fellow at the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-proliferation (CPDNP), Japan Institute of International Affairs since 2007. Since 1996 he previously served as a Research Fellow at CPDNP. In 2003, he obtained his Ph.D. in International Public Policy from Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan.

³ Obama, Barack. "Remarks by President Barack Obama." Official Speech, Prague, Czech Republic, 5 April, 2010. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/.

⁴ "Iwayuru 'Mitsuyaku' Mondai ni Kansuru Yushikisya Iinkai Houkokusyo" ("Report on the Commission of the So-Called 'Secret Agreements'.") Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), 9 March, 2010.

http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyaku/pdfs/hokoku_yushiki.pdf.

The agreement has been obsolete for two decades.

⁵ Buzan, Barry and Ole Wæver. *Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 95.

⁶ Shinichi Ogawa, "Kaku Gunshuku to 'Kaku no Kasa'" ("Nuclear Disarmament and 'Nuclear Umbrella'") in *Tairyoubakai Heiki no Gunshuku Ron (Disarmament of Weapons of Mass Destruction)*, edited by Mitsuru Kurosawa, 42. Tokyo: Shinzan-Sha, 2004.

⁷ "Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation." Joint Statement of the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee, Ministry of For-

eign Affairs (Japan), 1 May, 2007.

<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/joint0705.html>.

⁸ Department of Defense (U.S.). *Nuclear Posture Review Report*, 2010, 15.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 16.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 48.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 32.

¹² Wirtz, James J. "United States: Nuclear Policy at a Crossroads," in *The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia*, edited by Muthiah Alagappa, 114. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008.

¹³ Department of Defense (U.S.). *Nuclear Posture Review Report*, 2010, 32-33.

¹⁴ Regarding the limits of conventional deterrence, see, for example, Payne, Keith B. "Post-Cold War Requirements for US Nuclear Deterrence Policy." *Comparative Strategy* 17, 3 (1998): 227-277, 259; Morgan, Patrick M. "The Impact of the Revolution in Military Affairs," in *Preventing the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, edited by Eric Herring, 143-150. London: Frank Cass, 2000; Ogawa, Shinichi. "Kakuheiki no Igi to Kadai: Kako to Shorai" ("Significances and Problems of Nuclear Weapons: Past and Future,") in *Senso no Honshitu to Gunjiryoku no Shoso (Essence of War and Armed Forces)*, edited by Tomoyuki Ishizu, 190-191. Tokyo: Sairyu-Sha, 2004.

¹⁵ Payne, Keith B. *The Great American Gamble: Deterrence Theory and Practice from the Cold War to the Twenty-First Century*. Fairfax: National Institute Press, 2010, 409.

¹⁶ Fortmann, Michel and Stefanie von Hlatky. "The Revolution in Military Affairs: Impact of Emerging Technologies on Deterrence," in *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age*, edited by T. V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan and James J. Wirtz, 316-317. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009.

¹⁷ Joseph, Robert G. and John F. Reichart. *Deterrence and Defense in a Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Environment*. Washington DC: National Defense University Press, 1999. 21.

From Unilateral to Multilateral

BILL KIDD¹ AND JOHN AINSLIE²

Someone has to take the first step. The journey to multilateral action on nuclear disarmament is proving a longer road than those who established the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) had envisioned. As a result nuclear weapon proliferation has established a significant foothold with Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea (DPRK) at varying levels of armament, with Iran feared to be next in line.

The nuclear weapon-States who are signatories to the NPT paint pretty pictures of a world without nuclear weapons and have been doing so for many years now. Their failure to make significant headway towards achieving this supposed goal has led however, inevitably some might say, to the beginnings of proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their potential delivery systems. New nuclear States also want to use this style of megaphone diplomacy – “HEY WE’RE IMPORTANT TOO! WE’VE GOT THE BOMB!”

So, is it too late now for any of the nuclear weapon-States to unburden themselves and the global community of these weapons? Is the world too much of a dangerous place to disarm?

Let’s be honest, it wouldn’t be politically easy for one of the P5 to put themselves out there and say they’d be possibly willing to forgo the position of pre-eminence that they’ve held on the world stage since the end of the Second World War, and the establishment of the United Nations in the face of Cold War antagonisms. How could a player who’s held the whip hand in international power politics for so long, just give up one of the core building blocks of that power and still maintain economic and cultural influence across the globe?

However can anyone doubt the prize to be won in terms of diplomatic kudos by whoever takes that step of leading the way towards honestly disarming

warheads and dismantling the apparatus of their nuclear bases? Not to mention the economic savings, which would accrue for the benefit of their population, enabling programmes of civic development to boost infrastructure and employment opportunities. All this, whilst removing the cloud of constant uncertainty hanging over that section of their population forced to live with a nuclear base as their next-door-neighbour.

We propose here to take the case of the United Kingdom and examine whether it could become that beacon of light and progress, even if by default.

All of the U.K.’s nuclear bombs are situated at the ‘Faslane/Coulport’ naval base on ‘Loch Long’, 40 Kilometres (25 miles) from Glasgow; the largest city in Scotland and the metropolitan centre for one half of that country’s population. There are around 225 nuclear warheads designated for deployment on the Trident submarine delivery system, which is stationed at this base (including three operational vessels and one presently on re-fit at Devonport in the South of England).

The original ‘Polaris’ system was established as a Cold War programme with the specific purpose of destroying Moscow and its surrounding cities. This was re-stated in 1980, when Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (Conservative) purchased the ‘Trident’ replacement. Then in 2006, Prime Minister Tony Blair (Labour) decided that a new weapons system was required, and ‘Son of Trident’ was announced. Now in October 2012, the Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg (Liberal Democrat) has stated the new system will go ahead. 20 years after the end of the Cold War, the objective will remain the same, that is, to obliterate at the press of a button the lives of the 14 million men, women and children of Moscow and its suburbs.

The new fleet of nuclear submarines is planned to enter into service in 2028, with a new design of nuclear bomb operational in the 2030’s, and a new

missile in 2040. The intention of the British Government, of any political stripe, is that this system should be based in Scotland until 2067.

This doesn't sound like a good faith approach to the NPT, particularly Article VI of that document, to which the United Kingdom is of course a signatory. The long-term direction of the British Government is one of the up-grade and maintenance of its 'independent' nuclear deterrent. It may also be inferred from this that the future plans of the USA are of similar intent, as the U.K.'s missiles are borrowed from the U.S. Navy, and all launch equipment and computer software is purchased from the United States (Britain holding only 12-month spare parts although its stated ambitions are for a 45-year programme). This is of course, all for a system we are assured is never intended to be used.

The cost to the U.K. taxpayer of this phallic nuclear symbol has doubled from £1 billion per year in 2005, to £2 billion per year in 2012. The U.K. Government's stated aim, to build a new nuclear system and keep it in service until 2067, will cost around £100 billion at present estimates. Meanwhile, universal welfare benefits are to be reviewed, along with public sector pensions being reduced whilst teachers, the emergency services and other public servants work longer into old age so the state can afford them a reduced life annuity. In the face of this the call from many is 'welfare not warfare'!

What therefore do those forced to live cheek-by-jowl with Trident, the people of Scotland, want to see? Well, 66% of Scots polled say they want the system scrapped (58% in England), with 30% stating retention is their preferred option.³ In a March 2007 parliamentary vote an overwhelming majority of Westminster MPs voted for the Trident replacement, whilst the majority of that minority representing Scottish constituencies voted against.⁴ In June 2007, the vote in the devolved Scottish Parliament showed an overwhelming opposition to

'Son of Trident', with only the 16 Conservative and Unionist Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) voting in favour, out of a total of 129 MSPs.⁵

In addition, all of those political parties and other organisations that have signed up to the 'YES for Independence' campaign, have endorsed opposition to the replacement of Trident in Scotland and its soonest removal, as expressed by the Scottish Government.

Further, civil society in Scotland, including the churches, trade unions and voluntary organisations, has a long history of calling for nuclear disarmament. Indeed in 2007, a joint report on the future of Trident was published by the Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (SCND) and the Scottish Trades Union Congress (STUC).

The direction of this document was to spell out the economic and employment consequences for Scotland of the Trident replacement project and a decision to renew or not to renew the system, with regards to the alternative of the continuing maintenance of Faslane/Coulport as a conventional weapons naval base. The figures showed that the replacement of Trident would in fact cost Scotland more jobs than it would provide, and, by contrast, the funds released by the cancellation of Trident would create a major opportunity for productive investment in Scotland's economy - especially with regards to the development of the renewables industry.⁶

The key question is, following the Scottish independence referendum in the autumn of 2014, should the people of Scotland vote for the creation of an independent State, what will be the future of Trident? In October 2012 the Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond said that an explicit ban on nuclear weapons should be written into the constitution of an independent Scotland; therefore any Scottish government that tried to keep Trident would be in breach of the constitution.⁷ This

brings the long-term commitment of the governing Scottish National Party (SNP) to a new and defining moment in its opposition to nuclear weapons, and this despite the recent decision to remain within NATO post-independence. Such a stand, we would contend, deserves international support from all those who wish to see the NPT at work in practice.

How long would Trident's cancellation take to implement? Well, technically steps could be taken within 7-days that would prevent any of the missiles being launched. Within two years, all of the nuclear warheads could be removed from Scotland. After a further two years these bombs could be dismantled. This timescale was published by SCND in "Disarming Scotland" in June 2012 and has been described as realistic by senior American nuclear weapons experts, the Scottish Government, and, significantly, the Westminster Scottish Affairs Committee.⁸

What therefore would become of the United Kingdom's independent nuclear deterrent? Well it couldn't be moved to a new base in England or Wales. In 1963 the Westminster Government considered a number of possible sites for its nuclear-armed submarines, and did this again between 1980 and 1982. The records of these investigations and discussions showed major problems with all of the possible options, whether because of population density or for reasons of cost and environmental issues at developing a greenfield site. Even if a site could be identified it would take at least twenty years to replicate the facilities at the existing Scottish sites.

What about stationing overseas? Well in 1981 Prime Minister Thatcher considered and rejected the idea of basing the fleet in the United States, as this would have left the force transparently dependent on American support, raised even further issues of compliance with the NPT and come at

considerable cost for exclusive facilities to be constructed.

France? The nuclear submarine base in Brittany is too small to accommodate Trident and in reality the politics surrounding such a shared facility would surely make such a proposal a non-starter.

The contention is then, that with a 'YES' vote in the Scottish Independence Referendum in late 2014, one of the P5 will, by default, necessarily find itself on the edge of being outside the nuclear club. Unlike Kazakhstan's decision twenty years ago this wouldn't be through choice, but then as stated earlier, it's clear that there is no political imperative on behalf of any of the British establishment to disarm their nukes at any time in the future, so other circumstances may have to prevail.

Someone has to take the first step, and if Scotland becomes an independent nuclear weapons-free zone can Westminster's government find a way to remain nuclear weapons dependent? Or will this be the breakthrough that will lead to the serious de facto action on multilateral nuclear disarmament we're all signed up to with the NPT?

¹ **BILL KIDD** is a Scottish National Party (SNP) politician, Scottish Government Senior Whip and Member of the Scottish Parliament for Glasgow Anniesland. He has been an MSP since 2007. In addition, he serves as a Co-President for Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNND) and is an Executive Member of Scottish CND (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) and Abolition 2000 Global Council Member.

² **JOHN AINSLIE** has been the Coordinator of the Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) for over twenty years. He has produced a significant number of reports and papers, particularly on the Trident nuclear weapon system. He has given evidence to various Parliamentary Committees on the Trident system.

³ TNS BMRB Scottish Opinion Survey. March 13, 2013. http://www.tns-bmrb.co.uk/assets-uploaded/documents/nuclear-weapons-scot-independence-poll-13-mar-2013_1363172540.pdf.

⁴ United Kingdom House of Commons, Debates, *Trident*, March 14, 2007. <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070314/debidx/70314-x.htm>.

⁵ Scottish Parliament, Debates, *Trident Replacement*, June 14, 2007.

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⁷ Salmon, Alex. “Speech to the SNP National Conference.” Perth, Scotland. October 20, 2012.

<http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/home-news/in-full-alex-salmonds-speech-to-snp-conference.1350747474>.

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Nuclear Deterrence, NATO and the Role of Parliamentarians

UTA ZAPF¹

The new NATO Strategic Concept (November 2010) and the Defence and Deterrence Posture Review (May 2012) are rather disappointing.

In March 2010 the Deutsche Bundestag (German Parliament) passed a resolution sponsored by all parties (except the Left), that dealt with the future of nuclear weapons.

In the context of the ongoing debate on a new strategic concept we encouraged our government to engage within NATO for a diminished role of nuclear weapons, and to promote the idea of arms control and disarmament – nuclear and conventional. We further requested our government to actively seek the removal of nuclear weapons from German soil. In addition, we promoted the idea of a Nuclear Weapons Convention.

In another motion, sponsored by the Social Democrats we voiced protest against the modernization of tactical nuclear weapons and called for negotiations on sub-strategic nuclear weapons.

We had hoped that the Strategic Concept would accept arms control and disarmament – be it nuclear or conventional – as an important element of NATO's security agenda, and that the new Strategic Concept would accept the reality that NATO has no use for nuclear weapons, and that nuclear deterrence is a relic of the Cold War.

We also urged NATO in our resolution in the Deutsche Bundestag to enter a restrictive policy concerning Missile Defence, in order to consider Russia's security interests and fears.

Not much of this has materialized. Fact is that NATO “maintains the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations”², and

that to this respect it declares nuclear weapons a core component of its capabilities, and that the current nuclear force posture is necessary. NATO declares that “as long as nuclear weapons exist NATO will remain a nuclear alliance”.³ To make things more complicated, the new Posture Review confirms that – although seeking to create the conditions for further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO – those allies where US non-strategic nuclear weapons are stationed will ensure that all components of NATO's nuclear deterrent “remain safe, secure and effective for as long as NATO remains a nuclear alliance”.⁴

What does this mean? European allies are responsible for the carriers. In the case of Germany this is the Tornado. Do we have to buy new carriers or modernize Tornado, when the U.S. modernizes their non-strategic nuclear weapons? The Tornado should have been phased out by 2012 – it was prolonged – for how many years? 2025, or even longer?

Our task is to work strongly towards preventing modernization of US non-strategic nuclear weapons, and start a new attempt in European countries to remove these weapons from European soil.

We have to get away from nuclear sharing and thus come to new arrangements to reduce NATO's reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons.

NATO should be obliged to adhere to the Action Plan of the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference and start implementation also in its own policies. NATO includes three nuclear weapon states: the United States, Great Britain and France. All the other states are non-nuclear weapon states, and they should press the nuclear weapon states to comply with their obligations out of the NPT: “accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament” as agreed up in action 5 of the 2010 Action Plan.⁵

¹ **UTA ZAPF** is a German politician and member of the Bundestag. Since 1998, she has been the chairperson of the subcommittee for “Disarmament, Arms Control, and Nonproliferation” of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the German Bundestag. In addition, she serves as Co-President of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNND) and is a member of the European Leadership Network and Global Zero. She specializes in disarmament, security policy, arms control, crisis prevention and Southeastern Europe. After studying literature, she became a teacher in adult education and is also a freelance editor.

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⁵ United Nations. 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, *Final Document*, Vol. I, UN document NPT/CONF.2010/50, p. 21.
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Nuclear Deterrence and Changing the Framework of the Debate:

Obtaining National Self Interests by Advancing Global Public Goods

Jonathan Granoff¹

Twenty-first century security challenges are numerous, complex, and, more often than not, interconnected. At their core, each of these most pressing challenges requires cooperation and collective action. Persistent military competition and violence, along with less-than-adequate international security infrastructure, undermine efforts to cooperatively address these challenges. While the world's economies and businesses have long adapted to globalization, the political and security structures, debates, and frameworks remain mired in the past.

New risks, such as those arising from sub-state actors and abuses of cyber-space are growing, while critically important matters that require new levels of cooperation, such as eliminating weapons of mass destruction, ending poverty and protecting the living systems upon which civilisation depends, are being neglected. Nuclear deterrence policies are incompatible with the cooperative security system that is needed to address very real pressing threats to us all.

It is foolish to say that a healthy global climate, oceans with a proper balance of acid and alkaline, or rainforests that give off adequate oxygen are primarily national security goods. Is a stable global economy best understood as a national good? How about a functioning communications network like the Internet? Is it not more accurate to describe these as global public goods? The elimination of nuclear weapons is a similar global public good, and reliance by some on nuclear deterrence is contrary to pursuing that good.

Advocacy for the elimination of nuclear weapons has not succeeded. One reason is that the debate is framed within a traditional 'national risk vs. benefit' analysis. The debate poses the question incorrectly. It presumes that nuclear weapons provide a unique benefit to the security of privileged states, whilst also having controllable risks. On the other hand, most arms-control advocates argue the risk is too great; that some having the weapons is a stimulant for proliferation, and that by accident, design, or madness a use will occur that will be catastrophic. This might be true but this approach to the debate has not succeeded.

Within this analytical frame, an argument difficult to overcome is that these weapons provide a beneficial deterrent against a potential, as yet unrealized, unforeseen, unknown and unknowable threat. This threat could be existential and thus eliminating the weapon becomes too risky. According to nuclear weapons advocates, we have a known risk, which is being managed, but the unknown risk could be far worse. They thus successfully advance the solution of improving the management system and making concerted efforts to stop proliferation.

The reality is that nuclear weapons are a present existential threat and do not provide national security. In fact, they constitute a pillar in a systemically dysfunctional international security order, which is not adequately addressing a set of global threats. Nuclear weapons are a critical logjam for progress beyond a large complex systemic problem: the lack of a sufficiently broad common security framework that integrates nuclear weapons elimination into the process of addressing all shared threats to human survival. So long as nuclear arms control practitioners insist on pursuing arms control and disarmament goals outside of a broader framework defined by cooperation and collective security, we will have a very hard time achieving success. We must place the elimination of nuclear weapons in the context of achieving the entire menu of existential global public goods.

Each of us knows that our individual life is precious and fragile. What is more our capacity for existential planetary destruction reminds us that our collective existence is fragile. The future of all people is interconnected as never before, as we face numerous issues, for which we must work together to succeed. To address *inter alia* ensuring bio-diversity and ending the destruction of thousands of species; reversing the depletion of fishing stocks; controlling ocean dumping; preventing ozone depletion; halting global warming; controlling and eliminating all weapons of mass destruction and preventing new ones from emerging; ending terrorism whether by States or non-State actors; fighting pandemic diseases; ending crushing poverty; providing clean drinking water; and addressing crises from States in chaos - we must remind ourselves that no nation or even a small group of nations can succeed alone.

Some solutions must be universal. Chlorofluorocarbon from a refrigerant in the U.S. or China can harm the ozone in Chile, New Zealand or anywhere. If one country allows oceanic dumping, others will follow. Viruses do not recognize religions, races or borders. New levels of human unity and cooperation are needed. Governance to address these challenges can be ad hoc no longer.

Nuclear deterrence arguments must be framed within this new and accurate context of holistic global security. I furthermore suggest placing the issue in the context of accepted moral imperatives and existential necessities as part of changing the framework of the debate.

The Need for Cooperative Security from an Ethical Standpoint

Wise people have been instructing us for millennia to recognize our deeper human unity and have even encouraged seeing the human family as one. Now necessity alerts us: the galvanizing power of moral global leadership cannot be postponed in

deference to short-term parochial interests. Our collective challenges require principles that are uplifting, inspiring and affirmative of our highest potential. They must be based on universal values that weave peace and human security, rather than divisiveness and violent competition.

Nine countries directly, and about 30 indirectly - by virtue of their respective 'nuclear umbrellas' - claim that threatening to use nuclear weapons is a legitimate way for them to pursue security, but not a legitimate way for others to do so. This violent double standard undermines the political environment necessary to obtain cooperation to address integrated threats facing humanity. But those who play geopolitics believe that rules of morality and equity are not necessary in the affairs of States.

Niccolo Machiavelli stated it in, "The Prince": "Where the safety of the country depends upon resolutions to be taken, no consideration of justice or injustice, humanity or cruelty, nor of glory or shame, should be allowed to prevail."²

This policy of "emergency" can hardly make sense as a norm if we are to be ethical beings living in community. Such so-called 'realists' invariably assert that power in their own hands is necessary to ensure the security of their individual State. Overlooking the intricate interconnectedness of living systems, they exalt Social Darwinism. Strength is good, ultimate strength is better. In the quest for the ultimate weapon, an absurd result is obtained. The means to security and the pursuit of strength undermine the end of security. Such improved means to an unimproved end is most aptly articulated by nuclear weapons whereby the means of pursuing security undermines the end of security. This is not realistic. This is irresponsible.

Realists furthermore rely on a rigid worldview, in which the pursuit of the good and the pursuit of the real are divisible. Some even say only that which can be measured, predicted and controlled is relevant in policy discussion. What gives our lives

meaning, what makes us human, what exalts our lives, is not considered. They leave little room in the making of policy for conscience, love, or other immeasurable, formless, human treasures. Not the least of these treasures is caring for the welfare of others, precisely one of the aspects of human existence that provides meaning. It is our capacity for compassion.

Compassion is essential to our ethical nature and has universally guided every successful culture. It is upon the foundation of ethical principles that policies must become based. Without compassion, law cannot attain justice, and without justice, there is never peace. When kindness and compassion guide our policies, our rules become golden.

Putting these moral incites into practice, we will see the salient security challenges of today cannot be solved by military means - whether in Kashmir, India and Pakistan, the Middle East; Israel, Palestine or Iran, China and Taiwan, or the Korean peninsula for example. Hot spots such as Afghanistan or Iraq, can only be tended to by meeting real human needs - and those human needs must be approached using the wisest tools and ideas that humans have ever found to be true. We must stop experimenting with military models of security and begin using the methods that we use in our families and communities to good effect. Where can we find principles to use?

The principle of 'reciprocity' is the ethical and moral foundation of all the world's major religions (see side box). Multilateralism is the logical political outgrowth of this principle. An international order based

Is nuclear deterrence in accordance with the principles of religious faiths and philosophical traditions?

Buddhism: "Hurt not others in ways that you yourself would find hurtful." *Udana Varga, 5:18*; "A state that is not pleasing or delightful to me, how could I inflict that upon another?" *Samyutta Nikaya v. 353*.

Christianity: "All things whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you even so to them." *Matthew 7:12*.

Confucianism: "Do not unto others what you would not have them do unto you." *Analects 15:23*;

"Tsi-kung asked, 'Is there one word that can serve as a principle of conduct for life?' Confucius replied, 'It is the word 'shu' – reciprocity. Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire.'" *Doctrine of the Mean 13.3*; "One should not behave towards others in a way which is disagreeable to oneself." *Mencius Vü.A.4*.

Hinduism: "This is the sum of duty: do not unto others which would cause you pain if done to you." *Mahabharata 5:1517*.

Islam: "No one of you is a believer until he desires for his brother that which he desires for himself." *Hadith*.

Jainism: "A man should journey treating all creatures as he himself would be treated." *Sutrakritanga 1.11.33*;

"Therefore, neither does he [a wise person] cause violence to others nor does he make others do so." *Acarangasutra 5.101-2*;

"In happiness and suffering, in joy and grief, we should regard all creatures as we regard our own self." *Lord Mahavira, 24th Tirthankara*.

Judaism: "...thou shall love thy neighbor as thyself." *Leviticus 19:18*; "What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow man. That is the law; all the rest is commentary." *Talmud, Shabbat 31a*.

Native American: "Respect for all life is the foundation." *The Great Law of Peace*.

Sikhism: "I am a stranger to no one; and no one is a stranger to me. Indeed, I am a friend to all." *Guru Granth Sahib, p. 1299*. "As thou hast deemed thyself, so deem others."

Taoism: "Regard your neighbor's gain as your own gain, and your neighbor's loss as your own loss." *Tai Shang Kan Ying Pien, 213-218*.

Yoruba Wisdom (Nigeria): "One going to take a pointed stick to pinch a baby bird should first try it on himself to feel how it hurts."

Zoroastrianism: "That nature only is good when it shall not do unto another whatsoever is not good for its own self." *Dadistan-I-Dinik, 94:5*.

Philosopher's statements:

Plato: "May I do to others as I would that they should do unto me." *Greece, 4th Century BCE*.

Socrates: "Do not do to others that which would anger you if others did it to you." *Greece, 5th Century BCE*.

Seneca: "Treat your inferiors as you would be treated by your superiors." *Epistle 47:11 Rome, 1st Century CE*.

on cooperation, equity and the rule of law is its needed expression.

Where the rule of reciprocity is violated, instability follows. The failure of the nuclear weapon-States to abide by their pledge to negotiate the elimination of nuclear weapons contained in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) constitutes the single greatest stimulus to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. For some to say nuclear weapons are good for them but not for others is simply not sustainable.

Deterrence, which includes the threat to use nuclear weapons on innocent people, can never be ethically legitimate, and this taint is not cleansed by the righteousness of the few possessing the weapon. Imagine the affront to equity and logic if someone proposed that the Biological Weapons Convention should be amended to say that no country can use polio or smallpox as a weapon, but that nine countries can use the plague to maintain international peace and stability through a deterrence model. The incoherence of this proposition is patently offensive. So is the current posture of nuclear weapons. There is a moral and practical imperative for their abolition.

Equity and good qualities in policy bring benefits and bad qualities exacerbate problems. For example, the reparations demanded of Germany post World War I led to the chaos that birthed Nazism. The generosity of the Marshall Plan led to trading relationships, stability and well-deserved national pride. Moral coherence leads to success and stability. The Millennium Development Goals represent a ‘Global Marshall Plan’s’ beginning. History shows us what really works.

The fact is ethical values work on every level. To conclude this section I would like to propose two new rules for today’s nation States:

First, the “Rule of Nations”:

‘Treat other nations as you wish your nation to be treated’.

Second, the “Rule of the Powerful”:

‘As one does so shall others do’.

Nuclear deterrence policies that rely on the threat to commit that which is inherently immoral is, according to these rules and all ethical and common sense, utterly unacceptable and impractical.

Concordance of Ethical Imperative and Practical Urgency

Nuclear deterrence rests upon demonstrating willingness to use these catastrophic weapons, thereby creating an unacceptably dangerous situation. The extent of this danger is not sufficiently appreciated by the public or political leaders. Moreover the diplomats and military people who do understand it, seem to be irrationally silent. It is our duty to change this.

General Lee Butler, was the U.S. Commander of Strategic Nuclear Forces, with day-to-day responsibility for discipline, training of tens of thousands of crew members, nuclear systems operations, and the warheads those systems were designed to deliver. Drawing on his first hand experience Butler contends:

“Despite all the evidence, we have yet to fully grasp the monstrous effect of these weapons, that the consequences of their use defy reason, transcending time and space, poisoning the Earth and deforming its inhabitants.”³

According to Butler nuclear weapons are “inherently dangerous, hugely expensive and militarily inefficient.”⁴ He went on to state:

“Accepting nuclear weapons as the ultimate arbiter of conflict condemns the world to live under a dark cloud of perpetual anxiety. Worse, it codifies mankind’s most murderous instincts as an acceptable resort when other options for resolving conflict fail.”

*I have spent years studying nuclear weapons effects [...] have investigated a distressing array of accidents and incidents involving strategic weapons and forces [...] I came away from that experience deeply troubled by what I see as the burden of building and maintaining nuclear arsenals [...] the grotesquely destructive war plans, the daily operational risks, and the constant prospect of a crisis that would hold the fate of entire societies at risk.”*⁵

How many unlikely events happen every day? Think of the meltdown at Fukushima, or the unlikely and rapid end of the Cold War. The consequences of the unexpected assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo that led so quickly to World War I must be placed in context and serve as a warning. Historian, Eric Hobsbawm, reminds us:

*“The international atmosphere seemed calm. No persons had been assassinated at frequent intervals for decades. In principle, nobody even minded a great power leaning heavily on a small troublesome neighbor. Since then some five thousand books have been written to explain the apparently inexplicable: how, within a little more than five weeks of Sarajevo, Europe found itself at war.”*⁶

Today how can any scenario surprise us? Thousands of weapons remain positioned in launch-on-warning mode, whilst known terrorists itch to take down the current social order directly, or by precipitating a large conflict. Add to this the ongoing and increasing practices of cyber interference, religious fanaticism, sophisticated criminal organisations, civil wars, wars between developing countries and dangerous insecurities in the Middle East, and we cannot be surprised if any, some, or all of these events will conspire to produce a bloody, broad and protracted war. But with nuclear weapons in the mix, there may not be any books written after such an “unexpected” mishap.

It is an arrogant illusion to think that these weapons will never be used due to accident, mechanical

failure, or foolish human folly. Even under the best of circumstances mistakes can be made. After delving deeply into the history of incidents and accidents recorded by the U.S. and the USSR throughout the nuclear age General Butler surmises, “...it is more chilling than anything you can imagine.”⁷ He recounts:

*“Missiles that blew up in their silos and ejected their nuclear warheads outside of the confines of the silo. B52 aircraft that collided with tankers and scattered nuclear weapons across the coast and into the offshore seas of Spain. A B52 bomber with nuclear weapons aboard that crashed in North Carolina, and on investigation it was discovered that on one of those weapons, 6 of the 7 safety devices that prevent a nuclear explosion had failed as a result of the crash. There are dozens of such incidents. Nuclear missile-laden submarines that experienced catastrophic accidents and now lie at the bottom of the ocean.”*⁸

The Cuban Missile Crisis gave the world 13 days to reach safety. How much time is enough to rectify human or mechanical error? How much time is there in a crisis between India and Pakistan, a computer hacker creating an illusion of attack, or a terrorist posing as a State actor? What threat to our security is possibly greater than the threat posed by these weapons themselves?

Conclusion

Basing the security of our civilization on deterrence-based deployments capable of ending civilization in an afternoon, and simply hoping this security structure will never fail in preventing the unthinkable, is an unacceptable and logically unsustainable risk. It is also arrogant. As clearly espoused by Senator Alan Cranston, this means of pursuing security, is in truth “...unworthy of civilization.”

¹ **JONATHAN GRANOFF** is an author, attorney, and international peace activist. He is the current President of the Global Security Institute, a nonprofit organization committed to the elimination of nuclear weapons. He also serves as the Co-Chair of the American Bar Association’s Committee on Arms

Control and National Security, and as the Vice President of the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace, and Security at the UN. He holds positions on numerous governing and advisory boards including the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, the Lawyers Alliance for World Security, the Jane Goodall Institute, the Bipartisan Security Group, and the Middle Powers Initiative.

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Nuclear Deterrence and a Trans-generational Framework

Rob van Riet¹

Introduction

When U.S. President Barack Obama announced on 9 April 2009 in Prague his vision for a nuclear weapons-free world, but indicated that this might not be achieved in his lifetime, he advanced a trans-generational framework uncommon in political leaders – most of whom can barely see past the next election, let alone beyond their lifetimes.

President Obama's comments were both inspiring and sobering for those of us who are part of Generation Y (born from the 1980s-2000s), having lived most, if not all of our lives after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the nuclear stand-off between East and West.

His comments were inspiring in that he acknowledged responsibility for the past – including the U.S. use of nuclear weapons against Japan sixty-eight years ago – as well as espousing a commitment to the future, for the achievement of a nuclear weapons-free world. The commentary proved concurrently sobering however, in that it reminded a young generation, largely unaware of the extent of nuclear danger, that the fall of the Berlin Wall did not lead to the fall of the wall of nuclear weapons, still poised and ready to obliterate the world.

Rather, the complicated security requirements to phase-out the continued reliance of many States on nuclear weapons, and to ensure confidence in and compliance with a zero-nuclear-weapons-regime, will require considerable collaborative work beyond the scope of the U.S. alone, and probably take decades to accomplish.

The trans-generational nature of this task is not just related to the time it will likely take to achieve a nuclear weapons-free regime, and the responsibility of future generations to ensure that such a re-

gime is sustainable. It is also in the requirement for inter-generational discourse in order to understand the reasons for current nuclear doctrines and to forge viable solutions within emerging political realities.

The key challenge remains however, that members of Generation Y are mostly unaware of the continued reliance on nuclear weapons by the nuclear weapon-States and their allies, and the associated risks of these policies, even when nuclear weapons are deployed in their own countries.

Nuclear deterrence - a hangover from the past?

Sixty-eight years since the nuclear age was dramatically heralded by the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, human beings continue to live under what U.S. President John F. Kennedy famously called a “nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slenderest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by accident, or miscalculation, or by madness.”² Despite the end of the Cold War, and with it the disappearance of much of the antagonistic *raison d'être* for nuclear weapons (that on several occasions brought mankind to the brink of nuclear annihilation), around 19,000 nuclear weapons remain in the stockpiles of the nuclear weapon-States. By virtue of automated “launch on warning” systems, thousands of these weapons are constantly ready-to-fire within minutes.

The world now is a very different place than it was at the end of the Cold War. The borders and blocs defended by nuclear weapons during the Cold War barely exist. We now have a wide range of technological devices and programmes at our disposal, enabling us to connect with people all over the world. We can withdraw money from our bank out of a cash machine in virtually any country. It has become much easier to study and work overseas. Our governments trade with, invest in, and collaborate with governments that used to be on the other side of the Cold War blocs - as do our corporations, many of whom have erected sophisti-

cated global governance structures across the multiple countries in which they are now based (granted, not without significant challenges and flaws). Yet in the face of all these transformations to our modern political, economic, social and technological landscape, nuclear policy-makers remain rooted in the 20th Century – ‘dinosaurs’ unable to adapt, or worse, the makers of a modern day ‘Maginot line’.³

The absence of world war or of a major war between nuclear-armed countries since 1945 has been repeatedly attributed to the proper functioning of nuclear deterrence. The value of nuclear deterrence thus continues to permeate strategic thought. However, a closer examination of nuclear deterrence in current and emerging security environments should prompt a fundamental review of such beliefs.

A flawed policy

Proponents claim that nuclear weapons protect current and future generations by deterring war, in particular nuclear war. However, the fact that there has not been a nuclear war or a major war between nuclear-armed countries does not prove that nuclear deterrence works. There could be other reasons for this, including the fact that such wars would, in an increasingly inter-connected world, be contrary to the interests of potential adversaries.

The contrary argument – that nuclear weapons have a moderate-to-high probability to trigger wars, and possibly nuclear wars, is also difficult to prove. However, there is evidence for the latter found within historical occasions where nuclear deterrence did not prevent war,⁴ as well as occasions where nuclear war was only narrowly averted.⁵ What’s more there exists a theoretical underpinning to this argument within Game Theory (the theoretical model normally utilized to underscore pro-deterrence realist accounts). Game Theory models detail an increased risk of nuclear war

when additional ‘players’ (nuclear-armed States) enter the equation. In fact, some Game Theory models predict that in the absence of a global regime for eliminating nuclear weapons, it is inevitable that nuclear weapons will proliferate to additional actors (States and/or non-State actors).⁶ This will in turn considerably heighten the risk to future generations of a nuclear catastrophe.

Applying common models of risk analysis to nuclear deterrence, as used in virtually any other human undertaking, industry, system or design, the calculus would be that although the probability of the failure of deterrence might be low (although the long list of near-misses in the nuclear age reveals it is much higher than we may suspect), the potential consequences of such a failure would be so horrific and devastating (threatening life on earth as we know it) that the doctrine can only be deemed unreservedly intolerable. The simple truth is that we will never be able to achieve a failure rate of zero (or at least a rate vanishingly small) for nuclear deterrence. Yet when it comes to the nuclear enterprise, the defence and security elites in the possessor States shirk away from carrying out such risk-benefit assessments.

Risky, costly and a liability to future generations

Nuclear deterrence is a high-risk enterprise, which puts stakes on the table of an unacceptable magnitude. Human beings have a tendency to engage in risky behaviour, even if they are aware of the potentially life-threatening consequences of their actions or inaction. We tempt fate until disaster strikes, which may shock us into action. With nuclear weapons the risk is compounded by the fact that the rationale for the weapons – their capacity to deter – relies on a willingness to use them. Without such willingness, deterrence loses ‘credibility’. As such, so long as any such weapons and nuclear deterrence policies remain, it is certain that

they will one day be used, whether by accident, miscalculation or intent.

The use of just one nuclear weapon (most likely on or near an urban area) would create devastation magnitudes greater than the September 11, 2001 terrorist act, or any other terrorist attack to date. The use of tens or hundreds of nuclear weapons would create unimaginable humanitarian and environmental consequences that would span generations. Considering that the destructive power of nuclear weapons cannot be contained in space or time, the doctrine is ill-suited to responsibly exert influence over any one State or bloc of States. Deterrence holds the entire world hostage and poses an existential threat to civilization now and into the future. As such, the threat or use of nuclear weapons is not just a policy with unacceptable risks – it is a crime against current and future generations.

In addition, there is the large financial cost of maintaining a nuclear deterrent. Recent studies indicate that approximately \$100 billion USD per year is being spent globally on nuclear weapons.⁷ Allocating such massive budgets to weapons systems, developed in the hope they will never be used, drains the social capital required to stimulate economies, and diverts resources from enterprises geared to meeting current social needs, such as building the educational excellence, work-force training and public infrastructures for the future.

For protection or prestige?

It may very well be that many in the political, security and defence elites in the nuclear-weapon-possessing States realise that these weapons do not convey any real security benefits. In fact, it is no secret that many in these States' military establishments (privately) question their supposed military purposes. Interestingly, it is often the civilian defence experts, who seem most enchanted with the weapons and adamant about using them to manage their State's security, achieve strategic objectives, conduct foreign policy, or achieve prestige.

This enchantment is well expressed by a scene in an episode of the satirical British sitcom, *Yes, Prime Minister* (sequel to *Yes, Minister*), a television show from the 1980s. The show draws its laughs from portraying the Machiavellian interaction between the Prime Minister (Cabinet Minister in *Yes, Minister*), who believes he is in charge, and the members of the British Civil Service, who are depicted as really running the country.

In the episode entitled *The Grand Design*,⁸ aired on 9 January 1986, Prime Minister Jim Hacker considers cancelling the intended purchase of the new Trident nuclear weapons programme, due to replace the earlier submarine-based Polaris system, and instead use the money to invest in Britain's army and re-introduce conscription, thus solving Britain's defence, unemployment and education problems in one stroke. He calls it "Hacker's Grand Design". Cabinet Secretary Sir Humphrey is utterly aghast at the suggestion:

Sir Humphrey: *But it is not fair! With Trident we could obliterate the whole of Eastern Europe.*

Jim Hacker: *I don't want to obliterate the whole of Eastern Europe.*

Sir Humphrey: *It's a deterrent.*

Jim Hacker: *It's a bluff. I probably wouldn't use it.*

Sir Humphrey: *Yes, but they don't know that you probably wouldn't.*

Jim Hacker: *They probably do.*

Sir Humphrey: *Yes, they probably know that you probably wouldn't. But they can't certainly know.*

Jim Hacker: *They probably certainly know that I probably wouldn't.*

Sir Humphrey: *Yes, but even though they probably certainly know that you probably wouldn't, they don't certainly know that, although you probably wouldn't, there is no probability that you certainly would.*

[Silence]

- Jim Hacker: *What!?*
- Sir Humphrey: *It all boils down to one simple issue - you are the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister of Great Britain. Don't you believe that Great Britain should have the best?*
- Jim Hacker: *Yes, of course.*
- Sir Humphrey: *Very well, if you walked into a nuclear missile showroom you would buy Trident - it's lovely, it's elegant, it's beautiful. It is quite simply the best. And Britain should have the best. In the world of the nuclear missile it is the Saville Row suit, the Rolls Royce Corniche, the Château Lafitte 1945. It is the nuclear missile Harrods would sell you. What more can I say?*
- Jim Hacker: *Only that it costs £15 billion and we don't need it.*
- Sir Humphrey: *Well, you can say that about anything at Harrods.*

When this episode was first aired, the Cold War still provided the context for security thinking. Today that context is gone, yet the thinking remains remarkably similar. (And interestingly, the United Kingdom is once again on the verge of making a decision on renewing Trident – scheduled for 2016.) It is essential we abandon the antagonistic defence and security assumptions that underpin deterrence, and in all earnest invest in the cooperative mechanisms that are needed to meet the range of human, national and global security needs of the 21st Century.

A 21st Century approach to security

The twenty-first-century global security environment differs fundamentally from that of the Cold War, and will change even more profoundly in the decades ahead. Humankind stands at a historic juncture, facing a range of interconnected threats, which can only be tackled through unprecedented cooperation. The international community must

discard the myths and adversarial political frameworks of nuclear deterrence if it is to successfully address these threats. Instead, the cooperative security framework, based on international legal, economic and political mechanisms, must be better utilized and further developed to make war (and thus any residual attachment to nuclear deterrence) counter-productive, unfeasible, and unthinkable.

As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted in a recent Op-Ed:

“Many defence establishments now recognize that security means far more than protecting borders. Grave security concerns can arise as a result of demographic trends, chronic poverty, economic inequality, environmental degradation, pandemic diseases, organized crime, repressive governance and other developments no state can control alone. Arms can't address such concerns.”⁹

In our current situation, sitting in our goldfish bowl that is still polluted with the waters of 20th Century international conflicts, arms races and failed attempts at peace, one can understand the pessimism of some leaders and analysts regarding the possibility for security without nuclear weapons. Consider the European Union however. Countries such as Germany and France were constantly at war with each other in the 19th and 20th Centuries. These countries are now so interdependent, that the thought of war between them, or between any of the members of the European Union for that matter, is unthinkable.

The development of global interdependence can have a similar effect in diminishing States' interests in making war. The development of international legal and political mechanisms will provide ways to deter and address any deviations from this developing norm. Moreover, we do not need to start from scratch. There are already a variety of systems and regimes in place to learn from and build on, including the UN machinery and institutions, regional (non-nuclear) cooperative security mecha-

nisms, regional frameworks for political and economic integration, and best practices on dispute settlement from the global private sector. Furthermore, and somewhat ironically, an implicit level of trust lies within the current security consensus between the nuclear powers and non-nuclear States. This trust and tacit consensus can be built upon and converted into a better-institutionalised non-nuclear cooperative framework.

Ultimately, nuclear deterrence is a psychological phenomenon. Although several States have given up their nuclear arsenals, it seems that for the current nuclear weapon-possessing States giving these weapons up feels like a major security sacrifice. This, however, has more to do with what is known in behavioural psychology circles as the “endowment effect” than with the actual value of these weapons in providing security. The endowment effect is our tendency to value an object more highly when we own it than when someone else owns it – even when the object in question has little to no practical value. This is why it is vital in any disarmament process to replace the weapons and doctrine with other, more constructive strategic instruments. In fact, it offers an opportunity to replace the adversarial deterrence doctrine with a strategy based on cooperative security. In this context it is important to examine what we may learn from the roughly 150 States that handle their security without nuclear weapons, including those that previously relied on nuclear weapons but have relinquished such policies. It could also be important to learn from the regional non-nuclear cooperative security frameworks that many of these countries have erected, especially those that have established regional nuclear weapon-free zones.

Conclusion

In 1954 the British philosopher Bertrand Russell wrote, “The only thing that will redeem mankind is co-operation.”¹⁰ He also said, “To conquer fear is the beginning of wisdom.”¹¹ Both statements con-

verge in our paradoxical and troubled relationship with nuclear deterrence. Both the doctrine and our reliance on it are fuelled by fear. Such fear stands in the way of coming up with the innovative cooperative action needed to address the multitude of challenges we face.

Some governments continue to cling to fear and outmoded concepts of nation-State security – a division between the ‘us’ who need to be defended, and the infamous ‘them’. Meanwhile, members of the younger generation (and some fast-to-learn older people) are communicating with and reaching out to one another through a wide range of communication means, bypassing the geographical, cultural, political and religious barriers perpetuated by nation-States. A powerful example of this emerged in 2012, when bellicose threats between the governments of Iran and Israel were tempered by Israeli and Iranian families and students, reaching out to each other directly through social media with messages of love, peace and respect.

Even if global cooperative security mechanisms are not yet strong enough to provide a water-tight alternative to nuclear deterrence, the revolution in social media communications and global consciousness is reducing the concept of nuclear weapons threat and use to the dustbin of the past. Governments need to catch up to this social revolution and prioritise cooperation rather than conflict – an imperative if we are to secure our common future, and bequeath to future generations a safe and habitable planet.

¹ **ROB VAN RIET** is Coordinator of the Disarmament Programme at the World Future Council. In addition, he has been U.K. Coordinator of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNND) since 2011 and has served as the Director of the Nuclear Abolition Forum since its founding in 2011. He was a co-author of the Inter-Parliamentary Union/PNND Parliamentary Handbook *Supporting Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament*, released during the 127th Inter-Parliamentary Union Assembly in Quebec City, Canada, in October 2012. **The author would like to**

thank Mr. Alyn Ware and Ms. Teresa Bergman for their feedback, comments and suggestions for this article.

² Kennedy, John F. “Address before the General Assembly of the United Nations.” New York City, September 25, 1961.

³ The “Maginot Line”, named after French Minister of War André Maginot, was a French defence fortification arrangement based on World War I realities, which subsequently failed miserably in World War II.

⁴ Ward Wilson discusses a number of military conflicts where the possession of nuclear weapons by one side did not prevent an attack from an adversary. See Wilson, Ward. *Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons*. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013.

⁵ See Kaku, Michio, and Axelrod, David. *To Win a Nuclear War: The Pentagon’s Secret War Plans*. Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1987.

Outlines 15 occasions where nuclear war was narrowly averted.

⁶ See, for example, Rivera, Pablo. “Game Theory and Nuclear Weapons.” *Scribd Online Library*. August 17, 2010.

<http://www.scribd.com/doc/36017335/Game-theory-and-nuclear-weapons>.

⁷ See Blair, Bruce, and Brown, Matthew. “Nuclear Weapons Cost Study.” *Global Zero Technical Report*. June 2011.

<http://www.globalzero.org/files/scott/Global%20Zero%20Cost%20Study%2C%20June%202011.pdf>.

⁸ “The Grand Design”, *Yes, Prime Minister*, Episode 1, Series 1. Written by Antony Jay and Jonathan Lynn. First aired on the BBC on January 9, 1986.

⁹ Ki-moon, Ban. UN Secretary-General. “The world is over-armed and peace is under-funded.” *UN Office on Disarmament Affairs Update*. August 30, 2012.

<http://www.un.org/disarmament/update/20120830/>.

¹⁰ See Russell, Bertrand. *Human Society in Ethics and Politics*. London: G. Allen & Unwin. 1954.

¹¹ See Russell, Bertrand. *Unpopular Essays*. London: Simon and Schuster. 1950.

Nuclear Deterrence:

*A Dialogue between Richard Falk and David Krieger**

“Opponents of nuclear deterrence need a credible alternative that seems safer, cheaper, and more in accord with the values embedded in Western and other world civilizations, including respect for international law, while at the same time upholding national security as generally understood.”

“Nuclear deterrence is like trying to prevent traffic accidents by putting babies on the bumpers of all cars on the road. The babies would make more visible the risks of an accident and would presumably cause drivers to be more careful. This would not be sufficient, however, to prevent fatalities, because no matter how carefully drivers drive their cars, accidents still happen.”

A Critique of Nuclear Deterrence

Krieger: Nuclear deterrence has put a positive spin on the possession of nuclear weapons. It has allowed policy makers to argue that the weapons are not intended to make—but to prevent—war. Based on nuclear deterrence theory, some analysts have argued that nuclear weapons are actually instruments of peace rather than massive annihilation.

The concept of nuclear deterrence has given the public a false sense of security. It has been used to give the impression that nuclear weapons are protective devices to keep another country’s nuclear weapons from being used against one’s own country. In this sense, nuclear deterrence is a very dangerous concept. It is certainly not a fool-proof defense against nuclear weapons use or nuclear war, but it is considered by much of the public to assure the security of one’s country. When thinking about

nuclear deterrence, it is important to keep in mind that it is only a theory of human behavior. It is not proven, and there are many ways in which nuclear deterrence could fail.

Falk: Your criticisms of nuclear deterrence as an unproven instrument that generates both a false sense of security against a nuclear attack and feelings of unconditional dependence on nuclear weapons are well founded. At the same time, criticism of deterrence will never be convincing unless it also addresses the uncertainties that accompany the attempts to get rid of the weaponry through negotiated and verified disarmament. Opponents of nuclear deterrence need a credible alternative that seems safer, cheaper, and more in accord with the values embedded in Western and other world civilizations, including respect for international law, while at the same time upholding national security as generally understood.

A further issue cannot be dismissed. Many trusted security analysts, including independent ones, argue that even if there are risks associated with retaining nuclear weapons and the option to use or threaten to use them, their elimination would greatly increase the risks of major warfare. This perspective credits nuclear weapons with preventing the Cold War from turning into World War III because they induced both Washington and Moscow to be more prudent than rival governments had been in the past and led to the establishment of tools for crisis management to reduce the prospect of the outbreak of unintended warfare, either nuclear or conventional. We need to have responses to these concerns if we want our position and proposals to be taken seriously

Falk: Deterrence as a general idea is understood to entail discouraging a potential enemy from launching an attack or doing something perceived to be a fundamental threat to the security of the state. Only the extreme hawks, the “Dr. Strangeloves”, in

* This article is an abridged version of Chapter Two of *The Path to Zero, Dialogues on Nuclear Dangers*, Richard Falk and David Krieger, Paradigm Publishers, Boulder and London, 2012.

our midst had the moral temerity and strategic hubris to argue in favor of limited or preemptive nuclear war as desirable policy options, but despite some close calls, these crazies, although unnervingly influential, never got to steer the ship of state. The mainstream defense community seemed content with keeping the weaponry as a hedge against supposed Soviet expansionist designs, although within the nuclear weapons establishment.

Krieger: The common understanding of deterrence you mention suggests that there is much room for misunderstanding. You refer to deterrence as “discouraging a potential enemy from launching an attack or doing something perceived to be a fundamental threat to the security of the state.” Since deterrence is a theory about human communications and threat, precision is important if the theory is to work as predicted. But actually, the imprecision regarding the threat of nuclear retaliation is quite stunning, considering that with nuclear deterrence the future of civilization hangs in the balance. It is not at all clear that nuclear-armed country A would know with precision what would constitute for country B “a fundamental threat to the security of the state”, or that country B would know what this was for country A. It is this imprecision that makes nuclear deterrence so dangerous over time. Of course, aggressive nuclear policies may be far worse than policies of nuclear deterrence, but nuclear deterrence leaves much room for misinterpretation and miscalculation that could trigger nuclear war.

Falk: I agree with you about this and would mention an additional problem. Nuclear deterrence is usually associated with the idea that in the Nuclear Age a country must possess a retaliatory capability to discourage a surprise attack on it. This might be true for some states possessing nuclear weapons, but it is certainly not accurate if applied to the United States. The role of nuclear deterrence for the United States seems more ambitious and am-

biguous. If nuclear deterrence were confined to retaliation, then there would be no reason not to make a formal pledge never to use the weapons first and to encourage nuclear weapon states to join in a No First Use declaration a commitment that the United States has refused to make even in relation to nonnuclear countries.

Beyond Deterrence

Krieger: The United States does have a more ambitious and ambiguous approach to nuclear deterrence than would be required to deter only nuclear attacks. It seeks to manipulate the policies of other countries by this more encompassing approach to nuclear deterrence. In doing so, it creates expanded uncertainties for other states. Some policy makers view greater uncertainty as contributing to a more effective deterrent force, but I would not be so sanguine about increasing the uncertainties in the system. It could lead to unanticipated results, which can be deadly when you are standing at the edge of a nuclear precipice.

Falk: Nuclear deterrence is supposed to be helpful for other diplomatic purposes, including dissuading adversaries by creating uncertainty about whether certain forms of perceived hostile moves might lead to a response with nuclear weaponry. There is a history of “deterrent” threats mounted during the Cold War that had nothing to do with retaliation against an attack: ending the war in Korea (1953), protecting the Taiwan offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu from a Chinese attack (1954-1955, 1958), resolving the Berlin Crisis (1961), avoiding the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba (1962).

There are all these uncertainties as to whether the public argument underpinning nuclear deterrence constitutes full disclosure of the broad spectrum of possible uses of the weaponry. We know this topic is surrounded by great secrecy and that the public in the most democratic of countries is denied in-

formation about the actual strategic doctrines controlling the use of the weaponry, In effect, there is no transparency as to the actual scope of nuclear deterrence in the United States or in the eight other nuclear weapon states.

Krieger: The combination of nuclear deterrence, nationalism and secrecy is a dangerous narcotic. It induces policy makers to believe that nuclear weapons make them invincible. It breeds not only nuclear arrogance but a recklessness that makes leaders of nuclear weapon states and the citizenries they serve highly vulnerable.

Falk: I am increasingly inclined to think of deterrence as a *rationalization*, that is, an excuse for retaining and developing nuclear weaponry that hides rather than discloses the real reasons, rather than as a *rationale*, that is, an explanation for the persistence of the weaponry. If deterrence were the major part of the story, then it would seem reasonable to expect the United States especially to have initiated disarmament negotiations either during the peace-oriented leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev in the last years of the Soviet Union or certainly in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse in 1991.

But there was no move in this direction. Quite to the contrary, there were reports at the time that Washington was encouraging Boris Yeltsin's Russia to keep its nuclear arsenal intact and not to embarrass the United States by suggesting a receptivity to nuclear disarmament. In this sense, while acknowledging the significance of deterrence in explaining the public reluctance to part with the weaponry, I believe there are additional reasons that the security establishment, in this country at least, seeks to retain and spends billions to modernize the weaponry.

Krieger: Your observation that deterrence is a rationalization rather than a rationale is compelling, but it begs the question of what the weapons are rationalizing. You mention the billions of dollars

involved in modernizing nuclear weaponry. Not just billions but trillions of dollars have been spent on nuclear weapons over the course of the Nuclear Age. I wonder, though, if money alone drives the retention and modernization of nuclear weapons. I suspect there is much more to it, what I might call a "nuclear mind-set" rooted in fear and driven by power.

Falk: No question. I never meant to suggest that resistance to denuclearization was only, or even mainly, a matter of the market dimensions of nuclearism. I have been arguing that nuclear weaponry needs to be understood in relation to the grand strategy of important states, especially for a global state such as the United States. This is another way of talking about fear and power.

Why Does the United States Insist on Nuclear Deterrence?

Falk: I would like to make one further observation that you might find provocative but that follows from the failure of the United States to launch a nuclear disarmament initiative in the 1990s. There is a strange feature of deterrence in the current global setting: The U.S. government is both the most vocal advocate of nuclear deterrence and the country for which nuclear deterrence makes the least sense. Why? First, because it possesses such dominance in conventional weaponry that it would be capable of devastating any country that dared to threaten or attack it with nuclear weapons.

That is, to the extent that the logic of deterrence underpins security, the United States doesn't really need nuclear weapons, and in relation to the biggest current threat—repetition of 9/11—deterrence is acknowledged to be irrelevant partly because of the lack of a sufficient retaliatory target and the presumed suicidal intent of the attackers.

Unlike the United States, many countries can offset their feared vulnerability to attack by possessing nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Many commenta-

tors believe that Iraq in 2003 would not have been attacked if it had then been perceived as actually possessing nuclear weapons or stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons.

Second, in a disarming world, American military superiority would be arguably much more relevant to shaping the outcome of political conflicts than it is in today's world, where, to some extent, risks of escalation lead the United States to be somewhat, although insufficiently, self-detering, that is, seeking to avoid situations that might spiral out of control to the extent of crossing the nuclear threshold.

Krieger: I agree with you that nuclear deterrence may be far more effective in the hands of a small and relatively weak country and that Iraq might well not have been attacked by the United States in 2003 had it possessed a small nuclear arsenal. The few nuclear weapons that North Korea has developed provide it with some sense of security against a U.S. attack aimed at regime change. This situation sets up dangerous incentives for nuclear proliferation among smaller countries that fear the possibility of attack by more powerful countries. Understanding this should motivate more powerful states to move away from nuclear deterrence and to embrace nuclear weapons abolition before nuclear weapons continue to spread.

Dietrich Fischer has likened nuclear deterrence to trying to prevent traffic accidents by putting babies on the bumpers of all cars on the road. The babies would make more visible the risks of an accident and would presumably cause drivers to be more careful. This would not be sufficient, however, to prevent fatalities, because no matter how carefully drivers drive their cars, accidents still happen.

Finding Security without Nuclear Deterrence

Falk: Again I would stress that the political critique of deterrence cannot stand on its own but must be associated with an alternative that is safer,

cheaper, and not vulnerable to evasion by real or imagined enemies. So far critics have not been able to make this case in a manner that engages public support. At most, if fear is generated by a global crisis, as occurred several times during the Cold War and most intensely, during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, then managerial adjustments are made, accompanied by a surge of temporary support for antinuclear activism.

The moral critique of deterrence is unconditional, and if morality guided policy and governmental approaches to security, it would have long ago led to the abandonment of a security function for nuclear weapons, especially if the threat to use them is taken into full account. It should be noted, in passing, that deterrence rests upon the credibility of the threat to use the weapons in retaliation or if provoked. Thus, the political leadership of nuclear weapon states projects the belief that the security of their societies is based on a continuous and unconditional willingness to devastate an adversary with genocidal fury and an absence of wider concerns or any acceptance of responsibility for the radioactive fallout and harm suffered by peoples not even involved in the conflict. This posture contradicts the most fundamental and widely shared ethical commitment of all civilized societies to avoid violence toward those who are innocent.

Krieger: Perhaps you are right that rational debate cannot win the day on this issue, but at the same time it would be foolish to cease to attempt rational arguments to oppose reliance upon a theory as faulty and dangerous as nuclear deterrence. It is said that generals always prepare for the next war in the way they prepared for the last one. That is no longer possible in an all-out war. A country cannot escalate to the use of nuclear weapons without the risk of triggering national suicide and possibly a global holocaust.

In a global nuclear war, there would be no victors, only losers. The U.S. president who recognized this clearly was Ronald Reagan, who concluded, “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Drawing upon this conclusion, Reagan continued, speaking of the United States and former Soviet Union, “The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear weapons is to make sure they will never be used. But then would it not be better to do away with them entirely?” If Reagan was able to follow the logic of the situation to the need to abolish the weapons, if Reagan, a staunch Cold Warrior, could understand this logic, it should be clear to everyone who thinks about it.

PROF. RICHARD FALK is an international law and international relations scholar who taught at Princeton University for forty years. He is the author or co-author of 20 books and the editor or co-editor of another 20 books, speaker, activist on world affairs, and an appointee to two United Nations positions on the Palestinian territories. Since 2002 he has lived in Santa Barbara, California, and taught at the local campus of the University of California in Global and International Studies and since 2005 chaired the Board of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation.

DR. DAVID KRIEGER is the Founder of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and has served as its President since 1982. Dr. Krieger is Chair of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility, Chair of the Executive Committee of the Middle Powers Initiative, and a Founder and member of the Global Council of Abolition 2000. He is a recipient of many awards for his work, including Global Green’s Millennium Award for International Environmental Leadership. He is the author or editor of more than 20 books, including five poetry volumes, and hundreds of articles on peace and a world free of nuclear weapons. Dr. Krieger is an attorney and holds a Ph.D. in Political Science.

Dinosaur, Dragon or Durable Defence: Deterrence in the 21st Century

A summary of perspectives on nuclear deterrence

Alyn Ware¹ and Teresa Bergman²

The past 25 years have seen significant changes in security environments – nationally, regionally and globally – that impact on nuclear weapons policies and practices. These include, *inter alia*, the end of the Cold War (followed by periods of fluctuating relationships between the U.S. and Russia); the emergence of new nuclear weapons-possessing States (India, Pakistan and North Korea); the rise of international terrorism and the emerging capacity of non-State actors to acquire WMD; regime change by military force in States that had relinquished nuclear weapons and WMD programmes (Iraq and Libya); rising environmental threats to security including climate change; the adoption of a number of international measures including treaties on non-proliferation, disarmament and international crime; and a phenomenal increase in international cooperation across a range of areas, including in finance, trade, energy, health, information technology and communications.

These changes have influenced academic and policy analysis of the role – or roles – of nuclear weapons in the 21st Century. Opinions are diverse, but can be roughly categorized into dinosaur (outmoded), dragon (mythical, powerful and /or dangerous) or durable defence (suitable for core security and flexible to meet current security challenges).

There is a fourth perspective – perhaps more visionary and constructivist but no less valid - which encompasses all three and adds a problem-solving approach to examine the possibilities for moving

beyond nuclear deterrence to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world.

Durable defence (Protective)

Classic deterrence theory is based on the assumption that an adversary will be compelled not to attack in response to threats of unacceptable damage in retaliation. T.V. Paul for example notes:

“Deterrence is achieved if and when a potential attacker, fearing unacceptable punishment or denial of victory, decides to forgo a planned offensive.”³

Nuclear deterrence raises the level of threatened destruction to a much higher level than conventional deterrence and thus, according to the basic deterrence premise, provides a much greater deterrent value.

Many policy analysts, academics and decision-makers accept the basic premise of deterrence without question, albeit with some consideration of legal constraints under the laws of warfare. Their inquiry is thus primarily focussed on how nuclear deterrence can work, rather than on whether it is an inherently flawed policy.

Paul notes, for example, that,

“The classic conventional and nuclear deterrence theory is based on three core premises: (1) in order for deterrence to succeed, a deterrer should have sufficient capability, (2) its threat should be credible, and (3) it should be able to communicate the threat to its opponent.”⁴

A number of policy analysts and academics argue that nuclear deterrence has changed since the end of the Cold War, but is still a vital component of security for a range of countries including the traditional nuclear weapon-States, their allies, new nuclear weapons-possessing States, and possibly even for additional States.

T.V. Paul argues that nuclear deterrence has a range of valid functions in five differing types of security relationships: among great powers, among new nuclear States, in regional alliances (extended

nuclear deterrence), between nuclear States and non-State actors and amongst collective actors.⁵

Among the great powers (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council), Paul argues that nuclear weapons play a role as “a hedge against the emergence of great-power conflict in the future”,⁶ ensuring that peace will be maintained through nuclear deterrence if relations deteriorate. He also argues that nuclear deterrence plays a role in constraining current conflicts, like those between the U.S. and China over Taiwan and between Russia and NATO over ballistic missile defence:

“Nuclear deterrence in this context has offered the major powers greater manoeuvrability. It has allowed the major power States to sustain their credentials as system managers and has prevented the emergence of active security dilemmas among them that can be caused by conventional arms races and technological breakthroughs.”⁷

This analysis has been challenged by other writers such as Ward Wilson who notes that the historical evidence of crises between the nuclear powers indicates that nuclear weapons have often failed to be a constraining factor – and conversely have often stimulated the conflict. Wilson cites as examples the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Berlin crisis of 1948 and the failure of nuclear posturing to prevent China from entering the Korean War.⁸

MccGwire argues that during the Cold War, nuclear deterrence dogma was not responsible for the prevention of war – but made it more likely.⁹ With regard to war prevention, MccGwire argues that the costs of major war (between USSR and USA) were much greater than any benefits that could be gained (especially from the perspective of the Soviet Union) regardless of the threat of nuclear retaliation.¹⁰

Green supports MccGwire’s perspective that nuclear deterrence, is inherently flawed because it is based on provocative threats of massive destruc-

tion, and thus undercuts the political stability it is supposed to achieve.¹¹

“The arms race, threatening military deployments, confrontational rhetoric, and often reckless posturing that characterise its application are self-defeating, provoking precisely the response it is designed to prevent.”¹²

Blackaby et al. argued during the Cold War that nuclear weapons were not necessary for the defence of the UK, and put forward an alternative range of non-provocative defence options and strategies that they believed would enhance security and deter attack much better than nuclear deterrence.¹³

With regard to Paul’s position on Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), other analysts argue to the contrary that nuclear weapons are more likely to be fuelling the current tensions between Russia and U.S./NATO than constraining them. Butt and Postal argue:

“[t]he renewed [US/Russia] relationship is at risk because of Russian concerns about the future capability of the planned missile defence system to erode Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent,”¹⁴

They further assert:

“Russia and China might increase their arsenals, end future arms reductions talks with the United States, and decrease their assistance with worldwide counter-proliferation efforts.”¹⁵

It is the combination of ballistic missile capability along with U.S. nuclear first-strike capability that, from the Russian perspective, gives BMD an offensive capacity and undermines Russian nuclear deterrence. Without the nuclear weapons dimension, BMD could more readily be perceived by Russia as a defensive system that does not threaten their security.

Among new nuclear States, Paul focuses primarily on India/Pakistan, arguing that “The non-

escalation of crises in South Asia in the nuclear era attests to the effectiveness of deterrence.”

On the other hand, he concedes that,

*“The Kargil conflict provides ambiguous evidence for and against deterrence theory... a nuclear State, Pakistan, initiated a limited war against another nuclear rival, India, expecting no major retaliation from the larger neighbor. India did not escalate the war, but it did wage an intense localized battle that challenged deterrence axioms.”*¹⁶

Relating to the ambiguity of evidence for or against nuclear deterrence in India/Pakistan, Kapur, although favouring nuclear expansion, must concede that the introduction of nuclear weapons into the security environment in South Asia has not necessarily constrained India and Pakistan in the management of their conflicts. His theoretical analysis displays that nuclear weapons can create strong incentives for rational States to adopt aggressive, extremely risky strategies, and have, in Pakistan’s case, created a shield for military adventurism, bringing with it the risk of Indian overreaction.¹⁷

With regard to North-East Asia, there is considerable analysis on the role of extended nuclear deterrence in the security of Japan and South Korea (see below), but very little analysis on the role of nuclear deterrence in the security of North Korea. This is somewhat surprising as North Korea’s official announcement on leaving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to develop a nuclear weapons program exhibited classic nuclear deterrence rationale.¹⁸

With regard to the Middle East, analysis of the value of nuclear deterrence to Israel is somewhat skewed by the Israeli policy of opacity – neither confirming nor denying possession. On the other hand, nuclear deterrence to protect the existence of Israel as a State is insinuated in official statements on the need to achieve peace in the region, including recognition by all neighbours of Israel, before

Israel could join a process for a Middle East NWFZ. However, the degree to which this policy provides a genuine deterrent is debated. Some analysts argue that Israel’s nuclear deterrence prevented a chemical weapons attack by Iraq in the first Gulf War. Others argue that the fact that Israel has been attacked by Egypt and Syria (1973) and Iraq (Scud missile attacks in 1991), despite Israel’s nuclear arsenal, indicate that it is not an effective deterrent.¹⁹

Analysis on the potential of nuclear deterrence to enhance the security of Iran (and regional security in the Middle East) is also mixed. Waltz argues that acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran could enhance regional security by providing a balance to the nuclear weapons of Israel – and thus strengthening mutual deterrence against aggression.²⁰ However, public pronouncements by both the United States and Israel on the likelihood of military action against Iran if it moves towards possession appear to contradict Waltz’s opinion that stability would be achieved by an Iranian bomb.

With regard to regional alliances, the principle ones relying on extended nuclear deterrence are NATO, U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Korea, with nuclear deterrence featuring to a lesser degree in the U.S.-Australia alliance and the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty between Russia and Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.

Shetty, Kearns and Lunn argue that a number of countries, particularly the Baltic States, continue to see a security value in United States extended nuclear deterrence and in the deployment of nuclear weapons in some NATO countries in order to deter any potential attack or intimidation from Russia.²¹

The affirmation by NATO in its Chicago Summit that “As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will be a nuclear alliance”²² infers that the value NATO states place on nuclear deterrence extends beyond

deterrence of military attacks or intimidation from Russia.

On the other hand, Snyder et al. argue that the majority of NATO States now see the forward deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe as more detrimental and a greater security risk than benefit, and would support their removal.²³

Allison et al. go further to argue that extended nuclear deterrence is no longer necessary for the security of NATO States or for the other regional security alliances. They argue that the key security issues in the 21st Century are non-military threats which require international collaborative and non-military responses, that military threats can be better met by non-nuclear means, regional security can be better met by security mechanisms and mutually-beneficial economic and trade relationships rather than nuclear deterrence, and that the prohibition of nuclear weapons in regions assists in regional security and confidence-building.²⁴

Dragon – powerful (and dangerous?)

A number of academics and policy analysts focus on aspects of the power of nuclear weapons, including the military power, destructive power, political power and coercive/persuasive power.

Such analyses vary in whether they perceive such power as either a positive or negative force depending on the desired outcomes. What for one analyst might be deemed a positive impact of nuclear weapons (from the perspective of the nuclear weapon-State using them in a coercive way, for example), could conversely be seen in a negative way from the State being coerced.

Some analysts argue that States may be attracted to acquiring or retaining nuclear weapons capability due to the perceived political power or status that can be attained. O'Neill, for example, argues that India acquired nuclear weapons primarily for prestige purposes rather than military security reasons:

“Prestige is not the only motive for these weapons, of course, and in some cases of proliferation it may be absent, but it led India to acquire them even though the net consequence seems to have been a decrease in security.”²⁵

Shankar et al., claim that prestige is a primary factor behind the reluctance of nuclear weapon States – particularly U.K. and France – to seriously consider abandoning nuclear deterrence despite other benefits (political, economic and military) of doing so.²⁶

Evans, Kawaguchi et al. argue that the status value of nuclear weapons is probably over-stated, and that, in any case,

“[a]s the delegitimation of nuclear weapons proceeds, and the retention of nuclear weapons becomes more and more clearly unacceptable to the rest of the world, and manifestly unnecessary from a security standpoint, then status considerations alone are not likely to prove sufficient to block movement toward minimization and ultimate elimination.”²⁷

Some analysts argue that the alternative path of rejecting nuclear deterrence can confer prestige which is equally valuable and much less risky than the prestige acquired through nuclear weapons. Walters, for example, writes that Kazakhstan's decision to abandon nuclear weapons (over 1500 of which were in their territory at the time of independence), has enhanced Kazakhstan's international status and assisted in their economic growth and political leadership positions in the region and globally.²⁸

The principle focus of analysts, however, is the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the relationship between this and military power.

Nuclear deterrence is premised on the notion that the threat of massive retaliation provided by the uniquely destructive qualities of nuclear weapons, will compel a potential aggressor to refrain from attacking – whether with conventional weapons or nuclear weapons or other indiscriminate or mas-

sively destructive weapons. According to this thinking, the nuclear bomb – as the most powerful weapon – provides the ultimate deterrent power.

Wilson argues that the policy is based on a false presumption that the threat of mass destruction will deter an aggressor or compel an adversary to surrender. He contends that massive destruction and indiscriminate targeting in wartime – such as the strategic bombing of cities in World War II, or Napoleon’s use of mass destruction in the 1814 war against Russia – failed to ‘shock and awe the opponents. On the contrary, such campaigns serve to strengthen the resolve of the opponent. Wilson argues that,

*“Winning and losing wars depends on whether your adversary’s military is defeated, not how much damage is done to its civilians and their houses, businesses and country.”*²⁹

Evans, Kawaguchi et al. argue that it may be impossible to prove either way whether nuclear weapons have played – or can continue to play – a decisive role in deterring aggression or armed conflict either between the principal nuclear weapon-States or in regional contexts. However, they argue that even if it is possible to conclude such a role, the risks created by the weapons themselves, i.e. the risks of proliferation and nuclear weapons use, are far greater than the risks associated with their elimination.

Risk analysis features prominently in analysis of nuclear deterrence – with proponents arguing that the risks of nuclear deterrence ‘failure’ leading to nuclear weapons use are very low, while the benefits of deterrence in preventing aggression or war are very high.

Critics of this risk analysis argue that the risks of use of nuclear weapons is probably higher than generally assumed, and support this perspective with both empirical arguments (the number of times nuclear weapons use has been narrowly

averted) and theory. From the theoretical side, the need for nuclear threats to be believable (credible) in order to give nuclear weapons a deterrent value, can push adversaries close to the nuclear brink in a conflict, increasing the risks in such a conflict. The Cuban Missile Crisis is an example of this in practice.

The interplay of rationality and irrationality in nuclear deterrence is also an area of exploration. Simply put, under nuclear deterrence theory it is rational to threaten a nuclear attack against an adversary in order to deter them, but it would be irrational to carry out such an attack if nuclear deterrence fails, as such retaliation would impose incredible costs on the retaliating State as well as the State attacked with nuclear weapons.

If rationality holds on each side, i.e. if each side takes decisions that ensure the best possible outcome for their side, then nuclear deterrence works. However, Berekein argues that national decisions and inter-State behaviour often do not conform to rationality. Decision-makers often make decisions that are not the most likely to produce optimal outcomes, due to insufficient knowledge or understanding of the full conditions, or due to social, political or psychological influences. Berekein offers a more comprehensive understanding of decision-making through Prospect Theory.³⁰

Lebow and Stein support Berekein, and add additional considerations influencing decision-making that transcend a rational deterrence model. These include misperception and miscalculation arising from inadequate information and faulty evaluation.³¹

These critiques of rationality in nuclear decision-making indicate a high risk of nuclear deterrence failing even in a bi-polar world. A multi-polar world with a number of nuclear weapons players, increases the risks considerably.

With regard to the role of nuclear weapons to deter the use of nuclear weapons by an adversary, Evans, Kawaguchi et al. argue that,

*“Even if retaining nuclear weapons does continue to have some deterrent utility against others minded to use such weapons, this does not in itself make any case against abolition, because the argument for retention is circular. If the only military utility that remains for nuclear weapons is deterring their use by others, that utility implies the continued existence of nuclear weapons and would disappear if nuclear weapons were eliminated.”*³²

Harrington argues that nuclear weapons derive their political power not through destructive force or military value or prestige conferred by them, but through the human-attributed value focused on scarcity, durability and fear. They are scarce because only a few countries own them. They are durable – in that they are produced and stored/deployed but not used. As such, the political and psychological framework confers a currency of power onto the weapons – without which they would be absurd instruments of destruction.³³

Wilson argues that nuclear weapons have attained a currency of power due to the non-rational qualities ascribed to the weapons and to nuclear deterrence. He notes that terms such as ‘ultimate weapon’ and ‘you can’t put the genie back in the bottle’ have contributed to giving nuclear weapons a magical quality:

*“Nuclear weapons are extraordinary, it is claimed; they have power that goes far beyond conventional weapons. Bring your nuclear weapon out. Wave it around and everyone will do what you wish.”*³⁴

Wilson argues that nuclear weapons are not a genie, being neither benevolent nor magic. They are perhaps more like a dangerous fire breathing dragon that could destroy not only the village but the world.

The catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, ac-

ording to a number of analysts, renders such use illegal under international humanitarian law. Thus, deterrence would constitute the threat of an illegal action, and would thus be illegal as well. Some analysts frame their consideration of the illegality of nuclear deterrence on the 1996 decision of the International Court of Justice, which declared that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is generally illegal.³⁵ Others go further evaluating legal developments since the 1996 decision to reinforce the norm of illegality of nuclear deterrence and thus the legal imperative to abandon this doctrine.³⁶

Dinosaur – outmoded?

A number of policy analysts and academics argue that nuclear deterrence was a determinant for peace between the major powers during the Cold War, but is irrelevant to the security relationships between them in the 21st Century, and also to the wider security issues of other nuclear possessing-States or those under extended nuclear deterrence.

Doyle, for example, reports that,

*“[a] growing number of strategists and technical and political elites regard nuclear weapons and deterrence theory as anachronistic. Some view the whole idea of nuclear weapons as out of step with today’s global threats, understanding of power and notions of human rights and the rule of law. Emerging structural changes in the international system (such as globalisation) undercut traditional theories of nuclear deterrence, while trends in information technology make possible much more agile and discriminate forms of military power.”*³⁷

Primakov, Ivanov, Velikhov and Moiseev, argue that,

“[n]uclear deterrence is paradoxical since it mostly refers to the threats of the last century, while a possibility of a massive armed conflict between the superpowers and their allies under present-day conditions of globalization and multi-polarity is close to zero. Moreover, nuclear deterrence is forceless against the threats of the 21st century such as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and its

carriers' proliferation, international terrorism, ethnic and religious conflicts, cross-border criminality, etc."³⁸

Kissinger, Schultz, Nunn and Perry advance the view that nuclear deterrence was vital to security during the Cold War but "the end of the Cold War made the doctrine of mutual Soviet-American deterrence obsolete." They did not go so far as to say that nuclear weapons have no deterrent value in the 21st Century. Rather,

*"Deterrence continues to be a relevant consideration for many states with regard to threats from other states. But reliance on nuclear weapons for this purpose is becoming increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective."*³⁹

McCuire is even more critical of nuclear deterrence as an out-moded concept, noting that the doctrine was developed as a flawed concept framed in terms of past conflicts and political realities.⁴⁰

Green and McCuire concur that the transition of power from control over territories to the control of markets (financial and trade) has eroded the purpose of nuclear weapons (which are less able to defend markets than territory) and shifted the necessary security framework to being primarily one of cooperative security.⁴¹

Ware argues that regional and global methods and mechanisms – both legal and political - have developed to a level that the use of them is now generally capable of dealing with core security threats – including threats arising from nuclear weapons – without recourse to nuclear deterrence, thus rendering nuclear deterrence no longer necessary, if it ever was.⁴²

Enacting the vision – from deterrence to a nuclear weapons-free world

Some analysts synthesise arguments from the previous three categories into a constructivist approach to address the question of how to move beyond nuclear deterrence to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world.

Finaud, for example, argues that,

*"The approach to nuclear disarmament followed to date has only yielded limited success because it has been conceived in isolation of global and regional security environments and threat perceptions. A new paradigm should thus be sought in order to reconcile nuclear powers' security doctrines with the global aspirations for a safer world, and ensure that nuclear powers derive their security less from others' insecurity but from mutually beneficial cooperative security."*⁴³

Finaud identifies a number of practical measures to increase the reliance on cooperative security, lower the reliance on military security and eliminate reliance on nuclear weapons for security.⁴⁴

Evans, Kawaguchi et al. conclude that there is no military necessity for nuclear deterrence, but that there are strong political drivers maintaining nuclear weapons. They thus put forward a number of approaches to address these key drivers, including proposals of technical, political and legal measures.⁴⁵

Burroughs argues that,

*"A favorable global environment now exists for undertaking comprehensive work leading to a global regime of zero nuclear weapons: relatively cooperative, and increasingly inclusive, relations among key states, and rising global consciousness of the complete unacceptability of nuclear weapons."*⁴⁶

He continues to identify practical measures and processes that could be undertaken in order to build the framework for a nuclear weapons-free world, such a framework addressing legitimate security concerns in order to enable the relinquishment of nuclear deterrence and the attainment of comprehensive nuclear disarmament.⁴⁷

Conclusion

The academic and policy debate on nuclear deterrence is robust and varied. There has been a considerable shift in emphasis in the past few years,

with a greater emphasis of analysts on the new security environment/s in a globalized world. In this increasingly interconnected world, the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation and use are possibly increased. On the other hand, it also provides greater opportunities and possibilities to achieve nuclear abolition in a more cooperative security framework. This coincides and reinforces the increased political attention to the imperative and possibility to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world.

¹ **ALYN WARE** is a policy analyst and nuclear abolition advocate from Aotearoa-New Zealand. He is the founder of the Nuclear Abolition Forum, Global Co-ordinator of Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (PNND), a member of the World Future Council, a consultant for the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms and a 2009 winner of the Right Livelihood Award.

² **TERESA BERGMAN** is a Policy Officer at the Basel Peace Office, working as a researcher and editor for the Nuclear Abolition Forum since January 2013. She holds a joint Master of Arts degree in “Global Studies” from the University of Leipzig (Germany) and University of Wroclaw (Poland). Previously she held the position of Project Officer for NGO “Human Rights in Education” in her hometown of Wellington New Zealand.

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⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 1-27.

⁶ Ibid., p. 10.

⁷ Ibid., pp. 10-11.

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¹⁰ Ibid., p. 780-781.

¹¹ Green, Robert, *Security without nuclear deterrence*, Astron Media, 2010, pp. 90-123.

¹² Ibid., p. 122.

¹³ “Defence without the bomb.” *The Report of the Alternative Defence Commission*. U.K.: Taylor and Francis, 1983.

¹⁴ Butt, Yousaf and Theodore Postol. “Upsetting the Reset: The Technical Basis of Russian Concern Over NATO Missile Defense.” *Federation of American Scientists*. Washington, 2011, p. 5.

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¹⁵ Ibid., p. 46.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 12.

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²⁷ Evans, Gareth and Kawaguchi, Yoriko (Co-Chairs) “Eliminating Nuclear Threats: A Practical Agenda for Global Policymakers.” *Report of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament*. Canberra, 2009, p. 105.
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⁴¹ Green 2010, p.96 and 221-222. MccGuire 2006 p.782.

⁴² Ware, Alyn. “Rule of Force or Rule of Law, Legal Responses to Nuclear Threats from Terrorism, Proliferation, and War.” *Seattle Journal for Social Justice*, 2/1, Fall/Winter 2003. See especially Table II: EXAMPLES OF METHODS TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE OF DISARMAMENT AND NONPROLIFERATION OBLIGATIONS, and Table III:

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APPENDIX A:
Santa Barbara Declaration:
Reject Nuclear Deterrence: An Urgent Call to Action

Santa Barbara, CA, United States, February 17, 2011

by (see signatories below)

Nuclear deterrence is a doctrine that is used as a justification by nuclear weapon states and their allies for the continued possession and threatened use of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear deterrence is the threat of a nuclear strike in response to a hostile action. However, the nature of the hostile action is often not clearly defined, making possible the use of nuclear weapons in a wide range of circumstances.

Nuclear deterrence threatens the murder of many millions of innocent people, along with severe economic, climate, environmental, agricultural and health consequences beyond the area of attack.

Nuclear deterrence requires massive commitments of resources to the industrial infrastructures and organizations that make up the world's nuclear weapons establishments, its only beneficiaries.

Despite its catastrophic potential, nuclear deterrence is widely, though wrongly, perceived to provide protection to nuclear weapon states, their allies and their citizens.

Nuclear deterrence has numerous major problems:

1. Its power to protect is a dangerous fabrication. The threat or use of nuclear weapons provides no protection against an attack.
2. It assumes rational leaders, but there can be irrational or paranoid leaders on any side of a conflict.
3. Threatening or committing mass murder with nuclear weapons is illegal and criminal. It violates fundamental legal precepts of domestic and international law, threatening the indiscriminate slaughter of innocent people.
4. It is deeply immoral for the same reasons it is illegal: it threatens indiscriminate and grossly disproportionate death and destruction.
5. It diverts human and economic resources desperately needed to meet basic human needs around the world. Globally, approximately \$100 billion is spent annually on nuclear forces.
6. It has no effect against non-state extremists, who govern no territory or population.
7. It is vulnerable to cyber attack, sabotage, and human or technical error, which could result in a nuclear strike.
8. It sets an example for additional countries to pursue nuclear weapons for their own nuclear deterrent force.

Its benefits are illusory. Any use of nuclear weapons would be catastrophic.

Nuclear deterrence is discriminatory, anti-democratic and unsustainable. This doctrine must be discredited and replaced with an urgent commitment to achieve global nuclear disarmament. We must change the discourse by speaking truth to power and speaking truth to each other.

Before another nuclear weapon is used, nuclear deterrence must be replaced by humane, legal and moral security strategies. We call upon people everywhere to join us in demanding that the nuclear weapon states and their allies reject nuclear deterrence and negotiate without delay a Nuclear Weapons Convention for the phased, verifiable, irreversible and transparent elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Initial Signers: Participants in “The Dangers of Nuclear Deterrence Conference”, hosted by the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Santa Barbara, CA, United States, on February 16-17, 2011.

Blase Bonpane, Ph.D., Director, Office of the Americas

Theresa Bonpane, Founding Director, Office of the Americas

John Burroughs, Ph.D., Executive Director, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy

Jacqueline Cabasso, Executive Director, Western States Legal Foundation

Kate Dewes, Ph.D., Co-Director, Disarmament and Security Centre, New Zealand

Bob Dodge, M.D., Coordinator, Beyond War Nuclear Weapons Abolition Team

Dick Duda, Ph.D., founding member, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation – Silicon Valley

Denise Duffield, Associate Director, Physicians for Social Responsibility – Los Angeles

Richard Falk, J.S.D., Chair, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Commander Robert Green (Royal Navy, ret.), Co-Director, Disarmament and Security Centre, New Zealand

David Krieger, Ph.D., President, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Robert Laney, J.D., Secretary, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Steven Starr, Senior Scientist, Physicians for Social Responsibility

Rick Wayman, Director of Programs, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Bill Wickersham, Ph.D., Adjunct Professor of Peace Studies, University of Missouri

APPENDIX B: NATO Deterrence and Defence Posture Review

Approved at the NATO Chicago Summit, May 20-21, 2012

I. INTRODUCTION / CONTEXT

1. At the Lisbon Summit, the Heads of State and Government mandated *a review of NATO's overall posture* in deterring and defending against the full range of threats to the Alliance, taking into account the changes in the evolving international security environment. Over the past year, NATO has undertaken a rigorous analysis of its deterrence and defence posture. The results of this review are set out below.
2. The greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary. However, no one should doubt NATO's resolve if the security of any of its members were to be threatened. NATO will ensure that it maintains the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of our populations, wherever it should arise. Allies' goal is to bolster deterrence as a core element of our collective defence and contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance.
3. The review has reinforced Alliance cohesion and the continuing credibility of its posture. The review has also demonstrated anew the value of the Alliance's efforts to influence the international security environment in positive ways through cooperative security and the contribution that arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation can play in achieving its security objectives, objectives that are fully in accord with the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO will continue to seek security at the lowest possible level of forces.
4. NATO's Strategic Concept describes a *security environment* that contains a broad and evolving set of opportunities and challenges to the security of NATO territory and populations. While the threat of conventional attack against NATO is low, the conventional threat cannot be ignored. The persistence of regional conflicts continues to be a matter of great concern for the Alliance as are increasing defence spending in other parts of the world and the acquisition of increasingly advanced capabilities by some emerging powers. Globalisation, emerging security challenges, such as cyber threats, key environmental and resource constraints, including the risk of disruption to energy supplies, and the emergence of new technologies will continue shaping the future security environment in areas of interest to NATO. A number of vulnerable, weak and failed or failing states, together with the growing capabilities of non-state actors, will continue to be a source of instability and potential conflict. These factors, alongside existing threats and challenges such as the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction, piracy, and terrorism, will continue to contribute to an unpredictable security environment.
5. The current *economic environment* is a challenging one, as evidenced by recent reductions in many Allies' defence budgets and the probability of further cuts. In particular, Allies recognise that the challenge of maintaining modern, effective conventional forces is especially acute in an era of limited budgets. Allies are committed to the maintenance of the full range of capabilities necessary to meet the Alliance's level

of ambition despite these financial difficulties, and are developing innovative approaches to cooperating in the development of our capabilities to help achieve this goal.

6. Developments in the strategic environment since the Lisbon Summit and the review itself have confirmed the validity of the three essential core tasks identified in the Strategic Concept. We reaffirm our commitment to *collective defence*, which remains the cornerstone of our Alliance, to *crisis management*, and to *cooperative security*.
7. A robust deterrence and defence posture strengthens Alliance cohesion, including the transatlantic link, through an equitable and sustainable distribution of roles, responsibilities, and burdens.

II. THE CONTRIBUTION OF NUCLEAR FORCES

8. Nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO's overall capabilities for deterrence and defence alongside conventional and missile defence forces. The review has shown that the Alliance's nuclear force posture currently meets the criteria for an effective deterrence and defence posture.
9. The circumstances in which any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated are extremely remote. As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance. The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.
10. Allies acknowledge the importance of the independent and unilateral negative security assurances offered by the United States, the United Kingdom and France. Those assurances guarantee, without prejudice to the separate conditions each State has attached to those assurances, including the inherent right to self-defence as recognised under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, that nuclear weapons will not be used or threatened to be used against Non-Nuclear Weapon States that are party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. Allies further recognise the value that these statements can have in seeking to discourage nuclear proliferation. Allies note that the states that have assigned nuclear weapons to NATO apply to these weapons the assurances they have each offered on a national basis, including the separate conditions each state has attached to these assurances.
11. While seeking to create the conditions and considering options for further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO, Allies concerned⁷ will ensure that all components of NATO's nuclear deterrent remain safe, secure, and effective for as long as NATO remains a nuclear alliance. That requires sustained leadership focus and institutional excellence for the nuclear deterrence mission and planning guidance aligned with 21st century requirements.
12. Consistent with our commitment to remain a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist, Allies agree that the NAC will task the appropriate committees to develop concepts for how to ensure the broadest possible participation of Allies concerned¹ in their nuclear sharing arrangements, including in case NATO were to decide to reduce its reliance on non-strategic nuclear weapons based in Europe.

⁷ i.e. all members of the Nuclear Planning Group

III. THE CONTRIBUTION OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES

13. The Allies' conventional forces, their effectiveness amplified by the Alliance structures and procedures that unite them, make indispensable contributions to deterrence of a broad range of threats and to defence. By their nature, they can be employed in a flexible fashion and can provide the Alliance with a range of options with which to respond to unforeseen contingencies. They also contribute to providing visible assurance of NATO's cohesion as well as the Alliance's ability and commitment to respond to the security concerns of each and every Ally.
14. Among their key characteristics, the Allies' forces must be modern, flexible, and interoperable, capable of meeting a wide range of circumstances, including if necessary high-intensity combat operations. Such forces must be able to successfully conduct and sustain a range of operations for *collective defence* and *crisis response*, including at strategic distance. They must be rapidly deployable and sustainable; able to operate alongside other nations and organisations; and be adaptable enough to respond to unforeseen developments. They must also contribute to meeting future security challenges such as cyber attacks, terrorism, the disruption of critical supply lines, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Allies are committed to increasing the opportunities for their conventional forces, especially those in the NATO Response Force, to train and exercise together and in that way, among others, to strengthen their ability to operate in concert anywhere on Alliance territory and beyond.
15. The bulk of the conventional capabilities that are available now and will be available in the future for Alliance operations are provided by the Allies individually; they must therefore provide *adequate resources* for their military forces so that they will have the required characteristics, notwithstanding current and probably continuing financial difficulties.
16. Nevertheless, fielding and maintaining the capabilities needed for the full range of Alliance missions in a period of severe *budgetary restrictions* requires a new conceptual approach, one that places a premium on the identification and pursuit of priorities, multinational cooperation, and specialisation as appropriate, and on increased efforts to ensure that the Allies' and, as appropriate, our partners forces are interoperable. The work underway to outline how the Alliance intends to meet its future capability requirements, referred to as NATO Forces 2020, will be key in this context. This package will continue the important work on *transformation and reform* of Alliance structures and procedures that are already underway, as part of an effective and financially responsible approach to the development of capabilities. This should include further developing cyber defence capacities and integrating them into Allied structures and procedures. As also stated in the Strategic Concept, it will be important for NATO and the European Union to cooperate more fully in capability development as agreed, to avoid unnecessary duplication and maximise cost-effectiveness.
17. Allies' conventional forces have important roles to play in fostering *cooperative security*, including through cooperation and contacts with the armed forces of partner countries. Such activities can have broader stabilising effects by helping to shape and improve the Alliance's security environment, project stability, and prevent conflicts.

IV. THE CONTRIBUTION OF MISSILE DEFENCE

18. The proliferation of ballistic missiles is a growing concern for the Alliance and constitutes an increasing threat to Alliance security. NATO's ballistic missile defence capacity will be an important addition to the Alliance's capabilities for deterrence and defence. It will strengthen our collective defence commitment against 21st century threats. In Lisbon, Allies agreed on a missile defence capability that provides full coverage and protection for all NATO European populations, territory and forces, against the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles, based on the principles of the indivisibility of Allied security and NATO solidarity, equitable sharing of risks and burdens, as well as reasonable challenge, taking into account the level of threat, affordability, and technical feasibility, and in accordance with the latest common threat assessments agreed by the Alliance. Missile defence will become an integral part of the Alliance's overall defence posture, further strengthen the transatlantic link, and contribute to the indivisible security of the Alliance.
19. In Chicago, Heads of State and Government announced that NATO has achieved an Interim Capability for its missile defence. The United States will contribute the European Phased Adaptive Approach to NATO missile defence. Alliance leaders also welcome decisions by individual Allies to contribute to the NATO missile defence mission, encourage calls for possible additional voluntary contributions by Allies, including through multinational cooperation, to provide relevant capabilities. The Alliance will continue to implement the commitment made in the Lisbon package of the Alliance's most pressing capability needs to build a truly interoperable NATO missile defence capability based on the Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence command and control network as the enabling backbone.
20. Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute for them. This capability is purely defensive and is being established in the light of threats from outside the Euro-Atlantic area. It is expected that NATO's missile defence capabilities would complicate an adversary's planning, and provide damage mitigation. Effective missile defence could also provide valuable decision space in times of crisis. Like other weapons systems, missile defence capabilities cannot promise complete and enduring effectiveness. NATO missile defence capability, along with effective nuclear and conventional forces, will signal our determination to deter and defend against any threat from outside the Euro-Atlantic area to the safety and security of our populations.
21. NATO missile defence is not oriented against Russia nor does it have the capability to undermine Russia's strategic deterrent. The Alliance, in a spirit of reciprocity, maximum transparency and mutual confidence, will actively seek cooperation on missile defence with Russia and, in accordance with NATO's policy of engagement with third states on ballistic missile defence, engage with other relevant states, to be decided on a case-by-case basis.

V. THE CONTRIBUTION OF ARMS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION

22. Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation play *an important role* in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives. Both the success and failure of these efforts can have a direct impact on the threat environment of NATO and therefore affect NATO's deterrence and defence posture. When successful, they have contributed to more secure, stable and predictable international relations at lower levels of military forces and armaments, through effective and verifiable arms control agreements, and in the case of disarmament, through the elimination or prohibition of whole categories of armaments. Ex-

isting agreements cut across almost all aspects of the Alliance's work. However, they have not yet fully achieved their objectives and the world continues to face proliferation crises, force concentration problems, and lack of transparency.

23. NATO has been *involved in a variety of ways*, such as the coordination of positions on some conventional arms control issues, and serving as a forum for consultations and exchange of information, including with partners, on disarmament and non-proliferation. In conventional arms control the Alliance has taken a direct coordinating role in both negotiations and implementation. In other instances regarding disarmament and non-proliferation, NATO has contributed to raising international awareness.
24. The Alliance is resolved to seek a safer world for all and to create the *conditions for a world without nuclear weapons* in accordance with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, in a way that promotes international stability, and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.
25. Allies look forward to continuing to develop and exchange transparency and confidence-building ideas with the Russian Federation in the NATO-Russia Council, with the goal of developing detailed proposals on and increasing mutual understanding of NATO's and Russia's non-strategic nuclear force postures in Europe.
26. Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has dramatically reduced the number, types, and readiness of nuclear weapons stationed in Europe and its reliance on nuclear weapons in NATO strategy. Against this background and considering the broader security environment, NATO is prepared to consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area.
27. Allies agree that the NAC will task the appropriate committees to further consider, in the context of the broader security environment, what NATO would expect to see in the way of reciprocal Russian actions to allow for significant reductions in forward-based non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO.
28. In addition, Allies support and encourage the United States and the Russian Federation to continue their mutual efforts to promote strategic stability, enhance transparency, and further reduce their nuclear weapons.
29. Reaffirming the importance of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, Allies remain committed to *conventional arms control* and to preserving, strengthening and modernizing the conventional arms control regime in Europe, based on key principles and commitments.
30. Allies believe that the Weapons of Mass Destruction Control and Disarmament Committee has played a useful role in the review and agree to establish a committee as a consultative and advisory forum, with its mandate to be agreed by the NAC following the Summit.

VI. CONCLUSIONS – MAINTAINING THE “APPROPRIATE MIX” OF CAPABILITIES

31. The review of NATO’s deterrence and defence posture has confirmed that NATO must have the full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against threats to the safety of its populations and the security of its territory, which is the Alliance’s greatest responsibility. As outlined above, NATO has determined that, in the current circumstances, the existing mix of capabilities and the plans for their development are sound.
32. NATO is committed to maintaining an appropriate mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defence capabilities for deterrence and defence to fulfil its commitments as set out in the Strategic Concept. These capabilities, underpinned by NATO’s integrated Command Structure, offer the strongest guarantee of the Alliance’s security and will ensure that it is able to respond to a variety of challenges and unpredictable contingencies in a highly complex and evolving international security environment. Allies are resolved to developing ways to make their forces more effective by working creatively and adaptively together and with partners as appropriate to maximise value and strengthen interoperability, so that their forces are better able to respond to the full range of 21st century security threats, achieving greater security than any one Ally could attain acting alone.
33. Allies are committed to providing the resources needed to ensure that NATO’s overall deterrence and defence posture remains credible, flexible, resilient, and adaptable, and to implementing the forward-looking package of defence capabilities, which will also be agreed in Chicago. In the course of normal Alliance processes, we will revise relevant Alliance policies and strategies to take into account the principles and judgements in this posture review.
34. NATO will continue to adjust its strategy, including with respect to the capabilities and other measures required for deterrence and defence, in line with trends in the security environment. In this context, Allies will keep under review the consequences for international stability and Euro-Atlantic security of the acquisition of modern military capabilities in the regions and countries beyond NATO’s borders. This posture review confirms that the Alliance is committed to maintaining the deterrence and defence capabilities necessary to ensure its security in an unpredictable world.

APPENDIX C:

Creating the Conditions and Building the Framework for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World

*Middle Powers Initiative Briefing Paper for the Berlin Framework Forum,
February 21-22, 2013*

Dr. John Burroughs

Executive Director, Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy, New York,
UN Office of the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms

Executive Summary

The 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference declared that “*all states need to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons.*” The Framework Forum convened by the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) focuses on implementation of that declaration. It builds on MPI’s successful series of six meetings of the Article VI Forum, which contributed to the deliberations at the 2010 NPT Review Conference on a comprehensive agenda for nuclear disarmament. Since its formation in 1998, MPI, a coalition of eight leading international civil society organizations specializing in nuclear disarmament issues, has worked closely with about 30 key middle power countries. This Briefing Paper for the Berlin meeting of the Framework Forum considers first the question of conditions for a nuclear weapons-free world, and second issues of strategy and process as well as design relating to building the framework of such a world.

Creating the Conditions for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World

In Resolution 1887 of 2009, the United Nations Security Council resolved “to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.” This raises the crucial question: *what*, if any, conditions need to be created?

Views of governments range from an affirmation that conditions already exist, to emphasis on implementation of measures on the NPT agenda, to identification of political prerequisites such as resolution of regional tensions and enhancement of collective security mechanisms. The views are divided in two major ways. One is that some view conditions as nuclear weapons-related measures like the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), a fissile materials treaty, US-Russian reductions, and Additional Protocol that must be put in effect prior to embarking upon elimination. Others reject the notion of conditions of any kind and maintain that a comprehensive approach to elimination can be undertaken now. A second is that the Permanent Five hold that general conditions of security must prevail prior to elimination. In this vein Russia and China further insist upon restraints or bans on missile defences, non-nuclear strike and space-based systems, and other military capabilities.

The step-by-step approach conveys that the cautious and prudent negotiation and implementation of measures can build confidence and engage states over time in a verified and irreversible nuclear disarmament process. However, it underestimates the risks of ongoing reliance on nuclear weapons and the pressures for proliferation arising from that reliance. Moreover, the approach has been in play for half a century now, yet the basic problem of reliance on nuclear weapons still bedevils the world. At present, the approach is encountering serious difficulties.

In the view of the Middle Powers Initiative, a comprehensive approach to nuclear disarmament, involving at least a preparatory process, should therefore be pursued in parallel with work on measures now on the agenda and would stimulate and reinforce progress on those measures. Prevention of the further spread of nuclear weapons would be strengthened by a comprehensive approach. In broad terms, there is a favorable global environment. The world is experiencing a period of relative cooperation among the major military powers coupled with increasing assertion of a role in global governance by countries of the South and the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as by Northern middle powers. Moreover, the demands of global conscience are increasingly being heard; there is a growing unwillingness to tolerate some states' reliance on weapons whose use is palpably inhumane and also contrary to law governing the conduct of warfare.

Regarding the contention that nuclear disarmament is possible only in conditions of general security, such conditions are better viewed as facilitative rather than as absolute, and are considered further below under headings of strategic security, and cooperative and common security. They are to be distinguished from the *criteria* for an achievable and sustainable nuclear weapons-free world: verification, irreversibility, transparency, universality, bindingness in law, and effective governance. The criteria need to be met not only in future agreements; progress toward fulfilling them is taking place or can take place now.

Verification: Many tools exist for effective monitoring and verification, especially with respect to declared warheads, delivery systems, fissile materials and related facilities, and nuclear testing. It remains the case, however, that achieving confidence that arsenals have been reduced and eliminated and a true regime of zero established will be challenging, principally due to the possibility of hidden warheads, stocks of fissile materials, or capabilities. One implication is that transparency measures need to be implemented beginning now.

Irreversibility: The aim is to make arms control measures, and the elimination of nuclear weapons, not sham but effective, so that items subject to arms control and disarmament cannot be employed for rearmament. The principle of irreversibility has been applied to disposal of fissile materials from dismantled warheads, and to delivery systems, which have been verifiably destroyed under US-Soviet/Russian agreements. It has yet to be applied in a verified manner to the dismantlement of warheads. Modernization of nuclear weapons infrastructures for the purpose, declared or unspoken, of making a build-up of nuclear forces possible, circumvents the principle of irreversibility, and strengthens the institutional drivers of continued reliance on nuclear weapons. Also, there is no such thing, in technological terms, as an absolutely irreversible state of zero. The degree of difficulty of regenerating or creating nuclear arsenals will depend greatly, not only on any residual nuclear weapons infrastructure, but also on a country's civilian nuclear power infrastructure, in particular nationally controlled, or controllable, uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities.

Transparency: There is a long way to go to achieve transparency regarding warheads, fissile materials, and delivery systems. A new process that may help remedy this lack is Permanent Five consultations on transparency and other issues at which the P5 have considered proposals for a standard NPT reporting format. Commendably, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative group of governments has developed a draft standard nuclear disarmament reporting form and provided it to the NPT nuclear weapon states.

Universality and bindingness in law: The number of states with binding Additional Protocol agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) amplifying NPT-mandated safeguards obligations has climbed to 119 as of October 2012; however, a number of major countries have not brought such agreements into force. One hundred and fifty-eight states have ratified the CTBT, but it is presently rather far from entering into force due to the eight hold-out Annex 2 states. While there is nearly universal adherence to the NPT, the few non-member states possess nuclear arsenals, posing the problem of universality in stark terms. The participation of India and

Pakistan in the non-proliferation/disarmament regime will have to come through other means, in particular treaties in which the same basic obligations apply to all states. The participation of the DPRK and Israel in the NPT depends on the success of regional processes.

Effective governance: Over the decades and with respect to the vast majority of the world's countries, there is a good record of compliance with the NPT and safeguards agreements and of cooperation with the IAEA. Nonetheless, the IAEA and the Security Council have proved unable so far to induce or compel compliance with non-proliferation norms in several cases. The poor performance with respect to those cases not only fails to address present-day problems of proliferation or potential proliferation, it also engenders skepticism about prospects for moving to a regime of zero in which compliance can be monitored, induced, and enforced as necessary. One possible way to improve the response to proliferation situations would be for NPT states parties to create mechanisms for collective deliberation and action.

Strategic security: If 'strategic stability' means the preservation of 'nuclear deterrence' as practiced since World War II unless and until the weapons are eliminated globally, it is completely unacceptable. Nuclear weapons can be marginalized as instruments of national policy even when still possessed, by changes in doctrines, deployments, alert status, and numbers. It is true that strategic capabilities, nuclear and non-nuclear, must be managed effectively in a disarmament process. Constraints on missile defenses, space-based systems, and non-nuclear strike systems will facilitate, and be stimulated by, nuclear disarmament. Currently, development and deployment of missile defenses and other strategic systems, in combination with ongoing Russian concerns about NATO expansion and US and NATO operations and activities in the Middle East and on Russia's periphery, are undermining prospects for further US-Russian nuclear arms reductions. From the US and NATO side, the question must be asked, are the supposed benefits of deploying missile defenses, developing non-nuclear strike systems, and preserving options for space-based systems worth the cost to prospects for nuclear disarmament?

Cooperative and common security: The concepts of *common security* and *cooperative security* build upon the key insight, arising out of the dilemmas of 'nuclear deterrence,' that a state's security, no matter what means of defense it has at its disposal, can depend crucially upon the security of an adversary. Nuclear disarmament is supported by an approach to security based not on a balance of power calculus but rather on recognition of the necessity of common security, embrace of the non-aggression norm, compliance with international humanitarian law and disarmament obligations, reliance on methods of conflict prevention and dispute resolution, and strengthening of the international rule of law and its foundational institutions, including the United Nations, International Court of Justice, and International Criminal Court. Both regionally and globally it is desirable to reinforce or build means of providing security alternative to that putatively or actually provided by reliance on nuclear weapons. One such means is the creation of new nuclear weapons-free zones, especially in Northeast Asia, the Middle East, and the Arctic. Regional preventive diplomacy, like that practiced during the Cold War in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, is important, for the sake of peace and security generally and to facilitate regional and global disarmament.

Building the Framework for a Nuclear Weapons-Free World

Process and strategy: MPI's view is that the time has come to create a process expressly devoted to establishment of a nuclear weapons-free world, a process that could at least undertake preparatory work. Absent the current support of states possessing nuclear weapons, middle power countries have several options. The launching of a process leading to negotiations on complete nuclear disarmament could be an objective at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, a setting in which non-nuclear weapon states have significant bargaining power.

It is always within the power of the General Assembly to establish a process leading to multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. In 2012, the General Assembly took at least an initial step towards exercising its power by adopting a resolution, sponsored by Austria, Mexico, and Norway, establishing “an open-ended working group to develop proposals to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons.” The working group can make decisions by vote, and could initiate, probably subject to further General Assembly decision, a process of negotiation or deliberation freed from the rigid rule of unanimity followed by the Conference on Disarmament.

The General Assembly also decided, by a resolution sponsored by Indonesia, to convene a high-level meeting as a plenary session of the Assembly, on 26 September 2013, to contribute to achieving the goal of nuclear disarmament. That meeting will present an opportunity for raising the profile of the disarmament enterprise and possibly for launching a new process, an opportunity that should be seized by middle powers as well as by parliamentarians, mayors, and civil society groups.

Middle power countries can also engage in independent courses of action without the immediate support or participation of nuclear possessor states. The regional nuclear-weapon-free zones can deepen coordination among the zones and undertake joint political action. Middle powers can undertake studies and deliberations on the architecture of a nuclear weapons-free world. They can encourage national adoption of measures of non-cooperation with nuclear weapons, such as a policy of divestment in producers of warheads and associated delivery systems; a ban on nationals’ participation in manufacture of warheads and delivery systems; and an obligation to prosecute persons connected to the use of nuclear weapons. They could also support Mexico’s proposal to amend the Rome Statute to make use of nuclear weapons an express war crime. More ambitiously, middle powers could initiate negotiations outside the UN and NPT contexts on a treaty categorically banning use and possession of nuclear weapons.

The underlying problem is one of political will. However challenging it may be to create a process expressly devoted to establishment of a nuclear weapons-free world, such a process is far, far more capable than the step-by-step approach of attracting and engaging global public opinion – a crucial dimension to successful disarmament.

Choices Regarding the Architecture of a Nuclear Weapons-Free World: Three forms of the legal framework for a nuclear weapons-free world deserve examination: 1) a Nuclear Weapons Convention; 2) a framework agreement on nuclear disarmament; and 3) a framework of instruments. A convention would likely incorporate or link to existing instruments. A framework agreement could set forth the obligation of non-use of nuclear weapons and a schedule for their elimination, and provide for further negotiations on matters such as verification, enforcement, and control and disposition of fissile materials. A framework of instruments would tie together agreements and institutions that now exist as well as ones to be created. It has an affinity with the step-by-step approach and does not necessarily imply reliance on a global multilateral agreement.

Another set of choices concerns the institutions needed for governance of a nuclear weapons-free world. There are a range of tasks that will need to be undertaken by the institutions, among them monitoring and verification; conflict prevention, dispute resolution, and crisis management; compliance inducement and enforcement; disarmament education to ensure public and political commitment over time; and assistance to states with implementation. One question is whether a nuclear disarmament verification body needs to be created and, if so, the nature of its relationship to existing agencies and arrangements.

Regarding dispute resolution and compliance inducement and enforcement, a nuclear disarmament agency and its governing body could employ a number of techniques, including mediation, referral to the International Court of Justice, withdrawal of privileges and assistance, and the imposition of economic sanctions. More robust means

of conflict prevention and peaceful crisis management need to be developed. As to the possible use of force to compel compliance, the Security Council is usually put forward as the appropriate body for considering and authorizing such action. However, the Security Council may need to be reformed to be more representative and to limit the exercise of the veto if it is to be accepted as the ultimate enforcement body for a nuclear weapons-free world.

The full report in English is available at: www.middlepowers.org

Nuclear Abolition Forum

Dialogue on the Process to Achieve and Sustain a Nuclear Weapons Free World

PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS | Albert Schweitzer Institute • Global Security Institute • International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms • International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation • International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War • Middle Powers Initiative • Pugwash • World Future Council

EDITORS | John Avery • John Burroughs • David Ives • Xanthe Hall • Jürgen Scheffran • Alyn Ware

CONSULTANTS | Nobuyasu Abe • Mani Shankar Aiyar • Ian Anthony • Wolfgang Bierman • Phon van den Biesen • Barry Blechman • Adele Buckley • Lyndon Burford • Jacqueline Cabasso • Malcolm Chalmers • Wook-Sik Cheong • Roger Clark • David Cortright • Tarja Cronberg • Tad Daley • Walter Dorn • Hans-Peter Dürr • Nina Eisenhardt • Gareth Evans • Richard Falk • Anwar Fazal • Marc Finaud • Christopher A. Ford • Mayra Gomez • Jonathan Granoff • Rob Green • Nicholas Grief • Regina Hagen • Ira Helfand • Rebecca Johnson • Martin Kalinowski • Togzhan Kassenova • Akira Kawasaki • Daryl Kimball • David Krieger • Mitsuru Kurosawa • Wolfgang Liebert • Sverre Lodgaard • John Loretz • Siddharth Mallavarpu • Paul Meyer • Keiko Nakamura • A. H. Nayyar • Andreas Persbo • Pavel Podvig • Ernie Regehr • Nick Ritchie • Douglas Roche • Tilman A. Ruff • Henrik Salander • Manpreet Sethi • Meena Singelee • Victor Sidel • Jennifer Simons • Erika Simpson • Alice Slater • Susi Snyder • Nikolai Sokov • Murray Thomson • Aaron Tovish • Hiromichi Umebayashi • Kenji Urata • Cindy Vestergaard • C.G. Weeramantry • Gunnar Westberg • Ward Wilson • Tim Wright • Jean-Pascal Zanders

DIRECTOR | Rob van Riet





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Sustain a Nuclear Weapons Free World**

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a Nuclear Weapons Free World

C/o World Future Council

100 Pall Mall, SW1Y 5NQ

London, United Kingdom

Tel.: +44 (0) 20 7321 3810

Fax: +44 (0) 20 7321 3738

Email: rob.vanriet@worldfuturecouncil.org

abolitionforum.org